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ABSTRACT

MODAL PROPOSITIONS IN ARISTOTLE'S SYLLOGISTIC
SEPTEMBER 1997

ADRIANE

A.

RINI

,

A.B., SMITH COLLEGE

Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Directed by: Professor Gareth

B.

Matthews

The dissertation is an investigation into the structure of

Aristotle's modal propositions through careful attention to
the text of the Prior Analytics

I

take account not only of

recent attempts to formalize Aristotle's modal syllogistic
but also of the discussion that Aristotle himself provides

about modal statements.

I

provide evidence that his modal

propositions are to be construed in a de re manner and then
go on to investigate the problems raised by a de re

analysis, particularly those problems concerned with

Arisototle's modal conversion principles. A large part of my
project is to show that these can be given a valid de re
analysis that sits well with the results Aristotle sketches.
Terms in modal syllogistic premises are shown to be

restricted in ways that reflect Aristotle's early

metaphysics and notions of predication.
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INTRODUCTION

In Chapters A8-22 of the Prior Analytics

Aristotle

investigates syllogisms involving modally
gualified
premises. This

modal syllogistic' has been getting bad

reviews ever since Aristotle wrote it. Of
Aristotle's recent
critics Jaakko Hintikka and Albrecht Becker are
among the
harshest, and much of the recent literature is
an attempt to

answer their evaluations of the troubles there.
Hintikka
regards the errors in the modal syllogistic as so great
that
he doubts it is even possible to give a formal
model for

Aristotle

s

logic at all.

Aristotle is just

a^ording

Becker suggests that maybe

confused.

The source of the confusion

'

to both Becker and Hintikka lies in Aristotle's

failure to distinguish between what nowadays we call de
d±^t^j and de re modality.

De dicto and de re do not mean the

same thing, and there is no way of reducing one to the
other. The thrust of Becker and Hintikka's criticism is that
by conflating the two Aristotle sets out a modal logic that
is

simply and blatantly inconsistent.
In the past several years Aristotle's modal syllogistic

has been getting more sympathetic criticism as several

scholars reject Becker and Hintikka's charges of

inconsistency and instead seek

reconstructions' that

validate the syllogisms Aristotle claims are valid. These

reconstructions vary enormously. Some do little more than

axiomatize the syllogistic and stop short of offering any
1

kind of interpretation of Aristotle's modal
propositions. Of
those that do offer interpretations of the modal

propositions, most advocate de re modals as the proper
logical representation of what Aristotle must mean. Some
try
a

combination of de dicto and de re operators together with

detailed explanations of how such combinations might not
lead to inconsistency. Still others emphasize the

inappropriateness of such modern devices as the de dicto /de
re distinction to the peculiar matter of Aristotle's logic

and then devise their own allegedly appropriate tools.
Not just the number but also the variety of

interpretations are a not-so-subtle hint that this is

complicated stuff. Certainly anyone studying Aristotle's
modal syllogistic faces serious interpretive difficulties.

Perhaps the biggest single cause of them has to do with the
fact that Aristotle seems to use his modal idioms loosely.
In the course of this study

I

will consider Aristotle's

modal idioms generally, but initially it will help to single
out just a few of his expressions and look at the

difficulties they raise for the interpreter. Consider, for
instance, the following propositions:

(i)

(ii)

A belongs to every B of necessity, and
It is necessary for A to belong to every B.

Aristotle uses expressions like these as examples of what he
calls necessary universal affirmative premises, and that

2

:

suggests that perhaps for Aristotle

(i)

and (ii) might mean

the same thing. But when we consider the
surface form of

these expressions, it looks as though (i) is a
good

candidate for de re necessity, and (ii) for de dicto

.

That

suggests that (i) and (ii) might not mean the same thing.
The surface form is similar in Greek. A good example of

Aristotle's two ways of expressing necessity comes
at 25a32-33

e -£ de ex anankes to A panti e tini toi B huparchei
to B tini toi A ananke huparchein

,

kai

.

It will be part of my project to show why the surface

form of such propositions is sometimes an unreliable guide
to the proper logical representation of Aristotle's modal

premises. This fact has been recognized by many though few

attempt to explain it. Becker and Hintikka do try to
explain, but their results lead inevitably to the charge of

inconsistency.

I

want to draw attention to the precise

nature of this charge. If Becker and Hintikka are right that

Aristotle's logic conflates the modern notions of de dicto
and de re modality, then we should be able to find evidence
of this in the text.
it is there.

I

am less convinced than they are that

One of my aims will be to examine the extent to

which the text supports the charge of inconsistency since
this has so greatly shaped much of the discussion.

3

The problems at issue here are easy to see
in the case
of the apodeictic syllogistic -- that is,
that portion of

Aristotle's logic devoted to syllogisms from necessary
premises. It is generally agreed now that a de re

interpretation is right for the apodeictic syllogisms. A de
re interpretation validates those syllogisms
Aristotle

counts as valid, while a de dicto interpretation gets them
wrong. But while the syllogisms themselves appear to involve
de re modals, Aristotle's 'proofs'

often require

of these very syllogisms

conversion principles' which appear to make

sense only on a de dicto interpretation. If both de dicto
and de re modals are required in this way, then Becker and

Hintikka are right -- Aristotle must be confused. What

I

want to do here is look carefully at the text to see whether
there is any evidence indicating that modal conversion must

ever be given a de dicto analysis.

Whether or not we can give de dicto or de re
conversions depends upon the basic internal structure of

Aristotle's modal premises (modal propositions)

.

I

will

focus specifically on the controversy about determining what
is the proper representation of the internal structure of

Aristotle's modal propositions. My concern is over whether
we can give a precise and coherent analysis of the structure
of these propositions.
can,

I

think that to a large extent we

and in showing how, it becomes apparent how clear some

4

of Aristotle's insights really are. These
insights

inevitably link with Aristotle's notions about
predication

developed more fully in his other logical works.
Some scholars, like Storrs McCall, suggest that a
good

understanding of the modal syllogistic can be had without an
analysis of the structure of modal premises. The question
then is not about how to analyse Aristotle's modal premises
but about whether to at all. McCall argues against basing
any proofs in the modal syllogistic on principles belonging
to what he calls "the modal logic of propositions"
1963, p.

[McCall,

32]. And so McCall does not offer any workable

interpretations of these premises; he leaves them ambiguous.

McCall's axiomatic method, though it leaves the
premises unanalyzed, does provide

a

workable representation

of the modal syllogistic. Because it is so workable it has

become the preferred representation today, and contemporary
logicians interested in Aristotelian logic have shown that
it can be a valuable tool.

Fred Johnson and S.K. Thomason

each take McCall's representation as their starting point
and develop a semantics for it.

While McCall's method has stimulated recent scholarship
and lead to a renewed interest in ancient logic, McCall's

reconstruction leaves unanswered some important interpretive
questions. Chief among them remains the question posed by

Becker and Hintikka about whether Aristotle's modal premises
can be given a uniform analysis with respect to the modern

5

.

de dicto/de re distinction. Answering
this requires finer

distinctions than we can make if we leave the modal

propositions unanalysed. And, so, because it does leave
them
unanalyzed, McCall's representation of modal premises
is
ill-suited to the questions

I

want to try to answer about

the inner structure of these premises. For this reason

will try,

I

instead, to find modal LPC-translations

Some people argue against the sorts of modal LPC-

translations that

I

give here. The first point against my

translations has to do with the fact that in LPC

a

proposition of the form Vx(Bx-»Ax) is true even when there
are no B's. Aristotle's logic, on the other hand,

presupposes the existence of at least some B's. So from the
very outset there is a difference between the two logics.
But all that is needed to accommodate this difference is a

general restriction on LPC-interpretations to the effect
that no terms are empty. So, Vx(Bx->Ax) when offered as an

interpretation of Aristotle should really be understood as

presupposing the existence of some B's. An additional
restriction on LPC-interpretations helps when constructing
intuitive counter-examples in the syl logisitic

.

In addition

to having no terms empty, neither do any terms exhaust the

universe. The first restriction guarantees that for any term
B we pick,

Bx true.

there will always be some individual that makes

The second restriction guarantees that there is no

single term which applies to everything. So, for instance.
6

there is nothing like a separate existence predicate
in the

syllogistic. In a situation involving only two individuals
and d, and two predicates A and

B,

c

generally it helps to

think of each predicate holding of one and only one
individual. These restrictions are themselves not modal

qualifications. They apply equally to non-modal and modal

propositions in Aristotle's syllogistic.
There are also complaints against translating into LPC
that are specifically modal. First, taking Vx(Bx-»LAx) as a

reading of Aristotle's necessary universal affirmative

premise makes the predicate LA end up behaving like a 'modal
term.

Some scholars want very much to avoid treating

1

necessar i ly-A

'

as a term.

For example, William and Martha

Kneale [1961] argue against it on the grounds that it makes
the modal operators appear trivial. Reading Aristotle with

modal terms makes Vx(Bx->LAx) just a special instance of
Vx(Bx-»Ax).

The Kneales think that is implausible and are

quick to discount such readings. They think this argues in
favor of a de dicto analysis of modals.
and de dicto interpretations is one

I

1

The issue of de re

will take up.

I

will

argue that a de dicto analysis does not in fact solve the

interpretive problems in the modal syllogistic.

Another feature of my analysis that is likely to
attract criticism is my preference for using standard modal

]

I

Chapter

discuss their argument in section 4.3 and again in
9.
7

logic, and even occassional
ly possible worlds, to talk about

Aristotle's modal notions. Many authors prefer to
use purely
extensional set theory to represent Aristotle's logic.
Johnson and Thomason develop
for Aristotle,

necessary-non-A

a

purely extensional semantics

invoking extensions of A's, necessary-A
'

s

.

*

s

and

Paul Thom commends their project:

One has to regard this kind of semantical analysis
of the modal syllogistic as particularly
appropriate if one thinks that Aristotelian
metaphysics are in any way implicit in that
syllogistic.
But he adds to this a warning about the importance of

avoiding possible worlds:
For, Aristotle's metaphysic envisages a single
world. True, in that world there is a fundamental
difference bewteen some sets (the Aristotelian
Kinds) and others. But this difference is not, to
Aristotle's mind, explained by any consideration
of what is the case in other worlds. It is a
primitive difference which fundamentally
structures this world -- Nature.

[Thom,

I

1996, p.

5]

agree with what he says, and my use of possible worlds

will be confined to interpreting the modal LPC-propositions
that

I

use to represent Aristotle's modal propositions. The

issue isn't whether or not Aristotle has in mind anything
like possible worlds. The issue is how we might represent

what Aristotle is doing. Possible worlds sometimes provide
an effective means for doing this. The matter isn't an

important one, since modal operators in the syllogistic are
8

only operators on single terms. For example,
the necessary
s are just the essential-^ s
4)
What is important
'

.

is that

the extensional semantics reflects a de re
analysis of

modal terms.

9

CHAPTER

1

THE NON-MODAL BASE

1

•

Categorical Sentences

1

In order to examine what Aristotle is doing in
the

modal case, it is necessary first to understand the nonmodal syllogistic. Traditionally, commentators use the

vowels A,

E,

I,

and 0 to represent Aristotle's four types of

categorical sentences:
Aba
Eba

'A
'A
'A
'A

Iba

Oba

belongs to all B'
belongs to no B
belongs to some B'
does not belong to some
'

B'

(A)
(E)
(I)
(0)

Where there are no modal operators involved, Aristotle's

propositions can be easily understood by translating them
into LPC:

Aba
Eba
Iba
Oba

:

:

:

:

Vx
~3x
3x
~Vx

(Bx -» Ax)
(Bx & Ax)
(Bx & Ax)
(Bx -» Ax)

where it is assumed no terms are empty or exhaust the
universe. One difference that should be noted is that where,
for example, we say "every B is an A,

belongs to all

B'

'

Aristotle says "A

or "A is predicated of every B.'

(See for

example 24b27-30, 25b37-40.)
One reason for preferring the LPC-translat ions to the
A E
,

,

I

,

0 notation arises with the addition of the modal

10

operators. In considering a modal sentence like Aristotle's
A belongs to every B of n cs-esiSi
ai.c

i.y ,

z.5a32

it seems there

,

two quite different ways of formalizing it in modal LPC.

The A,E,_l,0 notation, on the other hand, masks any

difference. With

L

for the necessity operator,

is the de dicto reading,

re,

LVx(Bx->Ax),

in LPC there

and there is the de

Vx(Bx-»LAx).

The fact that Aristotle himself doesn't make explicit

any such distinction makes some scholars wary of applying
the distinction to the modal syllogisti

^

r*

1

p.fU

piJU j.
1

T V>
^
iiC
1

.

i.

Ai

i.

T

IT
f

I

_i_

C\
I

notation gives a convenient way to schematise Arist
logic without having to distinguish between the different

modal notions. But representing a 'necessary universal
affirmative' as LAba doesn't leave us any closer to

understanding what Aristotle really means. If what we want
is to try to see what Aristotle means,

then we need to dig

deeper than the A,E,I,0 notation allows.

1

.

2

The Perfect Syllogisms

Aristotle assumes some syllogisms as axiomatic, or
'complete,' 24b23, and derives others from them.

2

The

complete deductions are the four moods of the first figure,

traditionally known as Barbara, Celarent, Darii, and Ferio.

Corcoran and Smiley disagree with this description.
They see the syllogistic as a system of natural deduction,
not an axiomatic system as I assume here. I address their
concerns later in this section.
2

11

o

)

Aristotle explains that the first figure is
complete because
it
stands in need of nothing else besides the things
[terms] taken in order for the necessity to be
evident,"

24b23-24

m

.

Consider his description of how terms are ordered

the first-figure moods Barbara and Celarent:

Whenever, then, three terms are so related to each
other that the last is in the middle as a whole
and the middle is either in or not in the first as
a whole, it is necessary for there to be a
complete deduction of the extremes. (I call that
the middle which both is itself in another and has
^^other in it
this is also middle in position
-- and call both that which is itself in
another
and that which has another in it extremes.)
25b32-38
(

We might give a more general picture of the first-figure

connections between the terms, where A is the major extreme,
B

is the middle term,

and C the minor extreme:
A

-»

B

C

Taking the term to the right of an arrow as the subject of

a

premise and the term to the left as the predicate, then we
can relate the subject C to the predicate A. The picture

then is one of simple transitivity. As Gunther Patzig [1968]

interprets Aristotle, it is this feature that makes the

Aristotle uses 'necessity' here to indicate the
necessity of the connection between the premises and
conclusion. This is not the same as either the de dicto or
de re necessity that I'm interested in here. What I am
interested in is the kind of necessity that features in
necessary propositions
3

.

12

]

.

first figure complete -- it needs no other
justification.
Each of the first-figure moods follows this
schema, but what
differs among them is the way each combines
different

premise types

—

the A,E,I,0's.

The first combination Aristotle considers is
Barbara.

This is what we get when both premises are universal

affirmatives:
C,

"if A is predicated of every B and B of every

it is necessary for A to be predicated of every
C,"

25b38-40

Precisely how to represent this is a matter of some
controversy. Several scholars follow the example set by Jan

Lukasiewicz [1957] who insists that the syllogisms be
represented as single conditional propositions. As
Lukas i ewi cz argues against the traditional representations:
It must be said emphatically that no syllogism is
formulated by Aristotle as an inference with the
word 'therefore' (ara), as is done in the
traditional logic. Syllogisms of the form:

All B is A;
All C is B;
therefore
all C is A

are not Aristotelian.

[Lukasiewicz, 1957, p.

21

4

Forms like this, Lukasiewicz says, are a later invention and
not Aristotle's own. Lukasiewicz thinks Aristotelian

syllogisms are implications of the form 'if a and

B,

Austin suggests some evidence to the contrary. His
ii, 16.
lone example is from the Posterior Analytics
4

,

13

then y,

where a and B are the premises and
y is the
conclusion, and where the syllogism as a whole
is
'

just a

single proposition. So following Lukasiewicz,
and

translating into LPC, we can represent Barbara
as
(1)

I.

[

M.

Vx Bx-»Ax
(

)

& Vx ( Cx-*Bx

)

]

->

Vx(Cx->Ax).

Bochenski [1951] and Patzig [1968] both follow

Lukasiewicz, preferring to represent the syllogisms as

conditional propositions. Storrs McCall claims to harbor
some misgivings about representing the syllogisms in this

way [McCall, 1963,

p.

6].

But his reservations,

it appears,

are not strong enough to warrant a change, for McCall uses

conditional propositions to represent the syllogisms

throughout his text.
Several philosophers have plenty more than misgivings
about the matter and so levy some strong criticism against

Lukasiewicz on this point. Among these critics are Smiley,
Corcoran, Smith, and Prior. Corcoran favors representing

Aristotle's whole syllogistic as a system of natural
deduction, so that rather than setting out the various

syllogisms as single propositions, Corcoran regards them as
simple deductions. Prior, too, is critical of Lukasiewicz
and points out the need to distinguish Aristotle's meta-

theory from the syllogisms themselves. Prior thinks that
what are needed are "not propositions but implicative

propositional forms, corresponding to the inferential
14

forms

[Prior,

1955, p.

117]. Robin Smith,

commending

Corcoran's method of representation, explains that
one of
its pr inicple virtues comes from the fact that
taking the

syllogisms as deductions works well where constucting a
formal model is our objective [Smith, 1989, p. xvii].
For my purposes here the style of representation

doesn't matter at all. Nevertheless, and with a nod to
Prior's very legitimate concerns, one way to handily sidestep the question is this: let's say an Aristotelian

syllogism is an inference with two premises, a and
conclusion, y. If it is stated as a

->

(B

->

y)

,

B,

and a

then,

provided we are allowed Modus Ponens -- the rule not the
formula"

5

-- then any conditional will license the

corresponding inference. So perhaps it doesn't matter
whether we interpret Aristotle as talking about conditionals
or inferences. This, of course,

is taking Modus Ponens as

part of Aristotle's background meta-theory, but

I

think this

5

Lewis Carroll, in "What the Tortoise Said to
Achilles," [1895] pokes fun at the trouble that comes from
confusing these two. The Tortoise challenges Achilles to
reach the end of a logical race-course that begins with a
The race runs something like
'Hypothetical Proposition.'
this: suppose that we have proved a and a -> B, for some
particular formulae a and B, then we want to conclude that B
must also be true. Achilles is ready to race immediately to
this conclusion, but the Tortoise points out Achilles is too
quick and really not very shrewed. The Tortoise won't yet
First Achilles must prove
accept that B must be true.
{(a & (a -* B)) & [(a & a -> B ) ) -> 6]} -> B
The point is
...and so on with many millions more to come!
really that a valid formula is never a rule.
(

15

.

assumption is by no means far-fetched. Aristotle
simply does
not formalize all details of his meta-logic.
6

Whether to represent the syllogistic as an
axiomatic
system or as a system of natural deduction is not
a question
of which logic is right -- they are equivalent.
It is
a

question of what exactly we take Aristotle to be setting
out
in the Prior Analytics
As my project here is to give a good
.

analysis of the inner structure of modal premises, then

whether we take the syllogistic as an axiomatic system or as
natural deduction, my results should hold in either case.
The issue would become an important one if,

like Corcoran

and Jonathan Lear [1980], we were concerned to show that the

syllogistic is complete and self-contained
didn't assume as

I

—

that is,

if we

do here that Aristotle, although

reasoning in accordance with valid principles of

propositional logic, need not always make those principles
explicit. Corcoran argues that Aristotle's syllogistic is

"fundamental in the sense that it presupposes no other
logic, not even propositional logic"

[Corcoran,

1974b, pp

92-93, author's italics]. 7 As Corcoran tells it, the

assumption that it does has grave and entirely unacceptable

0ther methods Aristotle uses but does not formalize
are proof by ekthesis and proof by contraposition.
6

Both Corcoran and Lear require considerable
interpretive work in order to get their completeness proofs.
This raises questions beyond those I am able to deal with
here. Most important among them is whether there really is
enough textual support for their claims.
7

16

.

consequences: if it is right and Aristotle
does presuppose
some more basic logical principles, "then,"
Corcoran
insists,
logic"

"Aristotle cannot be regarded as the founder of

[1974b, p.

98].

Instead,

it seems,

Aristotle would

just be a nice old man with an axiomatic theory
of

universals
Corcoran's worry here seems to me to be too extreme;

I

do not share his view that this might affect Aristotle's

reputation. But there is a real philosophical issue that has
to do with how the syllogistic relates to Aristotle's

project in the Posterior Analytics. And Corcoran,
correctly,

I

think

is concerned to treat the Analytics as a unified

whole in which the syllogistic represents Aristotle's
efforts to make explicit the logic underlying the scientific

knowledge that is the topic of the Posterior Analytics

.

But

that we need to go to such extremes as Corcoran to achieve
this is not at all clear to me.
For these reasons

Lukasiewicz in that

I

I

am inclined to side with

think that Aristotle does assume

certain principles of logic. This will be an important
point. But the style of notation is not important, and so,

simply for ease of exposition, where Aristotle describes
Barbara,

"if A is predicated of every B and B of every C,

is necessary for A to be predicated of every C,"

express it as

17

I

will

it

)

(

2

Vx (Bx
Vx ( Cx
Vx ( Cx

)

->
-4

Ax)
Bx
Ax
)

.

In Aristotle’s terminology,

A is the major term,

and the

premise containing the major term is the major
premise. C is
the minor term, and the premise containing
the minor term is
the minor premise. Here, in Barbara both the
major and
the

minor premises are of the traditional A-type, which
is to
say,

they are both universal affirmative.
The other first-figure moods come about when the

premise-types are changed. We get Celarent when the first or
major premise is a universal privative and the minor premise
is a universal affirmative:
B of

every

25b32-26a2

C,
.

"if A is predicated of no B and

it is necessary that A will belong to no C,

Darii and Ferio, the other first-figure moods,

illustrate the same transitivity exhibited by Barbara and
Celarent, but where Barbara and Celarent show that a

universal conclusion follows from two universal premises,
Darii and Ferio illustrate transitivity holds when one

premise is particular and the other universal. But whenever
one premise is particular, only a particular conclusion (an
or an 0

I

1

.

3

)

will follow.

Non-Modal Conversion

Among the principles used getting from first-figure
axioms to the theorems are the principles of 'conversion.'
One of the chief difficulties in Aristotle's modal
18

syllogistic involves his use of modal
conversions.

Aristotle's description of the modal conversions
is
analogous to his non-modal conversions, and

for that reason

shall describe first his use of conversion
rules in the
non-modal cases. These are agreed to be relatively
I

unproblematic. Aristotle discusses conversion for
non-modal
cases explicitly in Chapter A2 Both types of
universal
.

statement -- that is, privative and affirmative universals
convert.

"The [universal] positive premise necessarily

converts, though not universally but in part. For instance,
if every pleasure is a good,

then some good will be a

pleasure," 25a7-9. In LPC we can understand this as
(3)

Vx(Bx->Ax)

3x ( Ax&Bx

-»

)

.

This LPC interpretation fits well with Aristotle's

explanation, for as he continues,

"if A belongs to every B,

then B will belong to some A," 25al7-18.

Similarly,

"it is necessary for a universal privative

premise of belonging to convert with respect to its terms,"
25a6-7.

(4)

In LPC we represent this as

~3x( Ax&Bx)

-*

~3x(Bx&Ax).

While both kinds of universal -- privative and

affirmative -- convert, only one kind of particular
statement does. If

a

premise is particular and affirmative,

then the terms must 'convert partially.'
19

"If A belongs to

some of the B

s,

then necessarily B belongs to some of the

A's," 25a20-21.

(5)

3x ( Bx&Ax

)

->

3x Ax&Bx
(

)

.

A conver s i on is a 1 way s possible with a particular

affirmative premise, but not with

a

particular privative.

Aristotle provides an example of a particular privative
statement that does not convert: if man does not belong to
some animal, then we cannot validly conclude that animal
will not belong to some man, 25al2-13. We cannot because

animal does belong to every man,

i.e.,

every man is also an

animal. So, there can be no conversion rule for

particular privatives.
The conversion principles given as

(

3

)

—

(

5

)

are among

the tools Aristotle uses to get from his first-figure axioms
to proofs of the validity of other moods in other figures.

Aristotle claims in Chapter A3 that the conversion rules
hold in the modal cases as well.

"It will also be the same

way in the case of necessary premises: the universally

privative premise converts universally, while each kind of

affirmative premise converts partially," 25a27-29.
The details of modal conversion require closer

examination. In the non-modal syllogistic, tools like

conversion get us from the first-figure axioms to the second
and third figures; modal conversion works the same for

Aristotle, allowing him to derive many other (valid) modal
20

deductions. For this reason, some commentators
have thought
that the modal syllogistic can be studied
in a purely

axiomatic way

that is, not by translating into LPC, but

by representing the modal premises in the
(uninterpreted)

A,E,I,0 notation.
Storrs McCall approaches it this way and is able
to

provide an axiom system that McCall claims gets Aristotle's
modal syllogisms exactly right [McCall, 1963,
p. 49],

McCall's approach takes its cue from Nicholas Rescher's.
Both try to interpret Aristotle by constructing a system
that takes the major premise as providing a
the minor premise as a
of this so-called

special case.

'

general rule'
One disadvantage

intuitive' approach is that there is very

little evidence in the Prior Analytics to suggest that this
is at all what Aristotle has in mind. McCall's end results

might match Aristotle's own, but the devices McCall relies
on are not clearly Aristotle's. Hintikka has harsh criticism
of McCall on that point and notes that McCall "fails to

provide a single reference to Aristotle's actual discussion
of modal syllogisms to back [his theory] up"

1973, p.

[Hintikka,

146]. Nevertheless, part of McCall's claim is,

I

think, pretty clearly correct -- his results are all the

ones Aristotle wants and none of the ones he doesn't. Still,

McCall's exactness leaves open some of the same questions we
have with Aristotle and leaves us still trying to understand

why Aristotle says what he does in the modal case.
21

Unanalysed premises pose little problem
in the non-modal
case, but the introduction of the
models creates

ambiguities. The problem as

I

see it is to try to gain an

understanding of the modal syllogistic, and
this reguires
that we delve deeper and consider what
exactly Aristotle
means by his modal premises. It would be good
to see whether
we can use modal LPC to represent the meanings
Aristotle
could possibly intend.

22
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CHAPTER

2

DE RE LI -CONVERSION

2

•

1

The First-Figure Modal BasP

Throughout this study

I

will refer to non-modal,

assertonc premises as X-premises. A syllogism involving
only X-premises is then an XXX syllogism. The
third X

indicates that the conclusion is also an X-proposition

.

I

will call premises about necessity (or apodeictic
premises)

L-premises. An LLL syllogism then is a syllogism with two

L-premises and an L-conclusions

Aristotle doesn't offer any explanation of the LLL
syllogisms. He treats them as basic axioms in his logic and

merely stipulates (in Chapter A8

)

that they work just the

same as the assertoric syllogisms do:
In the case of necessary premises, then, the
situation is almost the same as with premises of
belonging: that is, there either will or will not
be a deduction with the terms put in the same way,
both in the case of belonging and in the case of
not belonging of necessity, except that they will
differ in the addition of 'belonging (or not
belonging) of necessity' to the terms,
29b36-30al
(

)

If the only difference between assertoric premises and

necessary premises comes from the addition of 'belonging of
necessity' to the terms, then it does look as though

Aristotle might well mean what we call de re. This passage,
29b36-30al,

is often cited as evidence that,

here, at least,

,

Aristotle is pretty clearly not thinking
of de
dicto necessity.
Still,

it is worth noting that when given
a de dicto

interpretation all of the LLL syllogisms are (trivially)
valid: if the XXX syllogisms are valid, the de dicto

LLL

syllogisms will be too since if (a & B)

trivially so is (La & LB)

->

->

y is valid,

then

Ly.

In addition to the LLL syllogisms, Aristotle
counts a

number of

mixed modal' syllogisms as valid. A syllogism is

called mixed when one premise has a modal qualifier and the
other premise has either no modal or a different one. So,
for example, an LX premise-combination 'mixes'

qualified L-premise with

a

a

modally

non-modal X-premise. Aristotle

considers several such combinations that he thinks can yield

L-conclusions

1

.

Among those Aristotle says are valid are all

of the first-figure LXL syllogisms: Barbara LXL

,

Darii LXL

Celarent LXL, and Ferio LXL. These seem to require

a de

re interpretation.

On a de re interpretation the first-figure LXL

syllogisms appear to be just special cases of the assertoric

first-figure syllogisms. An illustration will help

(XXX)

make this clear:

His student Theophrastus vehemently disagrees,
insisting that the conclusion can never be 'stronger' than
either premise, i.e., that an L-conclusion can never follow
from an X-premise.
J
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Aristotle's first-figure syllogisms have a basic
structure that we can represent as
B A
C B
C A

where the term on the left gives the subject and the term on
the right

,

the predicate. So on a de re analysis that

attaches the modal operator to the predicate, a necessary

premise relating, for example, the subject

B to the

predicate A will have the form
B LA.

A premise with that form still fits the structure of a

first-figure syllogism. In Aristotle's terminology the

A-term in the argument scheme above is the 'major term.

'

The

major term is the one that gives the predicate of the

syllogism's conclusion. If that term is modally qualified,
then the structure of the first-figure dictates that the

predicate of the conclusion will be similarly qualified. So,
for example:

B LA
B
C
C LA

The principle at work here is Uniform Substitution. We can

uniformly substitute a modally qualified predicate for
non-modal one and preserve validity.
25

a

)

)

)

)

'

)

)

Each of the LXL first-figure syllogisms can
be gotten
this way. We get Barbara LXL and Darii LXL
by Uniform

m

Substitution of LA for A:
Barbara LXL

Darii LXL
Vx Bx-*LAx
lx(Cx&Bx)
3x Cx&LAx

Vx Bx->LAx
(

(

Yx Cx-»Bx
(

Vx ( Cx->LAx

(

And we get Celarent LXL and Ferio LXL by Uniform

Substitution of L~A for

A.

2

Celarent LXL
Vx( Bx-»L ~ Ax

Ferio LXL
Vx Bx->L~Ax
5 x Cx&Bx
3x ( Cx&L~Ax
(

Vx Cx-»Bx
Vx Cx-»L~Ax
(

(

(

Uniform Substitution is validity preserving, so since the
XXX syllogisms are valid, then on this analysis all the

first-figure LXL syllogisms come out valid too. These modal
LPC translations also seem not a bad fit for Aristotle's

descriptions of these syllogisms in A9
LXL at 30al7-23

,

:

Barbara and Celarent

and Darii and Ferio LXL at 30a37-b2.

A note about LE- and LO-premises: there is a serious
question about how to represent premises of these sorts in
modal LPC. Just looking at the surface form of an LE-premise
"A belongs of necessity to no [B]
(31a36) might suggest
that we can represent that as ~3x(Bx&LAx). Later in Chapter
4, I explain why that is not what Aristotle means by a
universal necessary privative LE premise, but at this
stage I will use the right representation which is
Vx Bx->L~Ax
This makes the form of a particular necessary
privative (LO) premise lx(Bx&L~Ax). And so where we want to
get privative LXL syllogisms from XXX syllogisms, we can
substitute L~A for A.
7

(

(

)

.
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)

Not one of these LXL syllogisms
comes out valid when

the modals are interpreted de dicto. De
dicto Barbara LXL

would be:
Barbara LXL
LVx Bx-*Ax
_ Vx Cx-»Bx
(

(

LVx(Cx-^Ax)

Consider an instance of this de dicto Barbara.
Assume that
everyone who is a resident of Amherst is a bachelor.
(All bachelors are unmarried)
Ail residents of Amherst are bachelors
L (All residents of Amherst are unmarried)
L

The premises are true, but the conclusion is false.

There is also

a

convenient formal way of giving a

falsifying model to illustrate the invalidity

J

3
.

Assume two

In the case of the assertoric syllogisms only a oneworld model is needed, but in the modal cases we need two
worlds. If the modal operators are not completely trivial,
they must make a difference between the valid XXX syllogisms
and the invalid mixed modal LXL and XLL syllogisms. In oneworld models the modal syllogisms would collapse into nonmodal syllogisms and the modal operators would be completely
trivial. So where modals are involved we need to assume at
least a two-world model.
It is generally assumed that in Aristotle's logic no
terms are empty or exhaust the universe. The restriction
that no terms are empty guarantees that every term is true
of at least on thing. The restriction that no terms exhaust
the universe guarantees that in no world is everything A or
everything B or everything C -- i.e., something must be notA, something must be not-B, something must be not-C. So, for
example, in a universe of two individuals a and b, for each
of Aristotle's terms A, B and C, either a or b is true but
not both a and b are true.
27

)

worlds,

and w

w,

(the actual world) and w 2

and let

,

w,

see itself

The falsifying model is as follows:

2 .

Barbara LXL
LVx ( Bx-»Ax
Yx Cx-»Bx
(

)

LVx(Cx-^Ax)

w
VA

i :
:

Aa,
Ab,

Ba,
Bb,

Ca (and ~Ab,
Ca (and ~Aa,

~Bb,
~Ba,

~Cb)
~Cb)

I'll ex Plain how to contruct the model. Since the
first

premise in Barbara involves de dicto necessity, it has to
be
true that

all B's are A'

s'

in every world that w

So it has to be true in w 1# because w

has to be true in w

because w

2

First look at the situation in
are A’

s'

true in w

:

can see.

sees itself. And it

x

sees w

x

:

2 .

w,

.

We can make 'all B's

by making both Ba and Aa true in w

x

.

To

make the second premise 'all C’s are B's' true in w w Ca
will have to be true. So in w

x

it is true that all C's

are A's.
Next,

look at w

all B's are A's.

'

2 .

The first premise requires that in w

So let Ab and Bb be true in w

2

.

The

second premise is a premise about the actual world (w
it's already true, because in

Wj,

2

a

),

so

all C's are B's. Since the

second premise has no modal force, it doesn't dictate the

value of C in w

2 .

And this leaves open the possibility of a

false conclusion: Ca might be true in w
C's are A's'

is false in w 2

.

So,

28

2 ,

in which case 'all

de dicto Barbara LXL has

)

)

)

)

)

:

all true premises, but the conclusion
L (All C's are A's) is
false, because it is false in w
2 .

Similarly, each of the other first-figure
LXL

syllogisms can be shown to be invalid interpreted de
dicto
Darii LXL
LVx Bx->Ax
ix(Cx&Bx)
L3x Cx&Ax

Celarent LXL
LVx Bx->~Ax
Yx ( Cx->Bx
LVx Cx-+~Ax

(

(

(

(

wl: Aa, Ba, Ca
w2
Ab Bb Ca
:

,

,

wl: Ab,Ba,Ca
w2
Ab,Ba,Cb
:

Ferio LXL
LVx( Bx->~Ax
3 x ( Cx&Bx
L ix ( Cx&~Ax

wl
w2

:

:

)

Ab,Ba,Ca
Ab Ba Cb
,

,

This at least gives a presumption that in the cases of
the

first-figure LXL syllogisms Aristotle might be thinking of
de re modality.

All of the LLL syllogisms come out valid on the de

dicto analysis, but these too come out valid when

interpreted de re. Consider again the passage at 29b36-30al,
where Aristotle asserts that the difference between the

assertoric and the apodeictic syllogisms comes from the
addition of

belonging of necessity' to the terms. This is

his explanation of why LLL syllogisms are valid. But then

Aristotle is describing more here than just the substitution
we need to license the move, for instance, from Barbara XXX
to Barbara LXL,
A.

since that requires only substituting LA for

If Aristotle means by 29b36-30al that LLL syllogisms

differ from XXX syllogisms just in the addition of necessity
to the terms,

then what he is describing requires the

substitution of modal predicates for non-modal predicates
29

and the notion that what is necessary
is also true
Consider an example: de re Barbara LLL
will be

4
.

Vx(Bx-»LAx)

Yx Cx-»LBx
(

)

Vx Cx-*LAx )
(

.

If this is to work according to the same
pattern as Barbara

XXX, then the modal operator in the second
(or minor)

premise must be idle. Less formally, this just
amounts to
saying that what belongs of necessity also belongs.
So far

I

have shown that in the first figure the LLL

and LXL syllogisms are valid on a de

ire

analysis. But

because these are all in the first figure they do not
require any conversions

—

their validity is 'evident' as

they stand. And for this reason they make up part of the

axiomatic base of Aristotle's logic. The question

I

want to

address next is whether the same kind of de re analysis that
works here can get valid syllogisms in any of the other
figures. Aristotle bases his proofs of many of the other

syllogisms precisely on the ability to convert them into the
first figure. In this section

I

have shown that by this

technique Aristotle might well be converting other
syllogisms into de re first-figure syllogisms. It remains to

This is not a controversial point. Certainly, without
the idea that what belongs of necessity also belongs, none
of the LLL syllogisms nor any of the XLX and LXX syllogisms
work so neatly as Aristotle describes. So, although he
appears to use this idea routinely, perhaps he considers it
obvious and doesn't think it needs much explanation.
4

30

,

.

.

be seen whether Aristotle's modal
conversion principles can
be given a good de re analysis.

2

.

2

Ll-Conversion

The traditional controversy about how (and
whether) to
apply the de dicto/de re distinction to Aristotle's
logic
has to do with the fact that the syllogisms
seem to reguire
de re interpretations while the
conversions seem only to

work de dicto

I

don't see enough evidence in the Prior

Analytics to support the claim that Aristotle's use of
modals is so flagrantly inconsistent as that. In this
section

I

want to focus closely on what

will call

I

Ll-conversion -- the conversion of a necessary particular
affirmative premise. So, my question here is how to
represent what is going on when Aristotle says
(LI)

If A belongs... to some B of necessity,
then it is necessary for B to belong to
some A.
25a32-33
.

.

On the de dicto analysis this is just
(1)

L3x(Bx&Ax)

-»

L3(Ax&Bx).

But if (1) really were what Aristotle means, then the third-

figure syllogisms Datisi LXL, Disamis XLL

,

and Ferison LXL

-- all of which he counts as valid -- won't work.

They won't

work because they all require conversion back to de dicto
first-figure LXL syllogisms, and all of those were shown to
31

'

be invalid

This makes de dicto Ll-conversion
look a bad
bet here in the third figure as well.
Can we ^ ive a de re reading of (LI)
above? One way
to give a de re reading of Ll-conversion
would be
S°

(2)

3x Bx&LAx )
(

3x(Ax&LBx).

But this presents a new problem:

in modern logic (2)

is

invalid. Let A be 'man' and B be 'bachelor,'
then according
to

(

2

)

if some bachelor is a necessary man,

necessary bachelor.

'

some man is a

This is false since being a bachelor

isn t a necessary property of any man.

Since (2) is invalid it would be good to see if there
is any evidence that it isn't really what Aristotle
means by

Ll-conversion. Ll-conversion applies only to third-figure
syllogisms. Consider, first, what converting according to
bhe formula (2) does in each of the syllogisms that reguires

Ll-conversion. These are included in Table

LXL

.

1

below.

"These are de dicto Barbara, Darii, Celarent, and Ferio
I gave falsifying models for each in Section 2.1.
32

)
) )

)

Table

)

)

Vx(Cx->LAx)
3x ( Cx&LBx

))

1

LI -Conversion as 3x( Bx&LAx)

Datisi LLL

)

Datisi LXL

6

->

3x( Ax&LBx)

Datisi XLX

Vx(Cx^LAx)
x Bx&LCx
3x Bx&LAx

Vx(Cx-*LAx
x ( Cx&Bx
Vx(Cx->LAx)
3x Bx&Cx
3x( Bx&LAx)

Disamis LLL
3x Cx&LAx

Disamis LXX
3x( Cx&LAx)

Vx(Cx->LBx)
3x Ax&LCx

Disamis XLL
3x Cx&Ax

Vx(Cx->Bx
3x( Ax&LCx)
3x Ax&Bx

(

(

(

Vx(Cx->Ax)
3x( Cx&LBx)
Vx(Cx->Ax)

(

lx

(

Bx&LCx

3x( Bx&Ax)

(

3x Bx&LAx

V

Bx&Ax

Vx(Cx->LBx)
3x ( Ax&Cx
3x ( Ax&LBx
3x( Bx&LAx)

Ferison LLL
Vx Cx-*L~Ax
3x( Cx&LBx)
Vx Cx->L~Ax
3x Bx&LCx

Ferison LXL
Vx ( Cx-»L~Ax
3x Cx&Bx
Vx ( Cx-»L ~ Ax
3x Bx&Cx
3x Bx&L~Ax

Vx(Cx->~Ax)
3x( Cx&LBx)
Vx(Cx-»~Ax)
3x( Bx&LCx)
3x ( Bx&~Ax

(

lx

(

Ax&LBx

(

(

(
(

3x(Bx&L~Ax

(
(

(

(
(

Ferison XLX

Note that in order to get the logic to work here I'm

assuming that anything that is necessarily-C is also

C.

I

have not made this step explicit in the syllogisms above,
but without it none of the LLL syllogisms nor Disamis LXX

nor Ferison XLX work properly.

Although the de re conversion here is invalid, the
syllogisms above show that in one sense it does nevertheless

I'm including more than just the syllogisms that need
Ll-conversion Datisi LXL and Ferison LXL require
I-conversion, but not Ll-conversion But because they are in
other ways so closely related to the others I have included
them in the table.
6

.

.
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work.

It works insofar as the results
above might be taken

as a good match for Aristotle's schematic
descriptions of

these syllogisms. Where Aristotle says there
is an

L-conclusion or where he says only an X-conclusion
follows,
this analysis does match those results. This
makes invalid
de re Ll-conversion look at least
plausible as an

interpretation of Aristotle. If it turns out to be the
right
analysis, then rather than just some confusion about de
dicto and de re modals, the situation looks even
worse --

Aristotle is confused about validity. In order to show that
Aristotle is not so confused, we want some evidence that

(2)

really is not what he means by conversion of a necessary

particular affirmative.
In modern logic (2) comes out false when we put terms
in:

A for man, B for bachelor. While these terms give a

straightforward example that shows why nowadays we think
is invalid,

(2)

these terms don't give a particularly

Aristotlian example. In order to consider whether Aristotle
would accept (2) as the formula for Ll-conversion it might
help to look at an example from the sorts of terms he

routinely uses; so, instead, of 'man' and 'bachelor' let A
and B be 'animal' and 'white.' Then 'A belongs to some B of

necessity' goes to 'something white is by necessity an
animal.'

In LPC this is 3x(Bx&LAx) which is the antecedent

of (2). That much is unproblematic. The question then is

whether (2) gets Aristotle's conversion right. If it does
34

:

then

x

(

Ax&LBx

must be the right representation of 'some

)

animal is by necessity white.’ Aristotle's
comments in A10
suggest that he might take that to be false.
In 30bl9-40,

Aristotle offers an analysis of

a

second-

figure modal mood. The mood is traditionally known
as

Camestres.

'

In this particular passage Aristotle gives a

proof of a modal Camestres, in which only the first
premise

contains a modal -- necessity. So here we are considering

Camestres LXX

.

The conclusion is not a modal statement, and

in explaining this fact Aristotle drops a hint that helps

with my project of giving
conversions.

I

a

good interpretation of the modal

will discuss Camestres LXX in more detail

later in Chapter
In 30b34-35

6.

,

Aristotle tells us that "it is possible

for animal to belong to nothing white." From this it would

appear that Aristotle is denying the truth of 'it is

necessary for animal to belong to some white’ -- that is,
denying the truth of

some white is by necessity an animal.’

This suggests that he would interpret this latter statement
to mean the same as 'some animal is necessarily white,’

7

which is certainly false since no animal is white by
necessity. To see how this helps, consider (2) with the

general terms in place of term-var iables

’Later in this section
to do this.

I

will explain why he would want

35

(

2

'

)

If something white is by necessity
an
animal, then some animal is by
necessity white.

The problem arises here because if (2')
really is an

instance of (2) it would seem that 'something
white is by
necessity an animal' might be true while it is
false that
'some animal is by necessity white.’ If, however,
we can
take Aristotle's remark that

it is possible for animal to

belong to nothing white' to mean 'no animal is necessarily
white,’ then pretty clearly,
(2).

(2')

cannot be an instance of

Because if no animal is necessarily white, then it will

be false that some animal is necessarily white. So
(2)

cannot be the right analysis of Ll-conversion

.

Aristotle

might treat (2') as valid, but not an instance of (2).
If

(2)

is not what Aristotle means then maybe he isn't

so confused as he first appears. Consider an example that

follows Aristotle's suggestions in 30b33-40: a man is by

necessity an animal, but a man may or may not be white. In
other words, being an animal is a necessary property of a
man, but being white is only an accidental property. This

distinction fits the point Aristotle makes when he says "it
is possible for man to become white," 30b34-35.

So it is

possible for man to belong of necessity to animal and to

belong to nothing white. This is possible because being
white is accidental to an animal -- that is, it is not a
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property an animal has necessarily. So it seems that
for
Aristotle it must be false that some animal is

necessarily white.
What this suggests is that in cases of purported

I-conversion,
Oj.

like (2'), Aristotle would not allow the scope

necessity to shift from one term to the other as it does

in (2). Again it is important to consider that for Aristotle

it's not just a matter of surface form where the modal

operator is to be attached. His modal idioms don't always
indicate the deeper structure of his propositions. So it

might be that when interpreting
(LI)

If A belongs to some B of necessity,
then it is necessary for B to belong to
some A, 25a32-33,

we should give the antecedent as 3x(Bx&LAx), and then

convert to

(

3

)

3x ( LAx&Bx )

keeping the necessity attached to the same term as it is in
instead of (2), the correct form of

the antecedent. Then,

Ll-conversion, in this case, would be

(4)

3x(Bx&LAx)

h>

3x( LAx&Bx).

This still interprets the modality de re, and it's valid.
But, does it work in the syllogisms as Aristotle describes
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)) ) )

them? Table

)

) )

))

))
)

)

gives the results of using (4) as the
formula
for LI -conversion in the syllogisms.
2

Table

2

LI -Conversion as 3x(Bx&LAx)

->

3x(LAx&Bx)

Datisi LLL

Datisi LXL 8

Vx(Cx-*LAx)
3x ( Cx&LBx
3x ( LBx&Cx
3x LBx&LAx
3x( Bx&LAx)

Datisi XLX

Vx(Cx-»LAx)
3x ( Cx&Bx
3x Bx&Cx
3x( Bx&LAx)

Vx Cx-»Ax
3x ( Cx&LBx
3x( LBx&Cx)
3x LBx&Ax
3x( Bx&Ax)

Disamis LLL
3x Cx&LAx

Disamis LXX
3x( Cx&LAx)

Vx(Cx-^LBx)
Hx LAx&Cx
3x LAx&LBx
3x ( LBx&LAx
3x ( Bx&LAx

Disamis XLL
3x Cx&Ax

Vx Cx-»Bx
3x LAx&Cx
3x LAx&Bx
3x Ax&Bx
3x ( Bx&Ax

Vx(Cx-»LBx
3x( Ax&Cx)
3x Ax&LBx
3x LBx&Ax
3x( Bx&Ax) ***

Ferison LLL

Ferison LXL
Vx Cx->L~Ax
3x ( Cx&Bx
3x( Bx&Cx)
3x Bx&L~Ax

Ferison XLX
Vx ( Cx4 ~ Ax
3x( Cx&LBx)
3x LBx&Cx
3x LBx&~Ax
3x Bx&~Ax

(

(

(

(

Vx ( Cx-*L~Ax
3x Cx&LBx
(

3x( LBx&Cx)

3x LBx&L~Ax
(

(

(

(

(

(
(

(

(

(

(

(

(

(

(

3x(Bx&L~Ax)

(

Of the seven syllogisms that do require LI-conversion, six
of them work. The one that doesn't is marked with '***.'

uiouimo
n

i

iiu ij

|

uuro interpretation gets Dis am is XLL
t h an

-i

vj

it

rong f

L-conciusion as

Aristotle describes at 31bl2-19. The conclusion here is only

8

Datisi LXL and Ferison LXL do not involve LIconversion, but I include them here to help illustrate the
pattern of Aristotle's reasoning.
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a

non-modal I-premise. In Section

4

of Chapter 3,

carefully at the problem with Disamis XLL

.

look

I

It emerges that

there is some textual difficulty about
Disamis XLL. But
before we look at the issues raised by Disamis,
let's look
at the syllogisms that do work when the
Ll-conversion is

interpreted validly as 3x(Bx&LAx)

-»

3x(LAx&Bx).

The valid form of Ll-conversion is not all that
is

needed to get the syllogisms in Table

2

to work: we again

need the assumption that what is necessary is also true.
In
the invalid conversions we looked at earlier in Table

needed this to drop idle

L

1

s

1,

we

off predicates to make the

logic work. That made it a matter of switching from

belonging of necessity' to

merely belonging.

'

Now,

in the

valid conversions, we need to drop idle L's off subject
terms. This in effect would make the Ll-conversions
x

(

Bx&LAx

)

->

Jx(AxScBx).

While that might be a more

economical description of the logical goings-on, there is no
reason

I

can see for attributing such economy to Aristotle.

His descriptions of Ll-conversion always involve getting one

L-premise from another L-premise: 'if A belongs of necessity
to some B,

then B belongs of necessity to some A,

Jx(BxScLAx)

->

However,

3x LAx&Bx
(

)

1

and

seems a better analysis of that.

in his descriptions of entire third-figure

syllogisms, it does seem that for Aristotle L’s do drop off
subjects. If they don’t then the conclusion of Datisi XLX

would have to be an L-proposition of sorts: Jx(LBx&Ax).
39

.

,

'

,.

Aristotle clearly thinks the conclusion
of Datisi here is
not a necessary proposition:
...if the particular premise is necessary,
conclusion will not be necessary. For let the
both particular and necessary, and let A BC be
every C, but not however, of necessity. belong to
Then when
BC is converted it becomes the first
figure, and
the universal premise is not necessary
while the
particular premise is necessary. But when the
premises were like this [in the first figure],
conclusion was not necessary; consequently, it the
w -*-H not be in this case [in the third-figure
Datisi] either, (31b20-27).

At this stage,

I

will treat the matter of L's dropping

off subjects just as a formal feature of this

interpretation. This shouldn't be troublesome. Later in

Chapter

exploring the relations between Aristotle's

5,

metaphysics and predication, this phenomenon becomes more
interesting
The necessity in the Ll-premise in some cases has no
real effect on a syllogism's validity. Disamis LXX, Datisi

XLX and Ferison XLX are examples. Each has an Ll-premise
that gets converted, but the resulting conclusion in each
case is not modal. Ferison XLX is particularly interesting

given my project here. In 32al-4, Aristotle offers
wakefulness,
(E)

(LI)
(0)

'

animal

1

and

white'

as terms

~3x (White x & Wakeful x)
and
3x White x & L Animal x
then ~Vx (Animal x h Wakeful x
If

(

>

40

)
)

'

'It is

necessary for animal to belong to something
white,
32al-2, I represent here as 3x White
x & L Animal x).
(

Converting this according to

(

4

)

gives 3x (L Animal x &

White x) and turns Ferison XLX into
the valid first-figure
mood Ferio XLX.
One thing is still unclear. That is, why
should

Aristotle want

something white is necessarily an animal' to

ever be true? In the Ferison example he appears
to take it
as true.

But if he does, then it does look like Aristotle
is

contradicting himself -- sometimes taking it as true,
sometimes suggesting that it must be false (An.Pr.
30b34-35

)

,

sometimes suggesting that we cannot ever make

such statements {An. Post. A22)

.

In An. Post.

83bl9-24, he

explains that accidents can never take the subject position,
only the predicate position. So even though in 'some white
is necessarily an animal,

subject,

it seems that

'

white'

is the grammatical

(sometimes, at least) Aristotle is

assuming an underlying logical structure in which 'animal'
is the true subject.
If the valid de re analysis is right,

then we can no

longer give a univocal translation of

(5)

Some A is B by necessity.

McCall [1963,

both

p.

21],

following Rescher, does in fact list

!x(Ax&LBx) and =)x(LAx&Bx),
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(among others) as possible

)

)

.

representations of (5). His comment on possible
LPC-tr ansi at ions is:
None of these interpretations does justice
to
Aristotle's system. Not one of them even
simultaneously provides for the validity of
Barbaras LLL and LXL, the invalidity of Barbara
XLL, and the convertibility of the particular
premise Some A is necessarily B' into 'Some B
is
necessarily A.
[McCall, 1963, p. 21]
’

On the interpretation

I

set out, we can simultaneously

account for each of McCall's worries here. The validity
of

Barbaras LLL and LXL is accounted for, as is Ll-conversion
The invalidity of Barbara XLL appears to be straightforward
Vx ( Bx-»Ax
Vx ( Cx->LBx
Vx Cx-*LAx
(

)

.

But of course the important point to realize about McCall's

criticism is that he is assuming that the form of
sufficient to decide the placement of the

L.

(5)

is

My suggestion

is that we cannot rely on the form alone.

One reason for thinking as McCall does that it is

better to leave the modal premises unanalysed is that it
then seems there is no restriction on our substitution of
terms for variables in the syllogistic. But evidence cited

here suggests that this may not be quite right. Considering
the assertoric syllogistic alone, this point may be easily

missed. But it is harder to overlook when trying to make

sense of Aristotle's discussion of apodeictic premises.
42

There, Aristotle sometimes links his use
of modals to his

theory of predication in such a way as to
prevent certain
terms being taken in the wrong order. For
example,
Aristotle,

think, will never want to take as true a

I

proposition such as
(5)

some animal is necessarily white,

where the necessity is attached to 'white.' He may not want
(7)

some white is necessarily an animal,

where 'white
(7)

1

is the subject,

either. But the matter with

is not particularly a problem about modals;

what counts, generally, as good predication.
shows,

in either case,

9

it is about

What this

is that the syllogistic does depend

to a large extent on Aristotle's ideas about predication.

Many scholars note that in the modal syllogisms
themselves -- in the Barbaras, in the Celarents, etc. --

Aristotle seems to want to take apodeictic premises as
expressing necessity de re. The real problems seem to arise

with the introduction of modal conversions. What

I

have

tried to show here is that the logical structure of

predication often seems to determine which term takes the
modal qualifier. And, as Aristotle describes things, de re

necessity seems to attach to what the underlying theory of

Later in Chapters 5-8,
by such propositions.
9

I

deal with the issues raised
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.

predication guarantees is the true predicate.
This rules out
the invalid de re conversion in
(2) that some have supposed
Aristotle to intend, while it supports the
interpretation
given in ( 4
)
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CHAPTER

3

DE RE LA-CONVERSION

3

.

1

De Re LA-Conversion
The primary aim of this section is to show that
a valid

de re analysis of LA-conversion is,

in fact,

plausible.

I

will assume that, at this stage, there is at least a prima
facie case for de re reading, given the results of
Chapter
2.

Also, there is good evidence to reject de dicto. Some of

this evidence comes from the kinds of semantic

considerations

I

suggest in Section 2.2. But the most

obvious evidence is purely formal: it comes from the fact
that the first-figure LXL syllogisms only make sense when
the necessity is interpreted de re.

1

This is an important

point because most of Aristotle's proofs of second- and

third-figure syllogisms depend on 'converting' those
syllogisms back into the first figure, where validity is

plainly evident. Since the first-figure LXL syllogisms are
valid de re but not de dicto

,

then any time we convert a

second- or third-figure syllogism back into a first-figure
LXL syllogism, we should be converting back into a valid de
re Barbara, Celarent, Darii, or Ferio LXL.

We saw in Chapter

2

that there are two ways to give a

de re reading of Ll-conversion

.

One way makes the conversion

principle valid, the other way does not. The same is true of

In Section 2.1, I show that a de dicto reading of the
first figure LXL syllogisms cannot be right.
1

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

))

LA-conversion. The invalid reading is
Vx(Bx-*LAx)

(1)

->

3x Ax&LBx

)

.

3x ( LAx&Bx

)

.

(

The valid reading is
Vx ( Bx-»LAx

(2)

)

-»

It will help to look at the results of each of
these in the

syllogisms. Table

3

illustrates the results of using the

invalid de re analysis of LA-conversion.

Table

3

LA-Conversion as Vx(Bx->LAx)
Darapti LLL
Vx Cx->LAx
Vx ( Cx-»LBx
3x( Bx&LCx
3x Bx&LAx
(

(

Felapton LLL
Vx
Vx
3x
3x

(
(
(
(

Cx->L~Ax
Cx-*LBx

Bx&LCx
Bx&L~Ax

->

3x( Ax&LBx)

Darapti LXL
Vx Cx-»LAx
Vx Cx-^Bx
3x Bx&Cx
3x Bx&LAx

Darapti XLL
Vx Cx->Ax
Vx Cx->LBx
3x Bx&LCx
3x(Bx&Ax) ***

(

(

(

(

(

(

(

Felapton LXL
Vx( Cx-»L~Ax

Felapton XLX
Vx(Cx->~Ax
Vx Cx->LBX
3x Bx&LCx
3x Bx&~Ax

Vx ( Cx->Bx
3x Bx&Cx
3x Bx&L~Ax

(

(

(

(

(

(Darapti LXL and Felapton LXL do not involve LA-conversion.
I

have included them here only to give a complete picture of

the L+X syllogisms requiring A-conversions

.

This invalid de re conversion gets right three of the
four syllogisms that require LA-conversion. Darapti LLL,

Darapti XLL, and Felapton LLL come out fine. Darapti XLL
46

)

)

)

)

)

)

))

)

doesn't work. But, Darapti XLL doesn't work even
when we
interpret LA-conversion according to
above -(2)

7x(Bx->LAx)

i.e.,

as

x(LAx&Bx). I'll have more to say about

->

Darapti, but let's look,

first, at what happens in the

syllogisms when we convert according to (2).
Table

gives the results of valid de re LA-conversion.

4

Table

4

LA-Conversion as Vx(Bx-»LAx)
Darapti LLL
Vx ( Cx->LAx
^x(Cx->LBx)
3x( LBx&Cx
lx

(

LBx&LAx

3x(LAx&Bx)

-»

Darapti LXL
Vx Cx-»LAx

Darapti XLL
Vx Cx->Ax
Vx ( Cx-»LBx

(

(

Vx Cx->Bx
3x ( Bx&Cx
3x ( Bx&LAx
(

)

3x Bx&LAx

3x(Bx&Ax) ***

(

Felapton LLL
Vx ( Cx->L~Ax
Vx ( Cx->LBx
3x( LBx&Cx)
3x( LBx&L~Ax)
lx( Bx&L~Ax)

Again,

I

)

Jx ( LBx&Cx
Jx ( LBx&Ax

Felapton LXL
Vx ( Cx->L~Ax
Vx Cx-»Bx

Felapton XLX
Vx
Vx
3x
3x
3x

(

3x( Bx&Cx

3x(Bx&L~Ax)

(
(
(
(
(

Cx-»~Ax
Cx-»LBx

LBx&Cx
LBx&~Ax
Bx&~Ax

drop L's off subject terms to get the

conclusions Aristotle gives. This makes the form of the
LA-conversion, in effect, Vx(Bx-»LAx)

->

ix(Ax&Bx). But

Aristotle clearly describes LA-conversion as converting from
one necessary premise to another necessary premise, not from
a

necessary to an assertoric premise. So

Vx(Bx->LAx)

->

I

will treat

3x(LAx&Bx) as the better analysis of

Aristotle's meaning. This won't be
47

a

problem if

LB->B

and if

x(LEx&Ax) is not an apodcict ic premise for
Aristotle.

3

.

2

Darapti XLL

Whether we take LA-conversion to be
lx

(

2

Ax&LBx

or (2)

)

y
:

x ( Bx->LAx

(1)

Vx (Bx-»LAx)

->

!x(LAx&Bx), Darapti XLL does

)

not work. Now is a good time to look at the traditional

mnemonics for the syllogisms. The name 'Darapti' encodes
instructions for the syllogisms proof as follows: The
initial

D

'

indicates that the syllogism will be based on

the first— figure syllogism Darii. The vowels in
(a,

a,

i)

Darapti'

indicate that we're looking at a syllogism with

two A-premises and an I-conclusion

In the modal Darapti

.

XLL, we get an XA-premise, an LA-premise, and an
LI -conclusion

.

The letter 'r'

indicates that the syllogism

can be proven through impossibility
a'

3
.

And, a 'p'

after an

tells us that the corresponding A-premise

gets converted.
The Darapti XLL in Tables

3

and

4

follows the pattern

the mnemonic dictates. It is not, however, what Aristotle

describes in the text at 31a31-33. The premises are right,

Chapter 5 is directly concerned with showing that a
proposition whose logical structure is Vx(LBx->Ax) or
Jx(LBx&Ax) is not a true apodeictic. It is, instead, what
will call a 'genuine assertoric proposition.'
2

I

The mnemonics occasionally indicate moves that
Aristotle himself doesn't make. Proof through impossibility
in Darapti XLL is one example. So, the 'r' in Darapti XLL
isn't particularly Aristotelian.
3
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))

)

.

but the proof of them isn't. In the text Aristotle
does not

base his proof on the conversion of the CB-premise;
instead,
he bases it on the conversion of the CA-premise -for as he

says,

"C converts to some A,"

(31a33). This suggests the

structure of the proof is really
Vx(Cx-*Ax)
Vx ( Cx-»LBx
3x Ax&Cx

)

(

3x Ax&LBx
(

)

And this seems to fit what Aristotle does describe:

from premises
Vx Cx->Ax
Vx Cx-»LBx
(

(

'A
'B

(merely) belongs to every C'
belongs to every C of necessity'

'C

converts to some A.

convert CA to
3x Ax&Cx
(

"Consequently,

if B belongs to every C of necessity,

then it

will also belong to some A of necessity," (31a33); that is,
3x ( Ax&LBx

'B

will belong of necessity to some A.'

While the proof Aristotle gives at 31a31-33 is

traditionally called 'Darapti' that name encodes the wrong
instructions, since the premise Aristotle converts is really
the first A-premise. The traditional mnemonics are

occasionally misleading, and so it is necessary to consider
them carefully and always with an eye to Aristotle's text.
49

In what follows,

I

note those places where the two differ

and base my interpretations on the text
and not on
the mnemonics.

According to the general form of a third-figure
syllogism, the conclusion will always have the
A-term in

predicate position, and the B-term in subject position.
The

syllogism misnamed as Darapti
set out at 31a31-33

)

(I

mean the syllogism actually

does not have the right conclusion. It

has B as predicate, A as subject, and so seems to reguire an

additional conversion. It appears to need a conversion of
the conclusion itself in order to make A the predicate and B
the subject. But there is no evidence in the text that

Aristotle has it in mind to convert the conclusion.
The fact that the conclusion here does not follow the

pattern established in the assertor ic m ight be part of what
led the medievals to call the syllogism Darapti. The

mnemonic instructions might be an attempt to fit the
syllogism to the pattern of the rest of the third-figure
conclusions. And these all relate an A predicate to
a B subject.

4

If we were to convert the conclusion anyway, then we
would go from 3x(Ax&LBx) to Jx(LBx&Ax), and as I have noted,
Aristotle seems not to think of this last as an apodeictic
proposition. I'll discuss this matter in greater detail in
Chapter 5.
4
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3

•

3

Trouble-Spots Reconsidered
The results above in this chapter and also
in Chapter

2

'

su ggest that a de re analysis of LA- and
Ll-conversions

is at least plausible.

But it is not obvious whether the

valid or the invalid de re conversions get the better
results. There is little to decide between the two
analyses.

The invalid analysis gets all the right results where
LI -conversion is needed

(Table 1). The valid analysis gets

Disamis XLL wrong (in Table 2). But the valid analysis has
the distinct advantage of being valid.

It would be good to

see if we can find a test case that shows that either the

valid or the invalid de re conversion is really right.
What we are looking for will be syllogisms that have
the form

C
C
B

A
LB
LA

The syllogisms that do arc Disamis XLL, Darapti XLL, and

Datisi XLL. A diagram might help to illustrate what

have

I

in mind.

subj pred
A
C
LB
C
B
LA

Disamis
XLL

Darapti
XLL

Datisi
XLL

i

a
a

a

a
i

i

i

i

Reading down, Disamis has a major I-premise, a minor
A-premise, and an I-conclusion

.
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Reading lef t-to-right

,

the

major I-premise relates a subject C to
predicate
and so on.
If all of these are valid to Aristotle,

A,

then pretty

clearly the modal conversion of affirmatives must
involve
the (illegitimate) shifting of the modal operator
from one

term to another, since in all of the above, the
A-term
starts off non-modal, but through invalid conversion
ends up
a modal LA in the conclusion.

But Aristotle doesn't count

these all as valid. He counts Datisi XLL as invalid
(

31b20-31

)

.

And, as we saw in Section 3.2, his discussion of

Darapti XLL is too sketchy to decide the matter, since we
can't be sure what he would say about it if he converted the

conclusion. So, Darapti XLL doesn't give any conclusive

evidence since the syllogism in the text turns out not to
involve any modal conversion at all.

Disamis XLL raises more of the same kind of

interpretive problems. In Section 3.4,

I

look at these in

some detail.

3

.

4

Disamis XLL
At 31bl2-19 Aristotle describes a modal syllogism that

he counts as valid. Traditionally this syllogism is called

Disamis XLL. The name indicates that, in the third figure,
an Ll-conclusion follows from an assertoric I-premise

together with an apodeictic A-premise. The name also
indicates that both the I-premise and the Ll-conclusion
52

)

:

require conversion just as the I-premise and
I-conclusion in
non-modal Disamis XXX require conversion. Let's
consider the

similarities between the XXX Disamis and the XLL:
Non-modal Disamis XXX (28b7-ll) is
lea
Acb

::

3x(Cx&Ax)

:

V x(Cx-»Bx)

Iba

::

Aristotle

(

1

)

(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

:

3x(Bx&Ax).

proof depends upon two simple I-conversions

s

Jx

(

Cx&Ax

Given
I-conversion,
Given
Darii, 2,3
I-conversion,

Jx(AxStCx)
Vx(Cx->Bx)
Hx(AxStBx)
ix(BxStAx)

1

4

Disamis XLL, if it follows the same pattern of proof,
must be just a modal version of the same:
lea
LAcb
LIba

:

:

:

:

::

3x( Cx&Ax)
Vx Cx->LBx
1x(Bx&LAx).
(

But, unlike Disamis XXX,

)

this isn't valid. So,

it seems, we

have a problem. One solution might be to just leave the

propositions here unanlaysed, and, like McCall, represent
Disamis XLL as
lea
LAcb
LIba.

Leaving things this way McCall claims to get all the results

Aristotle wants. From this it might seem that any attempt to
53

capture Aristotle's meaning is bound to fail.
But this can't
be right.

There is another solution. It might be that
Aristotle
himself would agree that the argument above is
not valid.
And in fact when we put terms in,
is the more plausible answer.

it becomes clear that this

Let A be brown, B be animal,

and C be horse:
Some horses are brown
All horses are necessarily animals
Some animals are necessarily brown.

There's no reason to think Aristotle would call this valid;
instead, there's plenty of evidence to suggest that for him

this must be invalid. But where does that leave Disamis XLL?
It shows we really do have a problem there, but a problem of
a

different sort than first supposed.
So far

I

have been setting out Disamis XLL according to

the instructions encoded in the traditional mnemonics. Those

match the instructions for Disamis XXX at 28b7-ll. This
reliance on the mnemonics seems to me to be the source of

much trouble here. Let's put aside for the moment what the
traditional approach dictates and instead look closely at
the text.

Disamis XLL is purported to be the syllogism set out at
31bl6-19. And in fact everything leading up to this passage

suggests that Disamis XLL is what Aristotle has in mind. He
has already framed the discussion saying "...if one
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:

[premise]

is universal,

the other is particular, and both

are positive, then the conclusion will
be necessary whenever
the universal is necessary," (31bl2-14).
This much at least

sounds like Disamis XLL. But consider what
Aristotle goes on
to say:

Thus, if it is necessary for B to belong to every
C and A is below C, then it is necessary for
B to
belong to some A, (31bl6-17).

From the remarks at 31bl2-16 it would appear that 'A is

below

(

hupo

)

C’

must mean 'some A is

C,

’

since Aristotle

pretty clearly means at 31bl2-16 to describe a particular
premise. Robin Smith notes Aristotle's use of this same

construction at 30a40. The premise there is 'C is under
(hupo) B.

'

As Smith explains the 'C is under

B’

construction
’under’ in this sort of context usually means
either 'within the extension of’ or 'a subject of
predication of.
In the present case [30a40], it
has to mean something like 'part of C falls under
B,
if Aristotle's argument is to work. He must
mean his proof to follow the same form as that in
30a21-23, though his expression is perhaps
careless. [Smith, 1989, p. 122]
1

’

This is a bit like saying Aristotle "has to mean something
like 'part of C falls under B

1

"

because otherwise we'd have

to say Aristotle's just confused. But in the case of Disamis

XLL there is a real question about this. My point is that if
the proof encoded by the name Disamis XLL is the right

reading of Aristotle at 31bl6-19, then there's some reason
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to think he might be confused,

anyway,

since the syllogism

then is invalid.
At any rate,

A is below

C'

on Smith's account would

have to mean Jx(Ax&Cx), not 3x(Cx&Ax) as he
gives it. In

other words, it's a CiA premise, not an AiC premise, if
it's
an I-premise at all. So the I-premise in the
syllogism that

Aristotle sets out doesn't need any conversion
not Disamis in the first place. And,

—

so it's

in fact, Aristotle does

not mention the need to convert here.
But if 'A is below C' means for Aristotle that 'A is

within the extension of

C'

then an I-premise is not the

right way to represent the meaning. Instead, it would seem

that an A-premise is what's needed: Vx(Ax->Cx). There is

additional evidence in the Prior Analytics that Aristotle
does sometimes use 'under' or 'below'

(hupo) to indicate

A-premises. He uses hupo this way in 33b34-35: 'let B be put
as belonging to every C. Then,

B....’

Later,

since C is below (hupo)

in A19, Aristotle again uses hupo to describe

what is clearly a universal premise. He says 'nothing

prevents C being under (hupo)

B'

(38a40) and gives an

example with terms C for awake and B for animal: 'everything
awake is an animal’

(38a41-bl). So, returning to the

question of Disamis XLL, there is some independent

justification for taking hupo in 31bl6-19 as indicating an

A-premise and not an I-premise. This would make the name
Disamis XLL and its traditional proof inappropriate, because
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:

'

the syllogism in question would have no
I-premise at all. At
any rate, the proof given in the text
(i.e., the one that is

misnamed Disamis XLL) does not provide any clear
evidence
favoring one de re analysis over the other.
If it is right to take hupo here as indicating
an

A-premise, then Disamis XLL is not really what Aristotle
describes. What he really gives combines two A-premises:
Vx Ax->Cx
(

'A is

)

Vx_[Cx-»LBx

'

)

below

C'

it is necessary for B to belong to

every C
x ( Ax&LBx

ix(AxScLBx)

)

'then it is necessary for B to belong to
some A.

is the initial conclusion,

it needs converting to give,

reached validly. But

finally, the right structure

for a third-figure conclusion. Aristotle makes this

explicit:

"if it is necessary for B to belong to some A,

then it is also necessary for A to belong to some B (for it

converts)," (31bl8-19). Converting the conclusion gets the A
into predicate position, B into subject position, as the

pattern of the third figure dictates. In non-modal Disamis
XXX this is a straightforward conversion because the

conclusion there is assertoric. Now, the conclusion is
apodeictic, and that creates a problem. It appears that

Aristotle, finally, does want invalid Ll-conversion
3x(Ax&LBx)

-»

Jx(BxScLAx).

So,

perhaps, this situation is no

improvement. But look, however, at an instance with terms in

place of variables:
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)

Vx(Ax-*Cx)
Vx(Cx-*LBx)
3x( Ax&LBx)
lx

(

Bx&LAx

.

man is below two-legged
all two-legged things are by necessity
animals
some man is by necessity animal
some animal by necessity a man.

This doesn't look so bad. By taking 'A is below
a predicate C to a subject A,

C'

to relate

we aren't left open to the

possibility that A might be an accident. In An. Post. A22,
Aristotle tells us that 'the white thing is

a

log'

is not an

example of genuine predication. The reason has to do with
the fact that white is only an accident and, so,

is not a

proper subject of genuine predication. If we apply that

reasoning here, then, because in the AC premise A is the
subject term, it won't do to have A an accident. The
instance of Disamis above appears to work because A is a

substance term. The traditional Disamis XLL, on the other
hand,

leaves open the possibility that the A term is an

accident. Because the structure of the third figure requires
an A-predicate in the conclusion,

in the traditional Disamis

XLL, an accidental A term can end up with an L attached,

making the syllogism invalid. The textual syllogism at least
doesn't suffer from that problem.
Later in Chapters

5

and

6,

I

look closely at some of

the interpretive issues this raises. Next,

I

want to look at

how we might extend a de re analysis to LE-proposit ions
This is the subject of Chapter
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4.

CHAPTER

4

DE RE LE- CONVERSION

4

.

1

Valid Conversion
In this chapter

want to see whether any modal LPC

I

analysis can do all that Aristotle requires of his
LE-premises. LE-premises appear in all three figures,
hut in
the second figure they are especially important.
Most proofs
of second- f igure syllogisms depend upon E-conversion,

and

where those E-premises are apodeictic, then, the proofs

depend on LE-conversion

.

For Aristotle this conversion of

universal privative necessary premises -- that is,

conversion of LE-premises

—

does preserve validity.

LE-conversion brings second-figure syllogisms back to the
first figure, thereby illustrating the validity of the

second-figure syllogisms themselves. Here,

I

want to see how

to represent what Aristotle means by a 'universal privative

necessary premise.

'

This will require, too, an analysis of

how these LE-premises convert.

Chapters

2

and

3

showed how there are two ways we might

give a de re analysis of each LA- and Ll-conversion

.

One way

makes them both invalid; the other way makes them both
valid. On the account that gets them valid the L-conversions

come out as straight orward susbstitution instances of the

non-modal conversions -- all that appears to be required in

these cases is the substitution of a non-modal
predicate A
by a modal predicate LA. So from A-conversion
(A)

Vx(Bx^Ax)

3x Ax&Bx
(

)

,

we get valid LA-conversion
(LA)

Vx(Bx->LAx)

3x(LAx&Bx).

->

And from I-conversion
(I)

Ix(BxStAx)

3x( Ax&Bx),

->

we get valid Ll-conversion
(LI)

^x(Bx&LAx)

3x(LAx&Bx).

->

Proceeding on a formal basis, it might seem that

LE-conversion would be just as easily gotten from non-modal

E-conversion again with the substitution of LA for

A.

In

other words, it might seem that from non-modal E-conversion
(E)

~3x(Bx&Ax)

~3x( Ax&Bx)

->

we would get

(

(

LE*

LE*

)

)

~3x(Bx&LAx)

-»

~3x(LAx&Bx).

is valid for the same reason E-conversion is valid.

It

also works for the same reason that valid LA-conversion

works and valid Ll-conversion works. Aristotle certainly

describes modal conversions very generally, saying just that
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)

)

)

,

they work in the same way as non-modal
conversions do,
25a37-41
This makes (LE*) look a plausible analysis.
(

)

.

Nevertheless,
reasons.

(LE*)

is a wrong analysis.

In the first place

(

LE*

)

,

It is wrong for two

though itself valid,

doesn't get Aristotle's syllogisms valid. Second,

(LE*)

gives the general formula for an LE-premise as ~3x( Bx&LAx
and that,

I

will show, is really a misrepresentation of

Aristotle

s

meaning when he describes his universal

)

privative premises. It's an easier matter to show how (LE*)
gets the syllogisms wrong, so I'll deal with that

problem first:
Consider, what (LE*) does in Cesare LXL

,

(30b9-13):

jX(Bx&LAx)
Vx ( Cx->Ax
~

Jx

(

LAx&Bx

Vx(Cx->Ax)
~3x Cx&Bx
(

Using

(

LE*

)

,

I

convert

~

3x Bx&LAx
(

assume that any A is also LA

)

into ~3x( LAx&Bx).

If we

then this representation of

1

,

Cesare LXL demonstrates first-figure transitivity and gets
the conclusion above ~3x Cx&Bx
(

)

.

But this is not the

conclusion Aristotle wants. Aristotle clearly thinks a
conclusion should follow from Cesare LXL, but he thinks the

conclusion will itself be a necessary proposition, an

Later in Chapter 5,
make such an assumption.
:

I

explain why we are entitled to
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.

.

LE-proposition, relating C and B.
"

lx

(

Cx&LBx

)

2

This would have to be

on the interpretation we're considering. And

this presents a problem: for there is no legitimate
way of

attaching the modal to the B-term. Nowhere in the
premises
does an
B

L

attach to anything but the A-term; in the premises

and C are not modally qualified. In order to get the

conclusion Aristotle wants, it seems that what is missing is
some way of

detaching' the modal from the A term that then

allows us to affix it to the B term. There is no way of

doing that here, and so this analysis of Cesare LXL appears
not to be what Aristotle means.
The kind of principle Aristotle seems to want here is,
in modern logic,

plainly invalid. Nevertheless, it is

exactly what is needed to

'

prove' each of Aristotle's

syllogisms involving LE-conversion
syllogisms:

.

There are three such

in addition to Cesare LXL (above),

Camestres XLL

3

as Cesare LXL,

,

there are

and Festino LXL. Each of these others, just

requires some way of swapping the necessity

The same is true of the first-figure syllogism
Celarent LXL on which the proof of Cesare LXL is based. The
conclusion in both cases is for Aristotle a necessary
proposition
3

We might add Camestres LXX too. On the face of it,
Camestres LXX doesn't involve LE-premises or LE-conversion
since, as its name indicates, both of the E-premises are
non-modal (they are X's not L's). But in the course of
defending Camestres LXX, Aristotle gives an explanation of
why there can be no L-conclusion by showing what would
happen if we assume there were This explanation 'through
impossibility' does involve LE-conversion. I look at this
method in some detail in Chapter 7.
3
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)

.

)

:

from one term to another.
(

LE*

(

LE*

)

doesn't do that, and so

gets each of these syllogisms wrong.

)

(LE*) preserves

validity but Cesare LXL illustrates that the
conversion
we're looking for might not really be valid. Consider

Aristotle's account of LE-conversion
...if it is necessary for A to belong to no B,
then it is necessary for B to belong to no A
25a29-30
4

(

)

.

This appears to be just the sort of principle that's is

needed to get Cesare LXL to work. If we continue to take
"

3x Bx&LAx
(

)

as the form of an LE-premise, Aristotle's

conversion rule comes out as
(LE**)

~3x ( Bx&LAx )

This takes the

L

->

~3x Ax&LBx )
(

.

off the predicate of the original premise

and puts it on the predicate of the converted premise. In

Cesare LXL, that is just what is needed to get the modal

operator where we want it in the conclusion:
~3x Bx&LAx
Vx Cx->Ax
~3x Ax&LBx
Vx ( Cx->Ax
~3x Cx&LBx
(

(

(

(

So,

(LE**) fits Cesare LXL nicely.

“Traditionally, this is taken to be a de dicto
principle.
But taking it that way doesn't help with the
valid LXL and XLL syllogisms since these all require de re
necessity
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.

In order to emphasize the fact that
we’re interested in

universal privatives,

I

will represent (LE**) using

universal quantifiers, instead of existentials

=

Vx(Bx-*~LAx)
~
Jx(Bx&LAx)

->
->

Vx(Ax-»~LBx)
~3x ( Ax&LBx

)

LE-conversion according to this formula fits Camestres XLL
and Festino LXL. It also works for the second-figure
LLL

syllogisms too. So, each of the six syllogisms that depend
on LE-conversion comes out as Aristotle seems to describe.

Table

5

shows the results of taking an LE-premise as

Vx(Bx-*~LAx) and LE-conversion as Vx(Bx->~LAx)
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->

Vx(Ax-»~LBx)

.

)

)

))

Table

))

5

LE-Conversion as V x (Bx->~LAx)

Vx (Ax->~LBx)

Cesare LLL
Vx(Bx-4~LAx
Vx(Cx->LAx)
Vx(Ax->~LBx)
Vx Cx->~LBx

Vx(Bx->~LAx)
Vx(Cx->Ax)
Vx(Ax->~LBx)
Vx ( Cx-»L~Bx

Camestres LLL

Camestres XLL

Vx Bx->LAx
Vx Cx-»~ LAx
(

Vx Bx-»Ax

(

Vx(Cx^'LAx)

Vx( Ax-»~LCx)

Vx Ax->~LCx

Vx Bx-»~ LCx

Vx( Bx-^~LCx

Cesare LXL

)

(

(

(

(

)

Festino LLL
Vx ( Bx->~ LAx
3x Cx&LAx
Vx Ax-» ~LBx
)

Festino LXL
Vx(Bx->~LAx)
3x ( Cx&Ax
Vx(Ax->~LBx)

3x(Cx&~LBx)

3x(Cx&~LBx)

(
(

All of these work.

(LE**)

is not a valid principle,

but it

may well be that Aristotle sometimes reasons in accordance

with principles that, by modern lights certainly, are
invalid.

If Aristotle does do this,

then the fact that it's

invalid needn't count against (LE**). Furthermore, precisely
that feature that makes (LE**) invalid makes (LE**) work in
the syllogisms and makes it seem a good interpretation of

LE-conversion. By swapping the modal qualifier from one term
to another,

(LE**) gives a conversion that does what is

required to make the logic work in all cases that depend on
LE-conversion. So, in several important respects (LE**)
appears to be a plausible and workable analysis of

Aristotle's LE-conversion principle.
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It

is not,

however, an analysis we can be satisfied

with. While (LE**) clearly has much to recommend
it, it is

very definitely not right. In the next section,

I

will

show why.

4

.

Interpreting LE-Premises

2

Earlier
(

LE*

)

.

I

suggested that there are two problems with

In the first place,

it fails to get the syllogisms to

work in the way Aristotle says they should. But my second

worry about (LE*) involves the way it analyzes just a simple
LE-premise as

x(Bx&LAx).

(LE**)

is an improvement only

with respect to the first of these concerns. (LE**) gets all
of the relevant syllogisms to work but still gives
1x(Bx&LAx) as the general formula for an LE-premise.

If,

however, that is not the right analysis of an Aristotlean

LE-premise, then for all its advantages,

(LE**) will not be

right either. So, what does Aristotle say about his

LE-premises?
One of the first instances we have of an LE-premise

comes at 30al7-20, where Aristotle asserts the validity of

Celarent LXL. That isn't all that Aristotle is doing in this

passage -- he occasionally groups related syllogisms
together, pointing out the validity or invalidity of them
all in one go,

here,

and 30al7-20 is one such passage. Aristotle,

in just three lines,

explains that both Barbara LXL
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'

and Celarent LXL are valid. The construction
he uses to do
the job is worth noticing:
.if A has been taken to belong or not to belong
of necessity to B, and B merely to belong to C...
then A will belong or not belong to C of
necessity, (ei to men A toi B ex anankes eileptai
huparchon e me huparchon, to de B toi C huparchon
monon , outos
ex anankes to A toi C huparchei e
.

.

.

.

oux huparchei)

,

.

(30al7-20).

The construction is complicated by the addition of the modal

qualifier as well as by the fact that Aristotle is here
aiming 'to kill two birds with one stone,

1

explaining at

once that he counts both Barbara and Celarent as valid. When

Aristotle groups related syllogisms he routinely gives

disjunctive descriptions like the one above.

5

When it comes

to adding the modal qualifier, Aristotle simply and

conveniently adds 'ex anankes

to the already

complicated language.
Not all instances of LE-premises are complicated by

such groupings. There are other more straightforward

examples of LE-premises, and some of these, too, seem to
involve just the addition of 'ex anankes' to a non-modal
premise. Consider again what a non-modal E-premise looks
for example 'A belongs to no B (to men A medeni toi B

like:

26a37-38 is a nice example showing how dense such
passages can become even without modal qualifiers: "if B
belongs to no C and A belongs or does not belong to some B,
or does not belong to every B, then neither in this way will
there be a deduction."
5
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'

huparchei

)

(26a25). A later passage at 30b26-27 provides
a

,

nice example of how Aristotle adds 'ex anankes

construction: there the LE-premise is given as

medeni huparchei ex anankes

to a similar
'

to B toi C

Robin Smith translates this as

.
•

belongs of necessity to no C.’ At 31a36, we get a

B

slightly different expression (with, incidentally, different
variables) 'to de A oudeni toi C ex anankes,' or, again

following Smith's translation,
C.'

A belongs of necessity to no

Aristotle clearly does not intend the different modal

constructions here to signal a difference in meaning -- just
as Smith's translations indicate, Aristotle treats the two

as obviously equivalent

(

LE

)

expressions.

Turning back to the matter of how to represent these
LE-premises: since ordinary E-premises -- 'A belongs to no
B,

’

(

26a25

)

or 'A does not belong to every B’,

can be represented by ~3x Bx&Ax
(

)

,

(26a37) --

and since Aristotle's

examples of LE-premises above just add 'of necessity' to
such a premise, then
(Le)

~=Jx

(

Bx&LAx

)

,

might seem a plausible analysis of an LE-premise. So,

(LE**)

might not look a problem at all.
There are other times, however, when we find a very

different account of what Aristotle calls a universal

privative necessary premise: for example, at 30bl0, 'let it
not be possible for A to belong to any B,
68

(to A toi men B

,

medeni endechestho

.

)

'

Aristotle often expresses LE-premises

in terms of possibility in the Prior
Analytics.

See for

example 30bll-18; 31a5-10; 31b33-36. In each of
these

passages Aristotle sets out the LE-premise as a denial
of
possibility. How can we represent an expression like this in
modal LPC translation?

a

(Le)

!

x(Bx&LAx), cannot be the right representation of

Aristotle's meaning here because (Le) ~3x(Bx&LAx) means
is both a B and a necessary-A,

'

and that does not

mean the same as Aristotle's 'it is not possible for A to

belong to any

B.

1

What seems wrong with (Le) as an analysis

of a universal privative necessary premise is that in (Le)

the modal operator is given as 'necessity' when it really

needs to be

possibility'

in order to capture the meaning of

this new expression. So, with M

(

Le2

)

~3x ( Bx&MAx

=

~L~,

6

)

appears to be a better translation of Aristotle's expressed

meaning here.

Aristotle does allow this definition of possibility,
but he later adopts a different and more complicated
definition. Chapter 7 contains detailed discussion of these
different definitions and their uses in the Prior Analytics
6
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.

(

)

'

The difference between

and

(Le)
(Le2)

~3x Bx&LAx
(

~3x(Bx&MAx)

is the difference between

(i)

and

(ii)

for no B does A necessarily belong
for no B does A possibly belong.

Aristotle's expression 'A belongs of necessity to no
appears,

in surface form,

(i); whereas,

~

x

to be very much like

his expression 'let it not be possible for A

to belong to any B'
(Le2)

at least,

B’

Bx&MAx

)

.

seems to mean the same as (ii) above, or
But both formulas cannot be right because

they have different meanings and Aristotle very clearly

considers his expressions 'it is not possible for A to

belong to any

and 'A does not belong to B of necessity*

B*

to be equivalent -- he repeatedly offers each as his

necessary universal privatives. For 'A does not belong to
of necessity,

’

see 25a30-31; 30al7-23; 30b26-27; 31a37. For

'it is not possible for A to belong to any B,

30bl4- 15

;

B

31a5-10; 31b33-36.

’

see 30bl0-12;

7

'That Aristotle counts these expressions as equivalent
is not disputed. A comparison of 25a27-31 and 31a5-7 shows

why: at 25a27-31, Aristotle leaves no room for doubt that
'it is necessary for A to belong to no B' is an example of a
necessary universal privative premise. On the other hand, at
31a5-7 he gives let it not be possible for A to belong to
any B' clearly as an example of how to 'let the privative
premise be both universal and necessary.
'

7

70

,

.

While (Le) looks fine where Aristotle makes an

LE-premise by adding 'ex anankes

'

to an E-premise,

(Le)

doesn't capture the meaning of 'it is not possible for A to

belong to any

B.

1

Since Aristotle very definitely does count

his two expressions as equivalent in meaning, what is needed
is an analysis that can work for both expressions.

cannot do that;

I

want to show now that

this claim someone might object that

simply doesn't mean the same as
no B.

'

(

(

Le2

Le2
)

,

(Le)

can. Against

)

~3x Bx&MAx
(

)

A belongs of necessity to

Certainly anyone who insists on relying on surface

structure as an indication of meaning will not see these as
the same. But with Aristotle surface structure is not always
a clear indication of his intended meaning -- the fact that

he has two different expressions for LE-premises is good

evidence of that. If all LE-premises do have the same
meaning, then whatever their surface structure

,

we should be

able to represent their meaning in a single formula. Since,
for Aristotle, both 'A belongs of necessity to no
is not possible for A to belong to any B'

and 'it

do have the same

meaning, that meaning must be (Le2) ~3x Bx&MAx
(

~3x Bx&MAx ) doesn't, on the face of it,
(

B’

)

look like a

necessary premise at all. But ~3x(Bx&MAx) is equivalent to
Vx(Bx-*L~Ax) which is, perhaps,

a more intuitive

way of

representing an LE-premise. I'll use this form from now on,
and I'll call it (Le2). The order of the tilde and the
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L

is

'

cruri a

1

(Le2)
(Le)

ini f
the formulatilon

Vx (Bx->L~Ax)

To see why, compare

*

[=
[=

'7x(Bx->~LAx)

~3x Bx&MAx
~3x Bx&LAx
(

)

]

,

(

)

]

.

(

Le2

)

and (Le)

The latter is the same as (Le), the account
considered

earlier and since rejected. Using universal
quantifiers
makes the difference between the two interpretations
easily
apparent as a difference in the ordering of the modal

operator and the negation. If (Le2) is right, then, for
example,

any man

it is not possible for four-legged to belong
to

means

it doesn't mean

every man is by necessity not four-legged';
every man is not necessarily

f our-

legged.

Whatever the disadvantages of (Le), the conversion
based on it (LE**) does get all the right conclusions in the
syllogisms. Using universal quantifiers (LE**) is just:
(LE**)

Vx(Bx->~LAx)

-4

Vx(Ax-»~LBx)

.

(LE**) presents a problem insofar as LE-premises can't be

uniformly represented as Vx Bx->~LAx
(

)

.

What remains to be

seen is whether by representing LE-premises uniformly now as
(Le2) Vx(Bx-*L~Ax) we then forfeit the tidiness of

the conversion.

One important point that (LE**) makes clear is that

getting the syllogisms to work does require a conversion
that swaps the modal qualifier from one term to another.

Taking that as a cue, let's try stating conversion now as:
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)

)

(

LE

Vx(Bx->L~Ax)

)

->

Vx Ax->L~Bx
(

)

.

Again, we have an invalid principle, but one
that does take
the

off the original predicate and puts it on the

L

converted predicate. But the real test involves putting
(LE)
to work in the syllogisms themselves.

Consider again Cesare LXL
wj-

the form

x ( Bx^L Ax),

(On the right

,

this time with LE-premises

and with (LE) as our conversion:

(loosely) quote Aristotle's discussion.)

I

Cesare LXL (30b9-13):
~
Vx( Bx->L Ax
let it not be possible for A to belong
to any B
Vx Cx->Ax
let A merely b elong to n
Vx(Ax->L~
neither is it rvr\ n n i
for B to belong
to any A
Vx Cx-*Ax
but A belongs to every C, consequently
Vx Cx->L~ Pv
it is not poss ible for B to belong to
(

j

r\

>

(

)

\

(

antr P
uu

This seems a good fit. Of course, the valiidity of the

syllogism can

*

+

K r\ established in this way because this
KJ

conversion is invalid. In fact, as it's represented here, in
modal LPC, this syllogism is not valid. If we allow the

invalid conversion, this analysis does in fact illustrate
that the second- f igure Cesare reduces to the

first-figure Celarent. 8
8

Specif ically, Cesare LXL reduces to Celarent LXL which
(30al7-23). Celarent

is also valid according to Aristotle,
LXL, on this analysis, is

Vx(Ax-»L~Bx)
Vx Cx-»Ax
Vx Cx-»L~Bx
(
(
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)

))

)

)

Cesare LXL is only one of six syllogisms requiring
LE-conversion.

(LE)

in Cesare LLL,

LLL.

Table

fits nicely in each of the others also

Camestres XLL and LLL

and Festino LXL and

,

shows what happens when we take an LE-premise

6

to be Cx ( Bx->L Ax) and LE-conversion to be

Vx(Bx->L~Ax)

->

Vx(Ax->L~Bx)

.

Table

6

LE-Conversion as Vx(Bx->L~Ax)

Vx(Ax->L~Bx)

Cesare LLL

Cesare LXL

Vx( Bx-»L~Ax
Vx(Cx->LAx)
Vx( Ax-*L~Bx)
Vx ( Cx->LAx
Vx ( Cx->L~Bx

Vx Bx-*L~Ax
Vx Cx-»Ax
Vx ( Ax-»L~Bx
Vx ( Cx->Ax
Vx ( Cx-»L~Bx
(
(

Camestres LLL

Camestres XLL

Vx ( Bx-»LAx
Vx(Cx-»L~Ax)
Vx Ax-»L~Cx
Vx ( Bx->LAx
Vx(Bx->L~Cx)

Vx(Bx->Ax
Vx(Cx->L~Ax)

Vx( Cx->L~Bx

\/ir
v

-inn
T7nc
OO +-Li-UU

Festino LXL

(

i

JL

Vx(Ax^L~Cx)

)

Vx Bx-»Ax
Vx ( Bxh>L ~Cx
(

a.

T T T
jjuLj

(
v,

T ~

' JLJ

\

J-Jsl )

Vx Bx->L~Ax

Vx(Bx->L~Ax)
3x Cx&LAx
Vx ( Ax->L ~Bx
3x Cx&LAx
3x Cx&L ~Bx

(

3x( Cx&Ax
Vx ( Ax->L ~Bx

(

)

)

(

3x Cx&Ax

(

3x(Cx&L~Bx)

(

This may be something of an improvement, but, again,

each of these 'proofs' comes out invalid. They all depend

upon a conversion which is not valid. In his modal

syllogistic Aristotle obviously counts LE-conversion as
74

)

valid.

.

It seems from this that any de re analysis
of

LE-premises and LE-conversion comes out invalid. That
doesn't mean that a de re analysis is wrong. Consider what
the de dicto analysis of Cesare LXL would have to be:

L~3x(Bx&Ax)
Vx Cx-»Ax
L~3x Cx&Bx
(

(

)

That's no improvement since that's not valid either. So if
we do accept (LE) as the right representation of Aristotle,

we're left with a puzzle. Why might Aristotle think

LE-conversion is valid? Answering this question is the
subject of Chapter

4

.

3

5.

Complaints Against De Re
Not all of the complaints against a de re analysis

focus on the question of validity. In The Development of

Logic [1961], William and Martha Kneale charge that a de re
interpretation is 'clearly wrong’ for an entirely
different reason:
If modal words modify predicates, there is no need
for a special theory of modal syllogisms. For
there are only ordinary assertoric syllogisms of
which the premises have peculiar predicates.
[Kneale and Kneale, 1961, p.91]

That isn't all the Kneales think is wrong with

a de re

analysis -- they also think that Aristotle's conversion

principles do require not de re, but de dicto modality, and
75

.

hence, that Aristotle's modal syllogistic is

incoherent [1961, p 91
.

]

This chapter and the preceeding ones illustrate how
a
de re analysis can give a plausible account
of conversion.

want to address the Kneales

'

I

other concern now, about the

effect of modal words modifying predicates. The point of
their criticism here is that a de re analysis makes the
modal syllogistic trivial since all the modal syllogisms are

then just

peculiar' variations of the non-modal syllogisms.

There is, however, good reason to believe that Aristotle

would not regard this as a serious criticism of his modal
logic. Consider again his remarks at 29b36-30a3:
In the case of necessary premises, then, the
situation is almost the same as with premises of
belonging: that is, there either will or will not
be a deduction with the terms put in the same way,
both in the case of belonging and in the case of
belonging or not belonging of necessity, except
that they will differ in the addition of
belonging (or not belonging) of necessity' to
the terms ....

There is no indication here that Aristotle regards this as

trivializing the modal syllogistic. We might even take
Aristotle to mean by this that a modal syllogistic that
didn't fall right out of the non-modal would be trivial. If
that is the case then the Kneales

1

complaint very definitely

misses the mark.

Aristotle's comments at 29b36-30a3, above, make clear
that necessary syllogisms differ from assertoric syllogisms
76

in the addition of

belonging (or not belonging) of

necessity' to the terms." Scholars eager to
show that a de
re analysis is right for Aristotle's
syllogistic have clung

tight to this particular passage, pointing to it
as good

evidence that de re is really what Aristotle means. But
the

evidence presented in this chapter shows that we cannot
take
this remark to mean that all necessary premises are
gotten

simply by uniformly substituting LA for A in non-modal
premises. In the cases of A- and I-conversion, uniform

substitution of LA for A does preserve validity. So the
valid de re analysis might well be right there. But as
Chapters

2

and

3

show, the evidence in the cases of LA- and

Ll-conversion is not decisive since the valid forms of these
conversions are not the only interpretations that get the
syllogisms to work; we can also give invalid de re

interpretations of LA- and Ll-conversion that are not gotten
by uniform substitution but that work very nicely.

LE-premises, however, are different. Sometimes

'when

Aristotle describes a universal privative necessary (LE)
premise, he isn't simply adding 'necessary' to the terms;
instead, he often expresses an LE-premise as a denial of

possibility -- as, for example, 'it is not possible for A to
belong to any B.' We cannot get this by substituting LA for
A in a non-modal E-premise ~=lx(Bx&Ax); we can get it by

substituting MA for A here, but, then, by substituting that
way, we are not at all doing what Aristotle describes at
77

,

39b35 30a3, above. The other of Aristotle's
LE-expressions
A belongs of necessity to no B,

necessity'

does look like 'of

'

is simply added to the terms,

but since Aristotle

takes this expression to be equivalent to 'it is not

possible for A to belong to any
Jx

(

Bx&MAx

and not

)

B,

it too must mean

’

Jx(Bx&LAx). Substituting LA for A in a

non-modal E-premise would get us ~3x Bx&LAx
(

equivalently Vx

(

Bx->~

LAx

)

,

and this

)

,

or

have shown is plainly

I

not what Aristotle means by an LE-premise.
Of course, there is always McCall's answer. We can

avoid all this messy trouble by representing an LE-premise
as

LEba

'

and then LE- conversion as LEba->LEab. This way

validity of the conversion isn't
to get Cesare LXL, Carnes t res XLL,

problem. McCall is able

a

an H
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But McCall doesn't provide a semantics for his propositions
and so it is difficult to evaluate his response.

There are scholars who do try to tell what his

propositions must mean. Fred Johnson and S.K. Thomason, in
particular, each offer a semantics for McCall's system. In

Chapter
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look closely at Thomason's semantics to see
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unanalysed propositions.
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1

ARISTOTELICITY

'

5

OF THOMASON'S SEMANTICS

A Semantics for McCall

Some people prefer McCall's approach to Aristotle's

modal syllogistic because its success does not hinge on the

question of how to interpret the modal premises, and as
these people like to point out, the question of de dicto

versus de re modals isn't one that directly concerns
Aristotle. If we follow McCall we can forget about whether
to interpret necessity de dicto or de re;

instead, we can do

things purely axiomatical ly and get the same results as

Aristotle. While that might seem a good move, it doesn't

really go any way towards explaining what exactly Aristotle
is doing.

This is because McCall doesn't give a semantics

for his system;

in other words,

he offers a way to represent

Aristotle's logic, but not an interpretation of it. For this
reason there is just as much a question about what McCall is

doing as there is about what Aristotle is doing, and so the

question in the last chapter about how to interpret an
LE-premise is still open. It would be interesting, then, to
see what would happen if we had a semantics for McCall.

Two logicians have taken McCall's system and given us
just that. Fred Johnson [1989] is the first. Steven

Thomason's original article [1993] is an attempt to improve
upon Johnson's semantics. When we look closely at what

Johnson and Thomason offer we see that we can indeed give de

re LPC translations for the syllogistic
even as McCall sets
it out.

Given the results in Chapters 2-4, that might not
be
surprising. What is surprising, however, are some of
the
basic assumptions that their semantics require, and
these

warrant some careful attention. In what follows

I

will take

Thomason's semantics as my example.
In two recent articles

[1993 and forthcoming], S.K.

Thomason develops a semantics for Storrs McCall's [1963]

representation of Aristotle's apodeictic syllogistic.
Thomason's work is largely an attempt to improve upon the

pioneering work of Johnson [1989], Thomason is inclined to
think of Johnson's models as 'contrived'

in that they are

explicitly defined in terms of certain of McCall's axioms
(Axioms 6-9 in Table

attempts to provide

7,

a

below). In Thomason [1993], Thomason

semantics in which those axioms fall

out, without having to explicitly stipulate that the

interpretations satisfy them. In a forthcoming article

Thomason extends those results, offering a more 'intuitive'

explanation for them. In both of his articles, Thomason
takes McCall's work as his base, and so the semantics he

gives is specifically a semantics for McCall's L-X-M system.
That this in turn makes it a good semantics for Aristotle's

system depends on how well McCall represents Aristotle. In
this chapter

I

try to consider Thomason's semantics in terms

of Aristotle's texts,

showing how ways we might read them do

make the semantics plausible.
80

)

I

)

)

)

)

set out the basics of Thomason's semantics
as he

gives them in pages 113-116 of Thomason
[1993], initially

making only a few notational modifications. Ultimately,
it
will help to give modal LPOtranslations of

Thomason's formulas.

McCall's system L-X-M (with inessential
modifications.
is as follows. The language
consists of terms (x,y, ... will be used as
meta-var iables ranging over terms), atoms
.

Axy
Ixy

Aky
E'ky

Iky
O'ky

.

)

"all x are y"
("some x are y"
("necessarily all x are y"
("necessarily all x are non- y"
("necessarily some x are y"
("necessarily some x are non- y"

(

and formulas
where a and

)

i

a where a is an atom, and
are formulas.
,

13

a-»B

The axioms of L-X-M are the tautologies of
propositional logic (with atoms, of course, in
place of the propositional letters) together with
all formulas of the forms A1-A14 of Table [7]...
and the only rule of inference is modus ponens.
The formulas A1-A14 of Table

7

McCall's system L-X-M.
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are exactly the axioms of

)

.

Table

)

))

7

McCall's Axioms
A1
A2
A3.
A4
A5
A6
A7
A8
A9

Axx

.

Ilxx
Ayz-»Axy-»Axz

.

.

(Barbara XXX)
(Datisi XXX)
(Barbara LXL)
(Cesare LXL)
(Darii LXL)
(Ferio LXL)
(Baroco LLL
(Bocardo LLL)
Ll-conversion
A- subordination
I-subordinat ion
0- subordination

Ayz>Iyxn>Ixz
A 'yz->AxyH>A uxz
E' zy->Axy=>E xz
A 'yz->Ixy->I xz
E yz-»Ixy-4 0 uxz
A zy->0' xy^O uxz
0 Vz-^A Vx-^O^xz
r xy->I yx
1

.

tJ

.

IJ

1

.

lJ

.

l

.

A10
All
A12
A13
A14.
.

.

.

1

1

j

1J

(

A"xy-*Axy
I xy->Ixy
0"xy-»0xy

(

IJ

(

(

<1>
<1>
<1>
<1>
<1>
<3>
<2>
<2>
<3>
<1>
<1>
<1>
<1>
<1>

Thomason [1993] actually gives three semantics,
increasing the strength from the first to the second to the
third. The first semantics validates only a portion of

McCall's system, the second validates more, and the third
gets the whole of McCall's system. <1>,

right-hand column of Table

7

<2>,

and <3> in the

correspond to the different

semantic frameworks, indicating the stage at which each of
the axioms above comes into play.

5

.

2

The First Semantics
At the heart of Thomason's semantics are various

functions that assign extensions to the terms. Those
functions are, in Thomason's notation, Ext, Ext*, and Ext

,

which when applied to a term x pick out the sets of things
that are x, necessar i ly-x

,

and necessarily-not-x,
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0

,

respectively. For reasons that become clear later
Thomason
imposes certain conditions on the relations
between these
various extensions. Let 4> denote the empty set.
The

conditions on the first semantics are
* Ext* x
c Ext x
and
Ext (x) n Ext x = 4).

(a)
(b)

A model

4>

(

(

)

(

l

)

,

)

of the first semantics consists of a set of

individuals, W, together with functions Ext, Ext

subject to conditions (a) and (b)

.

+

,

and Ext",

A valuation is a function

V from formulas to (T,F) satisfying the following
(c)
(d)

If M

V(±) = F
V(a->B) = T iff V(a)

=

F or F(/3)

=

T.

Ext
Ext") is a modeli then VM is
the valuation satisfying:
=

(W,

Ext,

VM(Axy)
VM(Ixy)

=

VTyi(A"xy)

VM(E"xy)
VM(l"xy)
VM M xy
(

T
T
= T
= T
= T
= T

=

)

+

,

Ext(x) c Ext(y)
Ext(x) D Ext(y) * b
Ext(x) £ Ext*(y)
Ext(x) £ Ext (y)
Ext (x)
Ext (y) ^ 4>
Ext* ( x
Ext (y) ^ 4>.

iff
iff
iff
iff
iff
iff

+

+

fl

)

fl

These semantic conditions can easily be expressed as rules
for translation into modal-LPC as follows, using A, B, and C

instead of Thomason's x, y,

z,

(bound) individual variables:

83

and reserving x, y,

z

for

)

)

Axy
Ixy

Vx( Bx->Ax

A"xy
E"xy
I"xy
0"xy

Vx Bx-»LAx
Vx Bx->L~Ax
3x LBx&LAx

lx

(

)

Bx&Ax

(
(
(

3x( LBx&L'Ax)

1

As my aim here is to see whether Thomason's semantics
is a good interpretation of Aristotle,

I

want to pay close

attention to the specific conditions Thomason imposes.

Condition (b) is straightforward and uncontroversial
as it stands,

condition (a)

* Ext (x)
+

<J>

c Ext(x),

occasion some controversy. Only part of

(a)

.

But,

might

is suspect --

the part that says the set of things that are necessari ly-x
is not empty,

Ext*(x) *

<J> .

I

will call this condition

Strong Existential Import': if ordinary existential import
tells us that whatever A may be 3xAx is true, then strong

existential import tells us that given ordinary existential
import

ixLAx is true.

Thomason's semantics explicitly

requires that strong existential import hold, and his work
shows it is needed to get the logic to work. It is not

In this translation method, LA simply denotes the
necessary A's. Of course, in ordinary modal logic L is a
sentential operator whose semantics is typically given in
terms of possible worlds: if L<|) is true, then 4> is true in
all accessible worlds. This way of putting it sounds grossly
unAristotelian, and for this reason many scholars eschew L's
and M's. But we needn't do this. The possible worlds
semantics certainly gives the right analysis and much more,
but the 'much more' isn't relevant to Aristotle's modal
logic. His logic concerns a language in which modal
operators have scope only over simple terms, never over
complexes, and so it can be given an analysis in terms of
the extension of terms for necessary-A s and necessary-notJ

'

A' s.
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clear,
fact,

however, that it is a condition Aristotle uses.
In

there is a very real question about whether the

motivation for Strong El is at all Aristotelian, or even
compatible with Aristotle's discussions of modals.

In the

rest of this section

I

want to consider how we might try to

justify Strong El with Aristotle.
Here is one way we might take him. Among the things in

Aristotle's metaphysics there are substances and their
accidents. When we say

Socrates is a man' we predicate

essentially because being a man is part of Socrates'
essence. When we say 'Socrates is white' we predicate

accidentally. The predication in this case is accidental

because being white isn't involved in what it is to be
Socrates,

it's accidental to him.

Aristotle explains that for
to have a whiteness in it,

a

In the Categories

,

subject to be white is for it

(la28-29). Matthews and Cohen

[1968] suggest a way of understanding this. They explain why

when Aristotle talks about the whiteness in Socrates we
should understand him to be talking about

a

particular

whiteness that is in Socrates. This particular whiteness is
not the same whiteness as, say, the particular whiteness

that's in Callias. If we can call this whiteness white, and

Aristotle seems to talk as though we can, then it's part of
its essential nature to be white. Then Callias is only

accidentally white because something in him (his whiteness)

85

is essentially white.

So if anything is white at all then

something is essentially white, and this is just
Strong Existential Import.

5

.

The Second Semantics

3

Even allowing the assumption of Strong El, Thomason's
first semantics still leaves the validity of Darii LXL and

Ferio LXL, as well as Cesare LXL and Baroco LLL, unaccounted
for.

These are exactly the Axioms 6-9 (Table

7)

that

Johnson's interpretations are explicitly required to
satisfy. In order to validate Darii LXL and Ferio LXL,

Thomason introduces a new condition on his second semantics.
(Cesare LXL and Baroco LLL fall under the third semantics

which

I

look at in section

5

Thomason defines a model

of this chapter.)
2

as a modelj that satifies the

additional condition

(1)

Ext(x)flExt(y) ^

Ext(x)DExt (y) *
+

<J>.

Thomason takes this to mean:
(WP)

If something satisfies both of two
predicates then something both satisfies
the first and necessarily satisfies the

second.

(WP)

[Thomason, 1993, p.112]

is a weird principle to attribute to Aristotle.

I

will

show why. This new condition, expressed in modal LPC, is
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(la)

Ix(BxStAx)

->

3x Bx&LAx
(

2
)

.

(*
As it stands,

the move,

(2)

(la)

is,

for example,

very plainly, invalid. It would allow
from

'some man is white'

(which Aristotle says is true) to
(3)

'some man is necessarily white'

(which he repeatedly tells us is false). If (WP) allows the

move from (2) to (3) then we had better not attribute it to

Aristotle since he would most certainly count that move as
invalid. But (1) does get the logic to work, and for this

reason it is worth asking whether there is anything that

could be said for it as an interpretation of Aristotle. Any
reasonable answer will need to block the move from
(2)

to (3).

Thomason, at any rate,

is aware that his condition (1)

is not an obvious Aristotelian doctrine.

He offers a

possible explanation:

Strong existential import falls right out of this
condition, since
3x(Ax&Ax) -» lx(Ax&LAx)
(*)
*) implies IxLAx.
is an instance of (la), and
2
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Someone who believes that predicates are, by their
nature, necessarily non-vacuous, might well
believe also that they interact in such a way that
when they intersect they intersect necessarily (in
the weak sense that each will be satisfied by
oomething that satisfies the other necessarily).
[Thomason, 1993, p. 120]

Thomason is careful not to actually attribute this notion to
m.ioLOtle; he just offers this as one way of accounting for
the system McCall gives. We might try to justify Thomason's

condition by appeal to Aristotle's talk in Posterior

Analytics A22 about 'genuine predication.' Aristotle there
explains that

the white thing is a log'

is not an example

of genuine predication. The reason is that 'white'

identifies a subject indirectly, or accidentally. Genuine

predication doesn't allow picking out a subject in this way.
If identifying the subject by a non-substantial term makes

the predication not genuine, then only when we predicate

something of a subject which is identified by a substance
term do we predicate genuinely. For anything to be a

substance is already for it to be essentially what it is. In
this sense we might take 'man' as equivalent to
'

necessary=man

’

since anything that is a man is so

essentially. Horse would be equivalent to necessary-horse,
and so on. This gives us a way around the invalid move above

from (2) 'some man is white' to (3) 'some man is necessarily
white';

instead, we would get validly from (2) 'some man is

white* to (4) 'something that’s a necessary-man is white.’
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)

)

.

Since that is not invalid, it seems a better
way to go. But
that would mean that Thomason's condition
(1) cannot be

quite so general a condition as he makes it out
to be.
Instead, we might try restricting it to the valid
principle
(lb)

3x

(Bx&Ax)

3x LBx&Ax
where B
identifies the subject term of the
predication and the predication is
genuine
->

(

)

,

3

.

It would be good to see what effect the restriction
to

(lb) might have on a particular syllogism.

Darii LXL (A7,

in

Table 7) is part of McCall's axiom system. Thomason

interprets an Ll-premise as 3x(LBx&LAx). Darii LXL has an
Ll-conclusion, so Thomason's interpretation of Darii LXL is
Vx ( Bx->LAx

d x Cx&Bx
3x LCx&LAx
(

(

)

What's involved in getting the logic to work out right?
First,

consider the minor premise in Darii above --

x ( Cx&Bx

)

.

Assuming now that all premises are examples of

genuine predication, then since C is the subject term, we
can legitimately apply (lb) to the minor premise to get
Ix(LCxScBx).

Now we have:

0ne might consi de r a further restriction which takes
all terms in the apodeictic syllogistic to be substances.
But then there will be no difference between Barbara XLL and
Barbara LLL. And for Aristotle the first is invalid, the
second valid.
3
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)

Vx(Bx->LAx)
-i

x(

LCx&Bx

)

3x ( LCx&LAx
and,

simple transitivity gets the conclusion
Thomason's
interpretation requires. Thomason's version
of Ferio LXL may
also be derived from (lb).
so,

The restrictions required in (lb) do not
pose

insurmountable problems for Thomason's second
semantics. In
fact,

if Thomason simply restricts his
(1)

to (lb),

he

forfeits nothing other than a little extra generality.
And

d^ing oO gets him a far more plausible interpretation.

Thomason might not agree that he forfeits nothing here. He
might think he must then forfeit Disamis XLL

restriction

I

,

because the

suggest certainly doesn't allow Disamis XLL as

McCall gives it.

5

.

4

Disamis XLL Again
McCall takes Disamis XLL to be
lea
LAcb
LIba,

and this, plainly,

is invalid.

A simple falsifying model has

terms brown, animal, and horse:

Some horses are brown
All horses are necessarily animals
Some animals are necessarily brown.
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McCall gives no explanation for the
apparent invalidity of
the syllogism as he construes it. And
this leaves McCall's
interpreters in the rather awkward position
of needing to
explain the invalidity away.
Thomason,

in the first place,

takes an apodeictic

I-premise, LIba, to be doubly modal: 3x LBx&LAx
(

)

.

(in a case

where B is a substance term like 'animal,' B and
LB are

presumably equivalent.) So Thomason's interpretation
of
Disamis XLL will be
3x ( Cx&Ax
Vx ( Cx->LBx
Hx( LBx&LAx

)

where A is a predicate term. Here is where Thomason needs
the Weird Principle (WP) that if something satisfies each of
two predicates, then something satisfies the first predicate

and of necessity satisfies the second. So if something is

both C and A, then something is both C and LA. Consider how
this affects the proof of Disamis XLL:

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

3x ( Cx&Ax

Given

3x(Cx&LAx)
3x( LAx&Cx)
Vx Cx-*LBx
3x LBx&LAx

Conversion, 2
Given
Transitivity 3,4

(WP),

(
(

1

The Weird Principle is needed to get this to work because in

premise (1), A is a predicate term, not a subject term. But
there is good evidence that Aristotle himself would reject
(WP). Nonetheless,

the Weird Principle does seem necessary,
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since if we take Disamis XLL McCall's
way, then Thomason's
Weird Principle follows. On Thomason's
interpretation
the

B- term in Disamis XLL is an essential
B,

so B and LB are

equivalent in this case. Identifying the C and

B

terms gives

Hx(Bx&Ax
Vx Bx-»LBx

)

x ( Bx&LAx

)

(

So,

Ix(BxStAx)

-»

^x( Bx&LAx).

But perhaps we don't want to take Disamis XLL McCall's
way. When we look at the text of the Prior Analytics

,

we

find that Aristotle's description of this syllogism is not

completely clear:
Thus, if it is necessary for B to belong to every
C and A is below C, then it is necessary for B to
belong to some A, (31bl6- 17).
In fact,

from the text it appears there are two possible

responses to McCall. In the lines leading up to this, at
31bl2- 16

,

Aristotle pretty clearly means to describe a

syllogism with one universal and one particular premise. But
from the text it would appear that 'A is below

31bl6-17 must mean 'some A is

C,

'

C'

at

with A as the subject

term. Following McCall, Thomason gives the AC premise as

'some C is A,

1

with C as the subject term. But, as Aristotle

sets out the AC premise at 31bl7-20, the subject-term of the

premise is A and C is really the predicate. That suggests
the syllogism at 31bl6-17 might really be
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)

Ix(AxStCx)

Vx ( Cx->LBx
3x Bx&LAx )
)

(

where A is the subject term of the first
premise. If we take
it that way, then Thomason doesn't
need the Weird Principle
at all. He only needs the restricted
version of (1) -- i. s
(lb) -- that says we can put an L on
a term in

.,

subject position.
Perhaps a still better move would be to say
that

C

below

'

A is

at 31bl5-17 really is a universal. The
syllogism in

question would turn out to be
Vx( Ax->Cx
Vx ( Cx->LBx
lx

(

^

LBx&LAx

)

.

All Thomason needs to get that to come out right is Strong

Existential Import together with the assumption that no
terms are empty:

(

1

)

(

2

)

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Vx Ax->Cx
Vx LAx->Ax
Vx(Cx-^LBx)
Vx(LAx->LBx)

Given
Given
Given
Transitivity 2,3

3xLAx

SEI
4,5

(

(

ix(LAx&LBx)

Either of these two readings would,

I

think, help

Thomason. But because his interest is to give a good

semantics for McCall, Thomason simply admits Disamis XLL as
McCall gives it, and so is left needing to validate

reasoning that Aristotle himself might have rejected.
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5

The Third Semantics:

Cesare LXL and Baroco LLL remain to be
validated, and
these Thomason treats in his Third
Semantics. He defines a
model, as a model, that satisfies the
conditions
(e)
(f)

Ext b cExt“ a
Ext b cExt a
(

)

(

)

(

)

-*

+

(

)

A formula is valid

3

->

Ext(a)£Ext" (b)
Ext (a) cExt“(b)

.

if it is true in all models,.

Since a

model, does satify conditions (e) and (f), Thomason
gets

Axioms A6 (Cesare LXL) and A9 (Baroco LLL) to come
out valid

because all models

3

are carefully restricted in a way that

guarantees their validity. Consider the justification for
Cesare LXL as Aristotle gives it at 30b9-13:
(1)

Vx Bx->L ~ Ax

(2)
(3)

Vx Cx->Ax
Vx(Ax->L~Bx)

(4)

Vx ( Cx-*Ax

(5)

Vx(Cx->L~Bx

(

(

)

Cesare LXL does not

let it not be possible for A to
belong to any B
let A merely belong to C
neither is it possible for B to
belong to any A
but A belongs to every C,

consequently
it is not possible for
to any C

B to

belong

s

allowed in subject position. For take A to be animal,

B

white, and C man, and suppose that the only white things are

plants, which by necessity are not animals. The illegitimate

move of course is the principle that gets from (1) to (3), a
principle, perhaps, most commonly called

modal LPC this is just Vx(Bx->L~Ax)
is equivalent to condition (e)
94

'

LE-conversion

Vx ( Ax-*L~Bx

)

.

.
'

And this

above. As Aristotle first

In

:

states LE- conversion, at 25a29=30, and
when he uses it in
Cesare LXL above, the conversion seems
to be fully general
that is,

it appears that (e)

captures just what Aristotle

means without the need for any additional
restrictions on
terms. But that is only part of the story
that emerges from
the text. As Aristotle goes on to elaborate,
it becomes
clear that (e) is really too general for his
purposes.
Here is why.
I

have already referred to Posterior Analytics
22, in

which Aristotle explains that accidents can never take
the
subject position, only the predicate position. What's more,

were an accident to take subject position, then the result
for Aristotle either is not predication at all, or is

predication only by courtesy, 83al5-17. If this holds true
in the Prior Analytics as well,

then any instance of (e)

involving an accidental term presents a problem since

(e)

puts both the A term and the B term in subject position.

There is some evidence that Aristotle is aware in the Prior

Analytics of the difficulties this raises: In 43bl-6, he
sets out a method for selecting syllogistic premises that

would appear to rule out necessary privative premises
in general
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)

So one must select the premises
about each subject
4
in this way, assuming first the
subject itself
and both definitions and whatever is
peculiar to
the subject; next after this, whatever
follows the
subject; next, whatever the subject follows;
and
then, whatever cannot belong (me
endechetai . .huparchein to it. (Those to
which it
is not possible (me endechetai
for the subject to
belong need not [or, perhaps, must not
be
]
sslccted, because the privative converts
''
.

)

(

43bl-6

)

.

If this method applies to universal premises 6

strongly,

,

then,

taken

it would appear to mean that LE-conversion is

altogether irrelevant to the syllogistic. Even in its
weakest sense, it shows that in the syllogistic Aristotle
doesn

t

regard every instance of LE-conversion as relevant.

Following the argument in Posterior Analytics 22, one would
suppose the irrelevant LE-conversions are those that involve
some accidental term. LE-conversion, and hence, condition
(e),

does work when both terms are required to be substance

predicates, as for instance when A is 'horse' and B is
man':

'all men are necessari ly-non-horses

horses are necessari ly-non-men

Robin Smith
reading
4

(p.

.
'

'

goes to 'all

That seems unproblematic,

151) notes the Greek is open to either

One might suppose that 43bl-6 is only about particular
premises. But it seems that Aristotle means to set out a
general method for selecting syllogistic premises. In fact,
it would appear that 43b6 must be about universal premises.
This is because Aristotle has earlier explained (25a35-36)
that necessary particular privatives LO-premises do not
convert, since even non-modal O-premises do not convert in
the syllogistic. The point of 43b6 is that premises about
what is not possible do convert, so unless Aristotle is
contradicting himself, the line must refer to universals.
b

(
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)

)
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especially if we think that all
men are necessarily men and
all horses are necessarily
horses, and that what it is
to be
a horse, i.e., the nature
of horse, excludes being a
man,

and vice versa.

Let's turn now to Thomason's condition
(f). in modal
LPC (f) becomes Vx(Bx^LAx) -> Vx
L~Ax-»L~Bx
Consider an
instance of (f) in which the B term is
an accident. Let A be
man and B be white: if every white is
a necessary man, then
every necessary-non-man is necessarily-not-white,
which
seems not to follow. But if the antecedent
in this case is a
premise at all, it is only a premise by
courtesy, so it
(

)

.

isn t clear whether in this case we can
legitimately or

meaningfully convert according to (f). Thomason
introduces
(

-l

)

in order to validate Baroco LLL.

In modal LPC,

his

translation of Baroco LLL will be:
Vx ( Bx-»LAx
Vx LCx&L ~Ax
3x ( LCx&L ~Bx
(

)

This would seem to fail when A is animal, B is white, and C
is plant.

One reply would be to point out that the only term

here that is not modally qualified is the B-term, and that
is a subject term.

If Aristotle in the modal syllogistic

really is concerned only with predication that is genuine,
then B is already implicitly modal since it must be a

substance term. This would mean that the terms set out here

—

animal, white, and plant

—
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cannot be used to provide a

counter-example to Baroco LLL

,

and so, presumably,

it

is valid.

Maybe this cannot be the whole story. In establishing
the invalidity of Camestres LXL (30b20-40) and Baroco
LXL
(

31al0-15

) ,

Aristotle chooses terms which obviously allow

for premises which are not genuine. His terms in those
cases

are animal, man, and white. The question for principle (f)
is why these terms should not be chosen there.

answer this in greater detail in Chapter
i_he

6.

I

will try to

My purpose in

present chapter is to see what can be said in favor of

Thomason's semantics on the basis of Aristotle's text. In

discussing these issues

I

have accepted Thomason's

translations and considered the extent to which the

assumptions he makes can be textually justified.

5

.

6

Thomason's Relational Semantics
In a forthcoming article 'Relational Models for the

Modal Syllogistic,

1

Thomason aims to make his semantics more

intuitive. What he does is neat, and it raises a new

question: does what makes it more intuitive also make it any

more Aristotelian in flavor? So far, in the earlier sections
of this paper

I

have tried to find ways of restricting

Thomason's semantic conditions in order to make them better
fit Aristotle. The relational models are based on Thomason's

(unrestricted) semantics, and so the relational account will
be likely to admit some unwanted consequences, such as the
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Weird Principle.
In his relational models,
Ext* ( x

)

Thomason uses

in place of Ext(x) and

and

jxj

j

xn

He also introduces

.
j

x°
|

to denote the possible x's.

|

x'
|

Ext (x).

not x's

If Ext (x)

—

is the complement of

denotes the things that are necessarily

the things that couldn't be x's

—

then

x°
|

denotes the things that could be x's -- things whose nature
doesn't rule out their being x's. Thomason takes

n

|x

|

buoic
of

x

c*nd

non-empty

.

He then defines

using two relations R and

S.

a £

|

x

x

in terms

is defined in such

[x
j

a way that for any individual a,

and

jxj

to be

iff 3b(b £

j

|x

a
|

and

bRa). The possible extension is defined similarly: for any

individual

a £

a,

x

:

iff

be understood as saying,

individual

a

lb(b £

|x'|

and bSa)

.

These can

less formally, that for any

to be x is for a to be R-related to an

individual b that is necessarily-x

.

For

a

to be possibly-x

is for a to be S-related to an individual b that is

necessarily-x.

Expressing this in LPC with

representing terms, and

x,

(not terms as in Thomason),

y,

A,

etc.,

B,

etc.,

for predicates

for individual variables

then the idea is that we take as

basic for any term A the set of things which are necessarily
A.

We might justify this by thinking of the necessary A's as

the things whose nature it is to be A, and all the other A's
as things which are A by some kind of association with a

necessary A. So we might say, then, that Socrates is white
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virtue of his association with a whiteness,
where this
whiteness is white by nature.
If the necessary A's determine the
(actual) A's,

prefixing an

L

then

to A is at least intuitively backwards.
So

instead of LA, let A* denote those things that
are A by
nature. So A* corresponds to LA except that it is
not

defined by prefixing a modal operator to

A.

Then Thomason's

rule would be that instead of writing LAx, one would
write
A*x; and instead of writing Ax one would write 3y(A*y
&

yRx

and instead of writing MAx one would write ~ly(A*y &

) ;

ySx). Consider Hy(A*y & yRx). Let yRx be true iff y=x or x
is
A'

in’

y -- 'in'

in the sense of the Categories.

Then 'x is

would be true iff either x is A by nature or there is in

x a y that is A by nature.

In order to get all of McCall's syllogisms,

Thomason

imposes certain restrictions on the relational models:
(g)

|x

n

*
|

<t>

guarantees that there are some necessary x's. That is.
Strong Existential Import still holds. With A* for LA, it

becomes ^xA*x.
(h)

R is an equivalence relation.

This validates the 'dubious'
Ix(BxScLAx)

-- that is,

inference from

it validates

100

(WP)

^x(Bx&Ax) to

-- as follows:

Suppose

Hx

(

Bx&Ax

)

.

Then,

in terms of Thomason's
translation,

this means that 3x(3y(B*y&yR X & 3z
)
A*z&zRx
(

some x, y,

& zRx),

B*y & yRz & A*z for that same
y and

z;

ix

(

ly

(

B*y&yRz

)

.

That is, for

we have (B*y & y R x & a*z & zRx). But
R is an

z,

equivalence relation, so since (yRx

lz(

)

)

& A*z).

So,

with x for

then yRz, and so

that is,
z,

we have

iy(B*y&yRx) & A*x), and this is just
Thomason's

relational interpretation of 3 x (Bx&LAx).
If R is an equivalence relation then it's
difficult to

give an Aristotelian justification -- in fact, the
symmetry

requirement on R introduces problems here. Suppose that
Socrates is white by virtue of the fact that he stands in

relation R to something (his whiteness) that's essentially
white. Then by symmetry his whiteness is R- associated with

Socrates and so his whiteness is human -- since it is

R-associated with something essentially human, namely
Socrates. So there is something (Socrates' whiteness) which
is accidentally human and is essentially white.

This is an

odd justification for the principle. But again, the

principle at issue here is the Weird Principle, 3x(Bx&Ax)
lx

(

Bx&LAx )

,

-4

and that, as we have seen, is something Thomason

may not need.
If R is the relation between a substance and an

accident that holds when the substance has the accident in
it,

then

S

is the relation between a substance and an

accident if the accident is the kind of thing the substance
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could have in it. According to the
relational semantics, it
will be true that some man is possibly
white' if some man
IS associated by S with an essential
white (a whiteness).
But Thomason wants to make the S-relation
symmetrical. This
would have the whiteness S-associated with
the
man.

Following Thomason's translations, then, some
whiteness
would be a possible man. The plausibility of this
depends
upon what, if anything, Aristotle would count as
a possible
man; and it is not at all obvious that a whiteness
would

count. Again, the symmetry reguirement gets

unintuitive results.
One of the neat things about Thomason's R and

S

relations is the way they link with Aristotle's account of

predication in the Categories
S

But Thomason wants both R and

to be symmetrical relations, and in each case that gets

him into trouble. There's no reason to think that these

relations should be symmetrical. In the case of

R,

this is

easy to see if we take R to be the converse of the
'

in -relation in the Categories
'

of 'Socrates is white'

.

in the Categories the truth

is explained by the fact that he has

'in'

him something that is essentially white. That is to

say,

something that is essentially white stands in relation

R to him.

But the

"

in -relation for Aristotle is a relation
'

of ontological dependence, and if that were symmetrical then

Socrates (a primary substance) would have to be in a
subject. Aristotle is very explicit that no substance will

ever be that:

That it never is present in a subject
holds

good of all substance whatever,' Categories,
3a7.
In developing a semantics for McCall,
Thomason answers

many of the important interpretive questions
McCall leaves
open. For the few respects in which Thomason's
results sound

unAr istotel ian,

I

suggest ways we might try to make his

semantics better fit Aristotle. The Categories
suggests a
plausible justification for the Strong Existential
Import
that Thomason's semantics requires. Several others
of

Thomason's conditions are so general that they admit
flagrantly invalid readings. In all but one of these cases,
^®st

j_

i

ct ing premises to what Aristotle calls genuine

predication gives a way of blocking the unintended readings
and validating Thomason's conditions. In order to validate

Disamis XLL as McCall represents it, Thomason introduces
what

I

have called a Weird Principle. But McCall's account

of Disamis XLL is,

I

think, not obviously right. Finally,

in

his Relational Semantics, Thomason gives a clear,

intuitively plausible account of Aristotelian statements of

necessity and possibility. But the symmetry of the relations
he uses is too strong.
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CHAPTER

6

THE APODEICTIC INVALIDS

6

•

1

Restrictions on Terms
In Chapter 5,

I

mentioned several issues that arise

from trying to fit Thomason's semantics to
Aristotle's text.
In this Chapter I want to try to answer
a puzzle posed in

Section

5

of Chapter 5. The puzzle goes like this.

It seems

that Baroco LLL cannot be shown to be invalid by
selecting
animal,

'

white,

'

and 'plant' as our terms A, B, and C.

Baroco LLL on Thomason's interpretation is
Vx(Bx->LAx)

d x LCx&L~Ax
lx( LCx&L ~Bx
(

)

.

Thomason, himself, doesn't impose any restrictions on terms
in the syllogistic. And so it would seem that animal, white,

and plant are suitable terms. We then get:
All white things are necessary animals
Some (necessary) plant is necessari lv-not an animal
Some (necessary) plant is necessari ly-not white.
It isn't at all clear what to say about this.

Is it really

valid? Is it really an instance of Baroco LLL? Following

Thomason's semantics and placing no restrictions on terms,
this would appear to be an instance of Baroco LLL. But even

assuming the premises are true, it isn't obvious that the

conclusion need be true also. If we count white as an
accidental property of plants, then it might well be that no

plant is by necessity not white, since
any plant may be or
become white.

Aristotle doesn't have much to say about why
he counts
Baroco LLL as valid. He deals with the LLL
syllogisms very
briefly in Chapter A8 of the Prior Analytics
.

And his

comments there provide little insight about what
he might
say about the argument above. But one thing
we can
be

certain about is that, for Aristotle, there can
be no
invalid instance of Baroco LLL if Baroco LLL is a
valid

syllogistic form. So if the premises are true and the

conclusion false, then either that's proof that Baroco LLL
is not valid -- even though Aristotle says it is -or the

argument above -- with terms animal, white, and plant

—

isn't an instance of Baroco LLL.

This latter,

I

think,

is the only reasonable answer.

But then we want to know why these terms are not

appropriate. In Chapter
I

5,

looking at Thomason's semantics,

suggested the inappropriateness of these terms has to do

with the fact that
so,

white'

is an accidental property and,

cannot be a proper subject of an L-premise.

I

explained

why Aristotle might think that L-premises, or necessary
predication, must always be predication about subjects in
the category of substances. If that is right, then the

matter of terms for Baroco LLL is then easy to answer.
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Because Baroco LLL has all L-premises,
the subject of each
premise must be a substance term, and
so 'white' cannot be
chosen as the subject of the first
premise here.
If that's all we need then mightn't
we just restrict

terms in the apodeictic syllogistic to
substance terms and
then avoid the problem of accidental
subjects altogether?
This is the way Patterson [1995] reads
Jeroen van Rijen
[1989].

1

If we restrict all terms in the
apodeictic

syllogistic to substance terms then any term
well be given as
A o

L<t>

(

)

.

So far so good. This analysis

fits nicely with some of the restrictions
5.

can just as

An LA=premise 'All B's are necessary

.

then becomes Vx LBx->LAx

Chapter

<j,

I

suggested in

But there is an important difference. Restricting

all terms in the apodecitic syllogistic to substance terms

has the effect of blurring any distinction between the LLL

syllogisms and the mixed modal LXL and XLL syllogisms. Also,
if the restriction is right,

then there will be no real

difference between the assertoric and apodeictic syllogisms
either -- the apodeictic will be just the restricted case of
the assertoric when the terms are all substance terms. There
is another major problem:

if all terms in the apodeictic

syllogistic are necessary, then there is no difference

between Barbara LLL and Barbara XLL. Aristotle, however,

‘I think Patterson has misunderstood van Rijen.
In
fact, some remarks at the end of van Rijen' s book [1989, p.
208] point in the direction of the account I develop in this

chapter
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does describe a difference; he says
the first is valid, the
second invalid. Patterson [1995] discusses
these and other
disadvantages that come of making all terms
substance terms.
Patterson is right about the consequences,
though it is not
clear that he's altogether right about
attributing this
restriction and its troubling consequences to
van Rijen.
At the moment,

I

want to look at yet another problem

that comes of requiring all terms in the
apodeictic

syllogistic to be substance terms. The problem is
simple:
this requirement does not fit well with Aristotle's
own

examples using terms. Van Rijen prefers not to lay much

weight on Aristotle's use of terms and argues that the

striking carelessness of [Aristotle's use of terms]

witnesses the relative unimportance of this part of the
theory's systematics" [van Rijen, 1989,
Rijen

'

s

view,

p.

201]. On van

"the only part of apodeictic syllogistics that

can safely be taken to represent [Aristotle's] clear

inuitions [is] the inference base of his system" [1989,
201]

.

p.

It seems to me that it may be a little hasty to ignore

the text to such an extent, since all sorts of interesting

things emerge when we look at Aristotle's own examples. One
of them bears immediately on the question now at hand about

why we can't take all terms in the apodeictic syllogistic to
be substance terms: when we survey the text we see that

Aristotle without fail includes an accident among the terms
for apodeictics. We have already seen some examples of this;
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for instance in Section

5

of Chapter 5, we looked at the

terms Aristotle chooses to show that Camestres
LXL and

Baroco LXL are invalid. The terms for each are animal,
man,
and white. The fact that Aristotle uses accidents
to

illustrate invalidity shows that accidents are

a

part of the

apodeictic syllogistic. And, so, for this reason too, the
restriction that all terms be substance terms is too strong.
This restriction is too strong to apply across the

board to apodeictic syllogisms since these include the mixed

apodeictic LXL and XLL syllogisms as well as pure LLL
apodeictics. But if we do distinguish between mixed and pure
apodeictics, then there is a place for a restriction to

substance terms. It applies to the pure LLL's. In fact, it
is then just another way of saying,

as we did in Chapter

5,

that necessary predication must be genuine predication since

necessary predication must always be about substancesubjects. On the other hand, if accidents are allowed as

terms in the mixed apodeictics, then perhaps it's the fact
that these are mixed -- the fact that they include an

X-premise -- that makes the accidental terms appropriate
to them.

The way to get clear about this is to look closely at

what Aristotle has to say about terms, how he uses them, and
what exactly they are supposed to show. Aristotle generally

doesn't give terms for the valid syllogisms, so my focus
will be the invalids. Aristotle's method of establishing
108

invalidity typically involves setting out
counter-examples.
These counter-examples are always given
as triples of terms
which, when put into the appropriate form,
make the premises
true and the conclusion false. In this chapter
I want to
look at those structures Aristotle counts as
invalid with an
aim to see whether the counter-examples he offers
obey the
restrictions that
I

I

have just suggested.

should explain that these invalid structures aren't

strictly

syllogisms' since Aristotle reserves the name

syllogism' only for the valid cases. But the invalid moods

play a very important role in the 'syllogistic' as

a whole.

From them we know which structures Aristotle rejects. But
also through his counter-examples, we find some hints about

why precisely he does reject them, hints about what makes
them invalid. For these reasons, the invalids must be

counted as part of the syllogistic, even if they aren't

strictly syllogisms. And, so, any attempt to model the

syllogistic must, of course, get the right results in the
invalid cases as well as the valid ones. Also, a good

account will need to accomodate and make sense of

Aristotle's counter-examples.
Not everyone will agree with this last remark. Van

Rijen plainly does not agree. Aristotle's technique of

setting out counter-examples has long irked scholars. It has

particularly bothered those scholars who regard logic -Aristotle's included -- as purely formal.
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Lukasiewicz [1957,

p.

72] and Ross

[1957, pp.

28-29] are
among the unhappy formalists. Ross
gives a lengthy and
passionate explanation of his dissatisfaction
with

Aristotle's method:
...it is not a completely satisfactory
way of
proving the invalidity of invalid
combinations;
tor instead of appealing to their
form as the
source of their invalidity, he appeals
to our
supposed knowledge of certain particular
propositions in each case. Whereas in dealing
with
the valid moods he works consistently
with ABC for
the first figure, MNX for the second, PRS
for the
third, and, by taking propositional functions
denoted by pairs of letters, not actual
propositions about particular things, makes it
plain that validity depends upon form, and thus
becomes the originator of formal logic, he
discovers the invalidity of the invalid moods
simply by trial and error. [Ross, 1957,
pp 28-29]
.

At the heart of Ross'

complaint are some very basic

ideas about the nature of logic. Ross adheres to a

traditional view according to which Aristotle's logic, like
all logic,

is formal.

Taking the syllogistic to be anything

less than purely formal has seemed to many scholars to

suggest that Aristotle's accomplishment is of lesser value.
Since to introduce terms and propositions is to introduce

extra-logical, and hence, irrelevant, information, it has

seemed to some people that Aristotle's counter-examples are

really something of an embarrassment. Only recently have
scholars begun to see the modal syllogistic as a logic of

essentialism that neatly mirrors much of Aristotle's
metaphysics and theory of predication. Even today, the
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formalists still find supporters. Corcoran
[1974] is strong
advocate of the formal approach. These different

perspectives are far-reaching, affecting more than just
what
we say about Aristotelian counter-examples. They
affect what
exactly we take the point of the syllogistic to be in the

broadest sense.
Chapter

8.

I

will return to this issue in detail in

At present

I

want to focus on the extra- logical

information the counter-examples do provide. However

dissatisfied we may be by the use of counter-examples, one
thing we can be certain about is that they provide

meaningful examples of the kinds of premises Aristotle is
concerned with in the syllogistic. So rather than take the

counter-examples to be examples of bad logic,

I

want to try

to take them as good examples of what good syllogistic

premises are supposed to be.

6

.

2

A4-6: Assertoric Invalids

The method of establishing invalidity by

counter-examples is not peculiar to the modal syllogistic.
It is a method Aristotle also uses in the assertoric, or

non-modal, syllogistic. The counter-examples there provide
the clearest evidence in the syllogistic of what for

Aristotle counts as a good X-premise. This makes the
assertoric invalids a good place to begin to look at what
kinds of relations between terms do not yield

Aristotelian conclusions.
Ill

In Chapter A4, Aristotle
discusses deductions in the

first figure. These are all of the
form
BA
CB
CA,

where the term on the left of each premise
pair is the
subject, the term on the right is the predicate.
In Chapter
A5 he discusses the second figure:

BA
CA
CB
In A6

,

he describes the third figure:

CA
CB
BA.

In each figure, when Aristotle rejects a premise

combination, he shows that it does not, in itself, guarantee
any conclusion. He does this by showing that from true

premises, first, we do not get a negative conclusion and,
second, neither do we get an affirmative conclusion. So for

each rejected premise combination there are two sets of
terms -- that is, two sets of (ordered) triples of terms
<A,B,C>. Both sets make the premises true. The first set is

supposed to show that the conclusion will not always be
privative. The terms that make this clear are 'terms for

belonging,'

i.e.,

from them an affirmative conclusion does
112

:

follow. The second set of terms
shows that the conclusion
will not always be affirmative. So,
in this case, the terms
are
for not belonging.
Often Aristotle effects the
'

difference between belonging and not belonging
by changing a
single term.
To see how all this works,

26a2-9

,

consider an example. At

Aristotle wants to make clear that no conclusion

results from the first-figure combination of 'All
B's are
and 'No C s are B
'

A'

'

.nothing necessary results in virtue of these
things being so. For it is possible for the first
extreme [the A term] to belong to all as well as
to none of the last [the C term]
Consequently,
neither a particular nor a universal deduction
becomes necessary; and, since nothing is necessary
because of these, there will not be a deduction.
Terms for belonging are animal, man, horse; for
belonging to none, animal, man, stone.
.

.

.

From the first triple <animal, man, horse> we have premises
All men are animals' and

No horses are men,

1

but it is

clear that we cannot have a negative (E or 0) conclusion: we
can't have either

No horse is an animal' or 'Some horse is

not an animal' because all horses are animals. From
<animal, man, stone> we cannot have an A-conclusion ('All

stones are animals'

is false) nor can we have an

I-conclusion (it is false that 'Some stones are animals').
So whatever form we try to give the conclusion here -- that
is,

whether we try to make it an

A,

E,

I,

or 0-conclusion --

we can give terms that make the premises true and the
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conclusion false. And so, no conclusion follows;
so no
syllogism results.
T^e method is similar for the other invalid
moods
list each of the triples in Table

8.

I

Table

,

,

8

Counter Examples in the Assertoric Syllogistic
terms for belonging

for not belonging

A4:

<animal, man, horse>
<science, line, medicine>
<good, condition, wisdom>
<white, horse, swan>
<animal, man, white>
<inanimate, man, white>
<animal, white, horse>

First Figure

<animal, man, stone>
<science, line, unit>
<good, condition, ignorance>
<white, horse, raven>

26a8-9 A+E
26al2-13, E+E
26a31-36 I /0+A
26a36-38 I /0+E
26a40-b9 A+O/E
26bl0-14, E+0
26b22-25, I+I,
0+0, I+0,0+I
,

,

,

,

<animal, white, stone>

A5

<substance, animal, man>
<line, animal, man>
<animal, substance, raven>
<animal, substance, unit>
<black, snow, animal>
<white, swan, stone>
<white, animal, raven>
<white, animal, snow>
<white, animal, man>

line numbers,
premise types

:

Second Figure

<substance, animal, number>
<line, animal, stone>
<animal, white, raven>
<animal, substance, science>

27al8-20 A+A
27a21-22 E+E
2 7b4-6 0+A
27b7-8, I+E
27b9-16 E+0
27b23-26, A+I
27b29-32,0+E
27b32-33 I+A
27b34-40, I+I
0+0 I +0 0+
,

,

,

,

<white, stone, raven>
<white, animal, swan>
<white, animal, inanimate>

,

,

,

A6: Third Figure

<animal, horse, man>
<animal, horse, inanimate>
<animate, man, animal>
<animal, man, wild>
<animal, science, wild>
<raven, snow, white>
<animal, man, white>

<animal, inanimate, man>
<man, horse, inanimate>

28a31-32 A+E
28a33-35 E+E
28b22— 24 A+0
28b36-38 I+E
28b39-29al ,0+E
29a2 E+0
29a7-10, I+I
0+0 I +0 0+
,

,

,

<animal, science, wild>
<animal, man, wild>

,

,

<raven, snow, white>

,

115

,

want to focus on just a few of the
points we can
infer from these examples. In the first
place,
I

it is

clear that
(a)
(b)
(c)

some white thing is an animal (26b22-25)
some man is white (27b34-40)
all men are animals (26a8-9)

are all acceptable premises in the assertoric
syllogistic.

This makes assertoric premises very different
from the

apodeictic premises that we considered in Chapter

where

5,

it seems that necessary premises must be instances
of

genuine predication. On the basis of premise

(a) we can see

that in an assertoric premise
(1)

an accident can take subject position.

So an assertoric premise need not be an instance of genuine

predication. From (b), it is clear that
(2)

And,

an accident can take predicate position.

the fact that Aristotle uses (c) as an assertoric

premise shows that
(3)

even genuine substantial predication
yields acceptable assertoric premises.

Up until now, when I've discussed premises like (c)

are animals,

1

'all men

my main concern has been to show how Aristotle

adds the modal qualifier 'of necessity' to give a (de re)
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premise:

L

all men are of necessity animals.' But
in

Chapters A4-6, Aristotle only considers
assertoric premises,
or X-premises. And at A4, 26a8-9, 'all men
are
animals'

not modally qualified;

is

it appears here as only an X-premise.

The evidence in Table

8

is interesting also for what it

leaves out. In his assertoric counter-examples,
Aristotle

never offers a triple of terms involving more than one
accident. So statements like

the white is musical' that

feature in Metaphysics Z4, are not obviously included in the

assertoric syllogistic. Later in the apodeictic syllogistic,

Aristotle does offer counter- examples involving two
accidents. This would seem to suggest that their omission

here in the assertoric syllogistic is just incidental.
will return to this question in Section 6.4, where

I

I

look at

Aristotle's comments about Darii LXL and Ferio LXL
In the next several sections,

I

want to pay careful

attention to how accidents feature in the invalid apodeictic
premise pairs.

6

.

3

Invalid Apodeictics
In Chapter

5

I

suggested taking all premises in the

apodeictic syllogistic to be instances of genuine
predication. The point of introducing this restriction was
to block the invalid readings that Thomason would otherwise

have to admit. The invalid readings arose as a result of

what

I

called Thomason's Weird Principle:
117

(WP)

If something satisfies both of two
predicates then something both satisfies
the first and necessarily satisfies the

second.

[Thomason,

1993, p.

112]

In Thomason's semantics (WP) has the
effect of 'upping'

the

modality of syllogistic premises from apparently
unqualified
assertoric premises to premises involving necessity.
If we

allow this 'upping' of modality without any restrictions
as

Thomason does, then we admit cases that Aristotle would

plainly count as invalid. This is because Aristotle
routinely uses unqualified premises. In the last section we
found evidence of each
(a)
(b)
(c)

some white is an animal,
some man is white,
all men are animals,

without any modal qualifications. Consider

principle will take this to

(b)

-- Thomason's

some man is necessarily white.'

But that, according to Aristotle,

is false.

So this way of

upping the modality of the premise is illegitimate. But the
result looks better if we attach the necessity to the

subject term -- then we have 'some necessary man is white.'
In Chapter 5,
(WP)

Section

3,

I

suggested that we might restrict

in a way that guards against the blatantly illegitimate

upping of modality.

I

explained that we might begin by

stipulating that (WP) can only attach the necessity to the
substance term of any predication, on the ground that for

anything to be a substance $ is already for it to be
118
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necessarily

$,

or

L(J>

.

Returning to our example (b), since

man is a substance term, man and necessary
man are

equivalent, and so, perhaps, 3x(Bx&Ax) can be
given as
lx

(

LBx&Ax

)

From (c) 'all men are animals' we would get

.

either 'all necessary men are animals’ or 'all men
are

necessarily animals' -- each of which seems fine. Also,
’X

(

LBx&LAx

) ,

which we considered in Chapter

If we left the matter there,

5,

seems fine.

then from (a) we would get

some white is necessarily an animal.' So we add a further

proviso,

in order to legitimately

up'

the modality of an

X-premise, the predication must be genuine and (WP) can only

make explicit the

Chapter

L

on the subject term. As we saw in

this is the only version of (WP) that Thomason

5,

needs in order to model Aristotle's logic.
model McCall's L-X-M system, which,

I

(He needs more to

argued, turns out not

to be isomorphic with the apodeictic syllogistic.) So we

restrict (WP) to cases of genuine predication and then
replace the substance-subject term

<p

with the equivalent

Lcp

This gets nice, tidy results in all the (valid) syllogisms.
But that,

I

think,

isn't the end of the story.

The evidence from Table

8

makes clear that in the

assertoric syllogistic the genuineness of the predication is
not an issue. This is seen from the fact that (a),
(c)

But,

(b),

and

are all given by Aristotle as good assertoric premises.
also,

the genuineness of premises doesn't seem to

matter in certain parts of the apodeictic syllogistic
119
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either.

In order to make clear why this should
make any

difference at all,

I

want to look at what Aristotle does say

about the invalid modal moods.
Some of Aristotle's comments about invalids are

peculiar to the modal syllogistic -- in particular, are
those cases he rejects involving the combination of
a

necessary premise with an assertoric premise. As we have
seen earlier, Aristotle thinks that sometimes an XL premise

pair does make a syllogism -- as for instance, Barbara LXL
in which the premise pair will always give an L — conclusion

But he also thinks that some XL premise pairs do not give
L- cone lus ions

as invalid.

for instance, Barbara XLL, which he counts

Its conclusion according to Aristotle will not

be an L-conclusion

.

In Chapters A9-11 where Aristotle

investigates mixed apodeictics, he has some careful

discussions about those cases in which

a

conclusion follows,

but not a necessary conclusion. In the next three sections

I

want to look closely at the explanations Aristotle offers
about why it is sometimes the case that an assertoric and an

apodeictic premise will not produce a necessary conclusion.
By way of explanation Aristotle typically gives terms to

illustrate that a certain conclusion might follow and not
another. His choices of terms for the mixed modal invalids
are particularly interesting, shedding some light on what
for Aristotle an L-premise really is.
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)

)

)

Chapter A9 covers XL premise pairs of the
first figure,
A10 covers those in the second figure,
and All the third
figure.

6

•

4

A9

I

:.

will look at these each in turn.

XL Premise Pairs in the First Figure

Aristotle begins the discussion of mixed modals

explaining that
It sometimes results that the deduction becomes
necessary when only one of the premises is
necessary (not whatever premise it might be,
however, but only the premise in relation to the
major extreme), (30al5-16).

This statement is the focus of, perhaps, the most famous

controversy about the modal syllogistic -- why should he
count Barbara LXL valid, but not Barbara XLL. But

Aristotle's own explanations are not worrisome if we accept
a de re

account of necessity. As he continues:

For instance, if A has been taken to belong or not
to belong of necessity to B, and B merely to
belong to C: for if the premises have been taken
in this way, then A will belong or not belong to C
of necessity. For since A belongs or does not
belong of necessity to every B and C is some of
the B's, it is evident that one or the other of
these will also apply to C of necessity,
(

30al7-23

)

Barbara LXL
Vx(Bx->LAx)
Vx(Cx->Bx)
Vx Cx->LAx
(

Celarent LXL
Vx Bx-»L~Ax
(

Vx ( Cx-»Bx
Vx( Cx->L~Ax
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)

But,

)

)

in the first figure,

if only one premise is necessary

and it is the premise in relation to the
minor extreme
(i.e.,

the premise that contributes the subject
of the

conclusion), then the conclusion will not be
necessary:
However, if AB is not necessary but BC is
necessary, the conclusion will not be necessary
(ouk estai to sumperasma anankaion
(30a23-25)
)

From this it seems Aristotle means that

,

a CA

conclusion

follows from the premises, but such a conclusion will not
be
an L-conclusion

.

If that is right,

then the de re analysis

clearly fits:
Barbara XLX
Vx Bx->Ax
Vx Cx->LBx
Vx Cx->Ax
(
(
(

To justify his claim, Aristotle considers what would happen
if the conclusion were an L-conclusion:

For if it is, it will result that A belongs to
some B of necessity, both through the first and
through the third figure. But this is false
(pseudos): for it is possible for B to be the sort
of thing to which it is possible for A to belong
to none of, (30a25-27).

The general idea is this:

Given
(

1

)

(2)

Vx Bx->Ax
(

Vx(Cx-»LBx)

Assume
(3)

Vx(Cx-»LAx)
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)

)

From (3) we can get something which
should not follow from
(1) and (2) -- that is, we can get
3x(Bx&LAx).
We can use

either of two different methods to get
3x(Bx&LAx). Darapti
LLL applied to (2) and (3) gives 3x(Bx&LAx),
through
the

third figure. Also, by LA-conversion of
(2) we get the same
conclusion through the first-figure Darii:
(4)
(5)
(6)

3x LBx&Cx

LA-conversion
Darii LLL 3,4

(

3x( LBx&LAx
Jx

(

Bx&LAx

2

LB->B

According to Aristotle what is pseudos is that "A belongs
to
some B of necessity.' The premises require that 'A belongs
to every B.'

We might understand Aristotle's point to be

that what makes (6) pseudos is the fact that it doesn't

follow from the premises since it requires more than the
stated premises allow. As Ross puts it:
calls the conclusion of this reductio-syllogism
not impossible but pseudos (a27), by which he
means that 'Some B is necessarily A', while
compatible with All B is A'
cannot be inferred
from it, nor from it+'All C is necessarily B';
i.e., it may be false though the original premises
are true. [Ross, 1957, p. 319]
A.

,

Ross goes on to suggest (p. 320) that pseudos, as Aristotle
uses it here, means 'unwarranted.' The reason it's

unwarranted is that it is possible for terms to be chosen in
such a way that A might not belong to any of the B's.

Aristotle provides terms to illustrate this point:
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)

It is, moreover, also evident from
terms that the
conclusion can fail to be necessary, as for
instance, if A were motion., B animal, and
C stood
tor man. For a man is of necessity an
animal, but
an animal does not move of necessity,
nor does a
man. It would also be similar if AB
were privative
(for the demonstration is the same),
(30a28-33).

So,

with terms in place Barbara XLX becomes:
Vx Bx->Ax
Yx Cx-»LBx

All animals are moving
A1 1 men are necessary animals
All men are moving

(
(

)

Vx ( Cx-»Ax

the affirmative case (Barbara) the failure of an

L-conclusion depends upon the fact that if an L-conclusion
did follow, then we would be able to assert
(d)

A belongs to some B of necessity.

And that, Aristotle tells us, is pseudos, because terms

might be chosen which satisfy the X-premise but which
falsify (d). This,

I

take it,

is the point of Aristotle's

comment at 30a31-32. Take the same terms: motion for

A,

animal for B. At 30a31-32 Aristotle says that 'an animal
does not move of necessity' which is to say that 'A belongs
to some B of necessity'

is false in this case.

is of necessity an animal

(30a31-31) and an animal does not

move of necessity, then neither does
is,

Since a man

a

man (30a31-32). That

Aristotle rejects the conclusion 'All men are

necessarily moving.'

124

He also extends the point to the privative:
Celarent

XLL is invalid. The same terms show why.

Celarent XLX (30a23-33)
Vx(Bx->~Ax)
All animals are not moving
vx(Cx-»LBx
All men are necessary animals
-x(Cx->~Ax)
All men are not moving
)

The conclusion here is not an L-conclusion, apparently for
the same reason as in Barbara:

It would also be similar if

AB were privative (for the demonstration is the same),'

(30a33-34). What Aristotle seems to mean is that the

explanation for the privative case (Celarent) is the same as
the explanation just given for the affirmative case

(Barbara). Since there it was pseudos that 'A belongs to

some B of necessity,

'

then perhaps Aristotle means that in

the privative case it is pseudos that 'A does not belong to

some B of necessity.

'

Again the same terms show why: an

animal does not not-move of necessity, and since all men are

(necessarily) animals, no man is necessarily

not-moving either.
In both the affirmative case (Barbara) and the

privative case (Celarent) the failure of the L-conclusion
depends upon the pseudos premise of the form 'A belongs (or
does not belong) to some B of necessity.'

'Men'

and

'animals' are the sort of things to which 'moving' or

'not-moving' do not apply of necessity, or L-apply. The fact
that Aristotle means to cover both the affirmative and
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'

privative cases with the same explanation shows
that for him
the issue isn't about whether A belongs or
doesn't belong to
B

and C. The issue is about the appropriateness
of the

qualifier

of necessity.

'

And his example of an

inappropriate use of the qualifier in each case involves

attaching it to an accidental term. By including an
accidental A in the triple of trems, Aristotle accomplishes
several things: he establishes clearly that Barbara and

Celarent XLL are invalid forms, and he sets out valid
instances of Barbara and Celarent XLX.

Suppose for the moment that the A-term were not an
accident. Suppose that instead of 'moving,

1

Aristotle had

said let A be something such as 'living thing' or 'plant.

Then the remark at 30a26-27 does not hold. Only when A is an

accident is it 'possible for B to be the sort of thing to

which it is possible for A to belong to none of.' More
simply, only when A is an accident is it right to say that A

might not belong to any of the B's. Or more simply
still, Vx( Bx=*M~Ax

2
)

.

Consider what would happen to the Barbara syllogism if
we let A be 'living thing':

In Chapter 4, I explain why Vx(Bx->L~Ax) must be the
right analysis for Aristotle's expression 'A necessarily
This makes Vx(Bx-»M~Ax) look like
belongs to none of the Bs.
the right analysis for 'it is possible for A to belong to
none of the Bs
2

1

.
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All animals are living things
All men are necessarily animals
All men are living things.
If the A term were given as 'plant'

and B and C are as

before -- B is animal, C is man -- then we'd not
have
Barbara; we would have Celarent:
All animals are not plants
All men are necessary animals
All men are not plants.

Let's look at Barbara first. There are two senses in which
it might be possible to get an L-conclusion here. The
first

way is to say that the syllogism is no longer Barbara XLX
(nor XLL

)

Since,

in fact,

all the terms are now substance

terms, perhaps, we might just as well call it Barbara LLL.

But this doesn't seem right since Aristotle says that the AB

premise is not necessary (me estin anankaion).

3

if the AB

premise is not necessary, then simply the AB premise is not
an L-premise.

It appears instead to be an ordinary

X-premise. As we've seen in Section

of this chapter,

2

Aristotle clearly uses propositions like 'some man is an
animal' as X-premises in the assertoric syllogistic, so

taking it this way shouldn't present

a

problem here.

There is another way we might say an L-conclusion is

possible in this Barbara -- it is possible because an
Sometimes Aristotle makes the same point by calling
the assertoric premises in the mixed syllogisms, premises
about 'merely belonging huparchon monon). See, for
instance, 30al9.
3

(
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conclusion might be consistent with true XL
premises. That
is not to say that an L-conclusion logically
follows from

L

the premises, but just that it is not inconsistent
with
them.

If Aristotle were to allow for the possibility
of an

L-conclusion, then we might take him to mean that it's
t-ossxble to conclude that

things.

'

all men are necessarily living

The necessity, we might say, is in this case

warranted insofar as being a living thing is part of the
essence of man. The necessity is not guaranteed by the
logical structure, but neither does it result in anything

pseudos. One way we might explain this is to say that what

makes an L-conclusion possible has to do with the meaning of
the terms,

thing

1

,

since it's the meaning of 'animal

and

man

1

1

,

'living

that make the L-conclusion permissible.

With Celarent, too, there is
L-conclusion does fit.

a

sense in which an

All men are necessarily not plants'

is true because the essence of man excludes being a plant.

So anything that's a man is necessarily not a plant. And, of

course, anything that's an animal also is necessarily not a

plant. So again, perhaps, an L-conclusion is warranted,

not pseudos.

What this shows is that Aristotle's explanation of the

invalidity of Barbara and Celarent XLL depends upon the

X-premise (the AB premise) being assertoric, and not modally
qualified. Aristotle's explanation shows that the

possibility of an accidental A-term is sufficient to
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establish the invalidity of the forms Barbara
XLL and
Celarent XLL. But nowhere in his discussion does
Aristotle
suggest that he means to rule out the possibility
of a valid
instance of Barbara XLL or Celarent XLL. In Barbara
and

Celarent, the fact that the AB premise is assertoric
leaves

open the possibility of A's being either an accidental
term
or a substance term.

It is possible when A is a substance

term to have an L-conclusion either about belonging
(Barbara) or not belonging (Celarent). So the fact that the

AB premise is assertoric gives Aristotle's explanation of

invalidity its bite and gives rise to a new question: does
Aristotle, perhaps, intend to allow valid instances of

invalid forms -- that is, are there, for Aristotle, valid

instances of Barbara XLL and Celarent XLL?
In supposing that the A term in Barbara and Celarent

might be a substance term, thus, making an L-conclusion not
pseudos,

I

have been stretching things rather far. I'm also

relying on just the kind of thinking that Ross objects to

when he complains in the first place about Aristotle's
counter-examples. They introduce meanings; and meanings,
Ross wants to say, are irrelevant to logic. Whether a thing
is a substance or an accident is a metaphysical notion,
a

not

matter of formal logic. But if Aristotle's metaphysical

notions are tied up with his logical notions in such a way
that an X-premise is ambiguous because it might be a premise

about substantive predication or it might predicate an
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accident of the subject, then the picture we
get from Ross
might not be the right picture.
In 30a34-36,

Aristotle discusses the particular

first-figure syllogisms:
In the case of the particular deductions, if
the
universal is necessary then the conclusion will
also be necessary [Darii LXL and Ferio LXL] but
if the particular premise is, the conclusion will
not be necessary, whether the universal premise is
privative or positive [Darii XLX and Ferio XLX1
30a34-36
;

,

(

)

Smith has a intriguing comment about 30a35:

Although Aristotle actually says the conclusion
will not be necessary,
it does not actually
follow in this case (and similar cases) that the
conclusion is not necessary but instead only fails
to follow that it must be. We may take Aristotle
to mean that the inference in this case is
'

invalid.
By

inference

[Smith,

'

1989, p.122]

Smith means the inferential form. As Smith

indicates, the point holds in similar cases as well -- it is
the same point,

in fact,

that we noticed with Barbara and

Celarent XLX. In each case, the inferential form does not

guarantee an L-conclusion

.

But all Aristotle says is that

"the conclusion will not be necessary.' Here,

in accounting

for the invalidity of Darii and Ferio LXL, Aristotle again

introduces terms:
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)

)) )

:

•••if the particular premise is necessary,
the
conclusion will not be necessary (for nothinq
impossible results ), just as it was not in the
case of universal deductions; and similarly
also
the case of privatives. Terms are motion
animal, white, (30b2-6).
4

m

I

mark the rejected L-conclusions with a

'

*
'

Darii XLL
Vx Bx->Ax
£x Cx&LBx
lx Cx&LAx

All animals are moving
Some white thing is a necessary animal
Some white thing is necessarily moving

(
(

(

Ferio XLL
Vx( Bx->~Ax

Jx Cx&LBx
3x Cx&L~Ax
(
(

No animals are moving
Some white thing is a necessary animal
Some white thing is necessarily not

moving

Earlier

pointed out that none of the counter-examples

I

for the assertoric syllogistic involves more than one

accident. Here, in the apodeictic, Aristotle explains why

Darii and Ferio XLL are invalid by setting out terms of

which two are accidents -- 'white' and 'moving.' Only one
accident appears in any premise, but both feature in the
conclusions. In Barbara LXL and Celarent LXL

,

the

L-conclusions are rejected apparently beacuse no thing moves

Both Ross and Smith are bothered by the remark for
nothing impossible results ouden gar adunaton sumpiptei).'
Ross [1957, pp 320-321] investigates the surrounding
passage in considerable detail, looking for parallel
arguments that might explain the language. Finding none, he
brackets 'ouden gar adunaton sumpiptei.' Smith takes this
expression to mean 'nothing impossible would result from
supposing the conclusion not to be necessary' [Smith, 1989,
p. 122]. I don't have anything to add to this discussion.
4

'

(

.
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or doesn't move of necessity. This same
reason makes the
L- conclusions of Darii and Ferio XLL
unacceptable,

too.

Still, we can avoid the use of two accidents
and illustrate

the invalidity by taking different terms.
For example, let A
be moving, B be animal, and C be man. Later
in this chapter

will have more to say about premises such as
'some white

I

thing is a necessary animal' that come of Aristotle's
terms.

6

•

5

A10: XL Premise Pairs in the Second Figure

Aristotle

s

account of the second figure provides more

interesting data and an unusually extended discussion of
terms for invalid combinations. He begins his discussion in
A10 by making the same point about when a

conclusion will

not be necessary':
In the case of the second figure, if the privative
premise is necessary, then the conclusion will
also be necessary; but if the positive premise is,
the conclusion will not be necessary, (30b7-9).

Aristotle goes on to justify this by converting the second
figure into the first figure:
But if the positive premise is necessary, the
conclusion will not be necessary. For let A belong
to every B of necessity but merely belong to no C.
Then, when the privative premise is converted, it
becomes the first figure; and it has been proved
that in the first figure, when a privative premise
in relation to the major term is not necessary,
the conclusion will not be necessary either.
Consequently, neither will it be of necessity in
this case,' (30bl9-24).

132

)

.

The syllogism Aristotle describes here
is called Camestres
LXX. His decription translates easily
into modal
LPC:

Camestres LXX
Vx(Bx->LAx)
Vx(Cx->~Ax)
Vx Ax-»~Cx
Vx(Bx->~Cx)
(

A belongs to every B of necessity
but merely belongs to no C
then, when the privative is converted
it becomes the first figure
( i
e
Celarent XLX)
.

.

,

At 30b22-23 Aristotle reminds us that the conclusion
of the

first-figure Celarent XLX will not be necessary. His point
seems to be that since the first-figure Celarent XLX

provides the basis for the proof of the second-figure mood

Camestres LXX, then in this second-figure mood, as in the
first, the conclusion will not be necessary.

about Celarent XLX we're told

'

In 30b22-23

oude to sumperasma estai

anankaion.' About the conclusion of Camestres XLX, Aristotle
says

oud

epi.

touton estai ex anankes

.
'

The former is 'not

necessary' the latter is 'not of necessity.' It seems that
in spite of the different locutions,

these two expressions

mean the same thing -- that is, in each case, the conclusion
is not an L-conclusion

Robin Smith offers two explanations of 30b24:
'Of necessity' is ambiguous: it could mean either
that the conclusion which follows cannot be 'of
necessity' (i.e., necessary), or that it is not of
necessity (need not be) a necessary conclusion.
[Smith, 1989, p. 122]
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In other words.

Smith thinks 'of necessity

1

here

means either
(i)

the conclusion which follows cannot be
an L-conclusion,

or
(ii)

If

(i),

the conclusion which follows need not be
an L-conclusion.

then only an X conclusion -- i.e., an assertoric

conclusion -- will follow. But if (ii), then the conclusion
could be an L-conclusion but need not be. Either (i) or (ii)
is sufficient to invalidate the form Camestres LXL

.

But

Aristotle invalidates it with a counter-example, and

a

counter-example will never show that an L-conclusion does
follow;

it shows that it does not.

In fact,

a

counter-example only establishes that there is an instance
in which an L-conclusion does not follow.

It was this that

makes it plausible to wonder, as we did in the last section,

whether Aristotle might allow a valid instance of the
(invalid) first-figure Barbara XLL

ambiguity of

.

Smith's point about the

the conclusion is not of necessity

1

holds in

the first figure as well. But there is a difference between

the first- and second-figure counter-examples.
see what it is

I

In order to

want next to look at the counter-examples

for the second-figure invalids.
In a long passage,

30b20-40, Aristotle carefully sets

out and discusses terms for Camestres LXL. He gives these as
animal, man, and white. Just a few lines later, discussing
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Baroco LXL and XLL, he mentions very briefly
that the same
terms can be used for these as well. Aristotle
says that
Festino XLL is also invalid, but offers no terms
for it.

Table

9,

In

list the invalid second-figure forms and offer

I

the obvious readings we get using the terms as
Aristotle

suggests.

I

use the

to indicate that these L-conclusions

are rejected by Aristotle.
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Table

9

Invalid Second Figure L+X Forms

Camestres LXL
*

Vx(Bx->LAx
Vx(Cx-»~Ax
Vx Cx-»L~Bx
(

Festino XLL
Vx Bx-*~Ax
3x CxScLAx

(30b20- 40)
All men are necessary animals
All white things are not animals
All white things are necessarily not men

(

31al5-17

(
(

*

Baroco LXL
Vx Bx->LAx
(

x ( Cx&~Ax
*

(no terms given)

3x(Cx&L~Bx)

ix(Cx&L~Bx)

( 31al0-15
All men are necessary animals
Some white thing is not an animal
Some white thing is necessarily not

a

Baroco XLL
Vx Bx->Ax
(

x ( Cx&L~Ax
*

3x(CxStL~Bx)

31al5- 17)
All men are animals
Some white thing is necessarily not an
animal
Some white thing is necessarily not
(

a

Cesare XLL
Vx Bx-»~ Ax
(

(

*

)

Vx Cx-»LAx
Vx Cx-»L~Bx
(

man

man

(Aristotle does not mention Cesare XLL,
but it would seem to be invalid if these
others are
.

)
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Let's try to take account of the new evidence
from

Table

9.

Since Aristotle only gives terms for Camestres
LXL

and Baroco LXL and XLL,
at the second figure,

I'll focus on those. We’re looking

so we are only concerned here with

privative conclusions relating
rejected conclusions is

C and B terms.

not of necessity.

1

Each of the

On the de re

analysis we're using, that means that the rejected

conclusions are all about what is 'necessarily not

B.

Looking back on the first-figure invalids, the rejected

conclusions there involved attaching an
term,

L to an

accidental

such as 'moving.' But this isn't the matter here in

the second-figure invalids since as Aristotle sets out the

terms the one that falls within the scope of the
a

substance term

—

substance terms an

man.
L

'

And, as

I

is always

L

have suggested, for

can be attached without change of

meaning. So something different must be going on here that

explains why these second-figure L-conclusions are rejected.
It isn't obvious just what that something is. At first

glance it appears that the matter might have to do with the

subject term which in each example is the

C term,

'white.'

Recalling again Aristotle's discussion in An. Post. A22, we
might suppose that he rejects the L-conclusions above
because, when terms are put in place, none of the

conclusions can be an example of genuine apodeictic
predication. Each of the conclusions treats the accidental

term 'white' as the subject term, and genuine predication
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requires that 'white' can never be the subject. That much
seems plausible, but there is a problem. If that explains

why the L-conclusions in Table

9

are rejected, then it would

seem that the CA premise in Baroco XLL must be rejected for
the same reason. White is the subject of an L— proposition

there too:
So,

some white thing is necessarily not an animal.'

the same reason would make the CA premise and the CB

conclusion either both true or both false or, perhaps, both
ungrammatical. Whichever it is, the result is that the terms

Aristotle mentions don't really show that Baroco XLL is
invalid. That,

in itself, may not be a big problem. Even if

the terms he offers don't do a good job of illustrating the

invalidity, we can still salvage the point by choosing terms

more carefully. For example, let A be man,
C be animal.

B be moving,

and

And suppose that everything that is moving

is a man.

Vx(Bx-»Ax)

Cx&L~Ax
3x(Cx&L~Bx)
5x

*

(

)

All moving things are men
Some animal is necessarily not a man
Some animal is necessarily not moving

Here, we do have true premises and a false conclusion --

true premises because although an accident B is a subject
term, this is in an assertoric proposition, and we have seen
in Section 6.2 that accidents can take subject position in

assertoric propositions. The conclusion is false because
every animal can move. To put the point another way, in
true proposition the

L

a

doesn't attach to a predicate like
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.

is not moving.

Section

4

’

The same point was needed earlier in

of this chapter to invalidate the first-figure

Celarent XLL, Darii XLL

,

and Ferio XLL

There is more to say about the second-figure invalids.
But some of it applies also to the third-figure
invalids.

I

will look at these next.

6

•

6

All: XL Premise Pairs in the Third Figure

The third-figure invalids are Felapton XLL, Datisi XLL,

Disamis LXL

,

Bocardo XLL and LXL

,

and Ferison XLL.

I

list

these in Table 10, together with the obvious readings we get

using Aristotle's terms. As before,

I

use the '*' to

indicate that these L-conclusions are rejected.
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)

)

)

)

)
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Table 10

Invalid Third Figure L+X Forms

Felapton XLL
*

Vx(Cx-*~Ax)
Vx(Cx->LBx)
3x Bx&L~Ax
(

Datisi XLL
Vx( Cx->Ax
*x

*

(

Cx&LBx

3x Bx&LAx
(

Disamis LXL
3x Cx&LAx
(

Vx Cx->Bx
3x Bx&LAx
(

*

(

Bocardo XLL
x Cx&~Ax
(

Vx Cx-»LBx
3x Bx&L ~ Ax
(

*

(

Ferison XLL
Vx( Cx->~Ax
lx

*

(

Cx&LBx

3x ( Bx&L~Ax

31a37- blO
All horses are not awake
All horses are necessarily animals
Some animals are necessarily not awake
(

( 31b20-31
All animals are wakeful
Some animal is necessarily a biped
Some biped is necessarily wakeful

31b31-33
Some animal is necessarily a biped
All animals are wakeful
Something wakeful is a necessary biped
(

31b40-32al
Some man is not wakeful
All men are necessarily animals
Some animal is necessarily not wakeful
(

32al-4
All animals are not wakeful
Some animal is necessarily white
Some white thing is necessarily not
(

wakeful

Bocardo LXL
lx Cx&L~Ax
(

Vx Cx-»Bx
lx(Bx&L~Ax)
(

*

32a4-5
Some animal is necessarily not a biped
All animals are moving
Some moving thing is necessarily not a
biped
(
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In the third figure counter-examples
Felapton XLL,

Datisi XLL

,

Bocardo XLL, and Ferison XLL all have true

premises but obviously false conclusions. Disamis LXL
and
Bocardo LXL are also rejected, but their conclusions

are not

obviously false; instead, they are like the conclusions
of
the second-figure invalids Camestres LXL and Baroco LXL.

That is, these all have accidents in subject position of
an

L-proposit ion
Ferison XLL is especially interesting because of its
two accidental terms. Terms for Ferison XLL are wakeful,
white, and animal. From what I've said so far,

that the CB premise

it would seem

some animal is necessarily white' must

be false, on the grounds that because white is really an

accident it can only belong to a thing accidentally. But

Aristotle several times offers
white' as a true L-proposit ion

some animal is necessarily
.

In fact,

Aristotle tells

that all swans are necessarily white. This is a favorite

puzzle among Aristotle's commentators and critics.

Aristotle has goofed, and
to the discussion.

I

I

think

have only a simple point to add

It seems to me that what we make of the

goof has to do with how we think Aristotle would respond if
we showed him a black swan. Would we expect him to go off

and re-write his metaphysics or would we expect him to

change his tune about swans? Black swans do exist. If

Aristotle came across a flock of them, then very likely he
would change his tune and acknowledge that the statement
141

swans are white of necessity' is in fact false.
There is,
of course,

a more serious

question about just how his

metaphysics can allow an accident to be a necessary property
of a subject. And there is a large body of literature
about

such things as propria and necessary accidents. But it isn’t
clear that the whiteness of swans counts as either of these.
Instead,

it seems to be a simple mistake. At any rate,

it is

not a problem with the logic here. To avoid the matter

altogether, let the terms for Ferison XLL be wakeful, man,
and animal. The premises are still true, but the purported

L-conclusion is then 'some man is necessarily not wakeful,'
and that is false.

6

.

7

The L-Not Principle

Having looked at all of the mixed apodeictic counterexamples,

let's return now to the puzzle, at the beginning

of this chapter, about condition (f) from Thomason's

semantics,

(f)

is Vx(Bx-»LAx)-»Vx(L~Ax->L~Bx)

,

and Thomason

imposes this condition in order to validate Baroco LLL. In

Chapter

5,

I

left unanswered the question about what really

to say about (f). We saw there that (f) might be plausible

when terms are restricted to substance terms. But if one of
the terms is an accident, then it is very difficult to know

what to say. Let's look again at an example: suppose A is
animal and B is white. Then if every white is a necessary
man, every necessary non-man is necessarily-not white. This
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)

.

)

))

.

might well be invalid. It might not make sense at
all.

There's not much in Aristotle's text to help here -- we
just
don't know whether (f) is Aristotelian. But as Thomason
shows

it does get the right results for Baroco LLL

,

In

.

Thomason’s interpretation Baroco LLL:
Vx Bx-»LAx
dx LCx&L~Ax
3x ( LCx&L ~Bx )
(
(

But there

s

a question,

in Baroco LLL.

I

too,

about what exactly is going on

want to try to see what is going on there

without explicitly appealing to (f). Maybe then we can see

whether there's a good Aristotelian-sounding explanation
for

(

f

)

In Chapter 5,

I

offered some textual evidence which

suggests that for Aristotle necessary premises always
involve genuine predication. The BA premise in Baroco above
is a necessary premise.

So to make the genuineness of this

premise explicit, we give its true structure as Vx LBx->LAx
(

)

And Baroco LLL then becomes
Vx LBx->LAx
Hx LCx&L ~ Ax
3x( LCx&L~Bx
(
(

But that alone isn't enough to validate Baroco LLL. What's

needed still is a principle that makes ~LB equivalent to
L~B.

If B is a substance term,

then there's some sense in

this: consider the substance term 'animal'
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-- anything that

.

)

is not

)

)

necessarily an animal, is also necessarily-not an

animal. It's not unreasonable to think that Aristotle
might

have had something like this in mind. So, maybe in
this way
we can say

~

LB and L~B are equivalent.

L-not Principle

.

I'll call this the

The L-not Principle together with

restricting L-premises to genuine predication gives a way to

validate Baroco LLL. Taking Vx(LBx-»LAx) as the first
premise, we have:

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Vx( LBx->LAx

3x
Vx (
Vx
3x (
(

(

LCx&L~Ax
~

LAx-»~ LBx
L~Ax->L~Bx

LCx&L~Bx

)

Given
Given
Contraposition (1)
L-not Principle (3)
Transitivity (2), (4)

This may not be the way Aristotle reasons, but it is not

obviously unAristotel ian either. And, it does validate
Baroco LLL and justifies a version of (f) with restricted
subject terms.
But this raises a whole new problem.

If the L-not

Principle is right, then it would seem that some of the

mixed apodeictic invalid syllogisms can then be validated.
Camestres LXL is one of these invalids.
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)

Camestres LXL
(1)
(2)
(3)

Vx(Bx->LAx)
Vx(Cx-*~Ax)
Vx(Cx->L~Bx)

(4)
Camestres
LXL can be validated as follows:

(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)

Vx(LBx->LAx)
Vx( ~LAx-»~LBx)
Vx ~Ax->~LAx
Vx ( Cx-» ~ LAx
Vx(Cx->~LBx)
Vx(Cx->L~Bx)
(

T-pr inciple (1)
Contraposition (4)
T-principle
Transitivity (2,6)
Transitivity (7,5)
L-not (8)

Aristotle's own account of Camestres LXL, at 30b20-40,
looks very different from this. He plainly counts Camestres
LXL as invalid and offers terms to show that an L-conclusion

does not follow. Those terms are animal for

white for

C.

A,

man for B,

As Aristotle offers the terms, the B-term is

already a substance term. (But also the genuineness of the
L-premise (1) will require that

B be a

substance term.)

Since B is a substance term, it seems there is no trouble

applying the L-not Principle: we can say that ~LB is

equivalent to L~B. That is, anything that's not-necessarily
a

man is also necessar i ly-not a man. In this way, the L-not

Principle takes us from (8) 'all white things are not

necessary men' to the conclusion

necessarily not men.

1

So,

(9)

'all white things are

if that's right,

Camestres LXL is

then validated.

When Aristotle describes why he counts Camestres LXL as
invalid, the explanation hinges on the account he gives of
the conclusion. Aristotle says that the conclusion will not
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be necessary;

it seems that by this he means that an

L-conclusion can be false. The problem is that in rejecting
an L-conclusion, he doesn't make it obvious just
how he

interprets that conclusion. From the proof above,

(supposing

the genuineness of L-premises and allowing the L-not
^^"Lnciple) Camestres LXL is formally valid. Yet Aristotle

rejects the L-conclusion. What's going on?
If we focus on the logical form of Camestres LXL and

say that

/x ( Cx->L~Bx

is the conclusion,

)

then, with genuine

L-premises and the L-not Principle, Camestres LXL is really
valid. Allowing accidentals in assertoric premises won't

help here because the B term to which the L-not Principle

applies is already guaranteed to be a substance term by the

genuineness requirement on premise (1). Perhaps we might
respond by taking the conclusion to be Vx Bx->L~Cx
(

)

.

Then,

with premises Vx(Bx->LAx) and Vx(Cx->~Ax), we produce
something which, in fact, isn't valid, but, on the other
hand, neither is it an instance of Camestres LXL. There

appears to be a dilemma.
It seems to me that when we look closely at what

Aristotle says about Camestres LXL, he has

a

rather

ingenious way of getting the best of both sides. It seems
that he does not treat 'all white things are necessarily-not
men’

as an instance of Vx Cx->L~Bx
(

as an instance of Vx Bx->L~Cx
(

)

,

)

.

Instead, he analyses it

which he then explains is

false since 'a man may become white.’ Perhaps Aristotle
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.

would interpret the conclusion this way because the
restriction to essential subjects makes him reject an

L-conclusion of the form 7x(Cx->L Bx
for Camestres LXL

,

)

.

In setting out terms

Aristotle makes C an accident -- 'white.'

So maybe the way to understand Aristotle is as saying that

the only (meaningful) way to give an L— conclusion here is as
sll men are necessar i ly— not white.

1

Since if he does adhere

to the comments in An. Post. A22, about genuine predication,

then

all white things are necessarily-not men'

genuine L-proposition

.

cannot be a

If Aristotle rejects an L-conclusion

in Camestres LXL when terms are animal, man,

and white

because he is refusing to analyze 'all white things are

necessarily not men' as Vx(Cx-»L~Bx

)

,

then maybe what he

means by 'the conclusion will not be necessary' is that from
the premises we can't have any L-conclusion because a

genuine Camestres conclusion in this case cannot be stated.
By modern logic, that makes Camestres LXL valid. If in an

argument you cannot have true premises and

a

false

conclusion, then you have a valid argument. So, since here
we can't have any L-conclusion, we have a valid argument.

Aristotle appeals to LE-conversion in the middle of his

discussion of Camestres LXL: 'For if B belongs of necessity
to no C,
(

30b26

)

then C will also belong to no B of necessity,
In stating LE-conversion, Aristotle is,

’

in a sense,

trying to have it both ways. Since, when he comes to put
terms in, he gives B as man, C as white, he is, on the one
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hand, allowing white as a subject term, but on
the other

hand, apparently interpreting it as the predicate
term.

It

looks like Aristotle is allowing white as subject in
the

surface structure -men.'

some white things are necessar i ly-not

But he's not allowing white as subject at the logical

level, and,

instead, analyses 'some white things are

necessarily-not men' as 'some men are necessar i ly-not
white.

That would mean that while at the surface level,

conversion appears to be from 'all white things are

necessarily-not men' to 'all men are necessarily-not white,’
at the logical level,

the only conversion is from one

formula to the very same formula. So while he appears to

consider the validity of Camestres LXL

,

he isn't really

dealing with Camestres at the logical level. And so his

method won't establish that Camestres LXL is invalid.
It might seem that if this way of taking Camestres LXL

has us calling it a valid syllogism, then this way must be

wrong.

It certainly would be wrong if Aristotle were to say

that Camestres LXL is 'invalid.' But to say that an argument
is valid or invalid is not to use Aristotle's terminology.

His handling of the matter is more subtle. In the assertoric

syllogistic, when he considers the 'validity' or
'invalidity' of arguments, he says simply 'there is a
syllogism' or 'there is no syllogism.'

In the assertoric

syllogistic, Aristotle establishes invalidity by showing
that from the given premises there is no syllogism because
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whatever form we assign to the conclusion we
can have it
false even when the premises are true. His
method, in
effect,

is to say:

Take these two premises. Does a

conclusion follow?' If we can falsify a conclusion no
matter
what its type (A, E, I, or 0), then 'there is no
syllogism.’
In the apodeictic syllogistic, Aristotle's approach
is

similar, but not exactly the same. Here he says: 'Take
these

two premises. Does an L-conclusion follow?' The type of the

conclusion is already determined by the assertoric form.

Tradition counts Camestres LXL as invalid. But all Aristotle
really says is that

the conclusion will not be of

necessity.' Aristotle rejects the conclusion, apparently,

because it can't be analysed according to the structure that
the proof dictates, which is Vx ( Cx-»L~Bx

)

.

Although Aristotle

talks about Camestres LXL as though he has established
invalidity, he really doesn't establish that Camestres LXL
is invalid.

If invalidity means not getting an L-conclusion

because we cannot even state one, then invalidity doesn't

mean what it usually does.
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CHAPTER

7

POSSIBILITY AND CONTINGENCY

7

.

1

Introduction
the next two chapters

I

turn to the problematic

syllogistic. The problematic syllogistic is the part of the

Prior Analytics that concerns 'premises about possibility.’
Aristotle deals with these in detail in chapters A13-22.
Also,

chapter A3 contains some brief, preliminary discussion

of possibility. The problematic syllogistic as a whole has

proven extraordinarily challenging to logicians. There are

many reasons for this. Some of the difficulties arise
because Aristotle uses 'possible (endechomenon)' and its

variants ambiguously. Sometimes he clearly means possible in
the sense of not-necessar i ly-not

,

that is, possible in the

sense of the logician's M. Other times Aristotle means

possible in the sense of contingent, that is, neither

necessary nor impossible. While the different senses of
'endechomenon' at times frustrate interpreters, often where

there is a question of which meaning Aristotle has in mind,
the context of the surrounding passage contains clues.

Distinguishing the different meanings is sometimes enough to
make sense of otherwise puzzling logical maneuver ings

.

On

the other hand, the most serious and perplexing difficulties

with the problematic syllogistic appear to be genuine
logical blunders for which the text provides little

explanation. These blunders appear, for example, in the

discussion of the Barbara at 34a34-b2 and the Celarent at
34bl9-35a2

both of which Aristotle wants to prove "through

/

impossibility.' The method of proof is itself dubious.

I

focus on problems of this sort in Section 7.5.
do think the difficulties in the problematic

I

syllogistic are too severe and extensive to hope that any
analysis can adequately explain all of the evidence.

Eventually it would be good to try to explain each of the
many separate problems encountered in this part of the
logic. All
this,

I

chapter,

I

can do here is make a start at this. To do

have divided the material into two chapters. In this
look at some of the traditional difficulties that

I

arise in the problematic syllogistic. In Chapter

8,

I

propose and test a hypothesis about the problematic
syllogistic, trying to apply the same kinds of devices that
I

used with respect to the apodeictic syllogistic in

Chapters

and

5

6.

In this chapter,

"families,

1

I

divide some of the syllogisms into

grouped together insofar as they share certain

common features. Some of the groups present interpretive
dilemmas; some groups seem to depend on unsound reasoning
and slippery logical methods; others groups contain

syllogisms about possibility that are valid and easily
explained. The various groups are neither exhaustive nor
exclusive. But they do give a sense of the kinds of problems

encountered in this part of the modal syllogistic. My hope
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'

is that by isolating some of the trouble
spots and

recognizing them as such, enough consistent material
will
Suixl remain to give a sense of some of the ways
Aristotle

understands

possibility.

'

In Chapter 8,

I

suggest a way of

reading Aristotle that brings a large part of the

problematic syllogistic into line with the account

I

suggest

for the apodeictic.

7

•

2

The Question of M's or 0's

Aristotle begins chapter A13 by explaining right away
what he takes a 'premise about possibility’ to be here:
use the expressions 'to be possible
(endechestai
and 'what is possible (to
endechomenon
in application to something if it
is not necessary but nothing impossible will
result if it is put as being the case (for it is
only equivocally that we say that what is
necessary is possible), 32al9-22.
I

)

)

’

This is a new sense of possibility.

definition (horismos

1

In fact,

it is a new

33a24-25). The only sense of

,

'possibly' used up until now is the kind of possibility

described in the apodeictic syllogistic. There Aristotle's
meaning is

'

not-necessar i ly-not

.
'

Recall Aristotle's

interpretation of LE-premises as denials of possiblility

.

An

example of such an LE-premise is 'let it not be possible for
A to belong to any B,

’

at 30bl0.

In Chapter 4,

I

explained

though, as I will show there is at least the
suggestion of contingency in the latter part of A3.
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'

why we should represent this as Vx Bx->L~Ax
(

equivalently, as Vx (Bx->~MAx)
t<j

or,

,

If such an LE-proposition is

be understood as a denial of possibility at all then
the

meaning of
not

.

)

.

possible' must be the same as

Using M

s

and L's, Mp =df

L p.

'

not-necessari ly-

This definition is the

same as our modern definition of possibility.

When he comes to discuss the problematic syllogistic,

Aristotle tells us plainly that he uses 'possibly' to mean
'neither necessary nor impossible.' This way of taking
possibly' makes it the same as modern contingency. To

distinguish this from
a Q-

M,

logicians denote 'contingent' with

QP =df ~Lp&~L~p. It is perhaps unfortunate that

Aristotle used variants of 'possible (endechomenon)

for

both possibility (M) and contingency (Q), but for the most
part he does note which sense he has in mind in the various

parts of the modal syllogistic. In the handful of places
where he doesn't precisely spell out which sense he means
there is plenty of trouble to be found. Perhaps the worst
such interpretive difficulties come with Aristotle's vague

explanations of syllogisms involving possible+assertor ic
premise combinations.

I

will look at the matters with these

in Section 7.5. But first,

let's consider what Aristotle has

to say about how premises about possibility convert.

Chapter A3 is directly concerned with converting

premises about possibility. There is, however, some

controversy about what meaning or meanings
153

possibly

1

has in

.

chapter A3.

I

'

think that in A3 Aristotle is interested

mainly in M-conversions
Ui

^

,

Ci mention at the end.

[1957/ pp

.

:

'

with Q-conversions getting only

a

Not all scholars agree. Ross

294-299] and Thom [1996, p. 38], for example,

clearly regard

'

endechesthai

in A3,

25a40-b3 as already

incorporating the contingency usage. Ross and Thom look
ahead to chapter A13 and import the later definition of
'possible' backwards into chapter A3. They then try to

explain all of A3 in terms of contingency. Contingency does
feature in A3, but it doesn't characterize the entire

discussion of what is
reading Aristotle is

'

a

endechomenon

there. My way of

little controversial, so let's look

at the evidence.
In A3 Aristotle tells us that possible premises

do convert:

When it comes to possible premises, since 'to be
possible' is said in several ways (i.e., we say of
what is necessary, of what is not necessary, and
of what is potential that it is possible), the
situation with respect to conversion will be the
same in all these cases with the affirmatives,
25a37-41
(

)

Paul Thom reads this as saying that A-conversion and

I-conversion 'hold in all senses of possible.' He then takes

contingent to be one sense of possible and finds in 25a37-41
an argument for QA- and Ql-conversion
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(QA)

if every b is contingently
contingently b,

(QI)

if some b is contingently a, then some
contingently b. [Thom, 1996, p. 38]

a,

then some a is
a is

Ross isn't clear about where exactly 'contingency' comes
into the discussion, but he, too, wants to find QA- and

Ql-conversions in the present passage.
pp.

[See Ross,

1957,

296-297.]

When we look at the different senses of 'possibly

1

Aristotle mentions in the passage guoted above, A3,
25a37-41

,

there is certainly no explicit mention of

contingency. All that we are told is:
(a)
(b)

what is necessary is said to be possible,
what is not necessary is said to be possible,

(c)

what is potential is said to be possible.

and

None of these expressly implicates 'contingency.' In fact,
the sense of possibility given in (a) is plainly

inconsistent with contingency. So, contra Ross and Thom, it
seems to me that A3, 25a37-41 is really about conversions of
MA- and Mi-premises, and not about Q-premises at all.

Ultimately, this will be

a

minor point, but one that helps

avoid the sorts of unnecessary complications encountered in
analysis.

Ross'

As I'm suggesting we read Aristotle, all that we find
at A3,

25a37-4 are affirmative M-conversions

.

The

conversions are stated more explicitly a few lines later:
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,

)

For if it is possible for A to belong
to every or
L ° some B,
then it will be possible for B to
belong to some A, (25bl-2).
At first glance, a good analysis of these
might appear to be
(MAI)
(Mil)

Vx(Bx->MAx)
~\x

(

Bx&MAx

-4
-4

)

3x ( Ax&MBx
3x Ax&MBx
(

)

.

When we put terms in place of variables, these analyses
don't look so good. Consider (MAI) with white for A and
man
for B:

if all men are possibly white,

is possibly a man.'

then some white thing

For this to be alright,

'some white

thing is possibly a man must' be true. But there is a
question,

think, about whether it is true.

I

If it isn't,

then both (MAI) and (Mil) must be rejected.
In order to know if it is true that some white thing is

possibly a man, we need to know what is it to be

a

possible

man, or possibly a man. There's enough in Aristotle's

metaphysics to give a reasonable sense of what he means by

necessary

'

where

(J)

is a substance term,

like 'man.

'

But

in general, Aristotle is not as clear about the notion of a

'possible

4>

’

as he is about the notion of a 'necessary

The matter becomes especially difficult where

<J>

'

<f>

.

is a

substance term. In the Physics and in the Metaphysics

Aristotle does discuss 'potentiality' with respect to
substances, but there is a question about whether the

'potentiality' there is incorporated in the syllogistic.
Paul Thom [1996, p. 5] suggests it isn't.
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I

am inclined to

.

agree with him.
later in Chapter

I

return to this question in greater detail
8.

One way around the matter is to give an interpretation
xn keeping with the analyses

I

used for valid LA- and

LI -conversions in Chapters 2 and 3.

Then, a good de re

account of MA- and Mi-conversions would seem to be:
(MA2)
(MI 2)

Vx Bx-»MAx
lx Bx&MAx
(
(

3x(MAx&Bx)
3x MAx&Bx

)
)

->

(

)

In addition to MA- and Mi-conversions

appears to want ME-conversion
[B]

:

,

Aristotle also

"for if it is possible for

to belong to none [of the A's],

possible for A to belong to any

B,

then neither will it be
(25b3). The valid

"

reading of this would have to be

(

ME 1

)

Vx(Ax->M~Bx)

Vx LBx->~ Ax
(

)

.

The invalid reading, modelled on LE-conversion in Chapter

4,

would be
(ME2)

Vx(Ax-»M~Bx)

-4

Vx Bx-»M~ Ax
(

)

.

Aristotle does explain that he is concerned with negative
statements about what is possible 'in virtue of

(i)

belonging of necessity or (ii) not of necessity not
belonging,' 25b4-5. So, pretty clearly he wants to consider

M-conversions and not Q-conversions here. But whether we put
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,

,

.

.

M's or Q's in above doesn't settle the question
about

whether (ME1) or

(

ME 2

)

is right.

Neither,

I

think, do

his examples:

i
is possible for a man not to be a horse or
for white to belong to no coat: the first of these
of necessity does not belong [ ( i ) ]
while the
other does not necessarily belong [ i i ) ] and the
premise converts similarly, (25b5-9).
.

.

.

l.

(

Consider the conversions each in turn.
(a)

For if it is possible for horse to
belong to no man, then it is possible
for man to belong to no horse, (25bl0).

(b)

if it is possible for white to belong to
no coat, then it is possible for coat to
belong to nothing white, (25bll).

(a)

is fine if what is necessar i ly-not-(j> is not-possibly-<{>
it isn't obvious just what is going on in (b)

But,
(

ME 2

as the conversion principle,

)

'coat'

(b)

Using

is a problem if

is a substance term and there are white coats.

issues this raises are the subject of Chapter

The

But with

8.

respect to the matter here about how to represent

ME-conversion, as far as

I

have been able to discover,

Aristotle never uses ME-conversion. So, the question of how
to represent it might in fact turn out to be

relatively unimportant.
What is clear is that so far in Chapter A3

—

that is,

up until 25bl3 -- there is no hard and fast evidence that

Aristotle really means contingent when he uses
158

'

endechomenon

'

a^-

t'jgethex.

)

But that is not to say that contingency is

.

absent from the discussion in A3. When Aristotle

does introduce his contingency sense of 'endechomenon,' he

signals the difference carefully. He has already explained
(

25b3f f

)

that possible premises (i.e., M-premises) convert

following the same pattern as E-conversion. At A3, 25bl4, he
changes tack:
But those premises which are said to be possible
(endechesthai) because of being so for the most
part or being naturally so (which is the way that
we define diorizomen what is possible) will not
be the same in privative conversions. Instead, the
universally privative premise does not convert,
and the particular premise does convert. This will
be evident when we discuss the possible,
( 25bl4-19
(

)

This appears to be the only mention in Chapter A3 of a

definition. Up until this point 'to be possible,’ we’re
told,

is 'said in many ways’

endechesthai, 25a37-38.) Now,

(

pollachos legetai to
'to be possible’

is precisely

defined as 'being so for the most part or being naturally
so.’

Privative E-premises about this kind of possibility do

not convert. But, surprisingly, O-premises do,

(25bl3). This

last remark has received a lot of attention. More than its
due, perhaps,

for it seems to be a goof. Tredennick puts the

problem in perspective: 'why is it that Aristotle, after
expressly admitting [the convertibility of the particular
negative problematic premise], apparently never avails
himself of it?’

[See Tredennick,
159

1983, p.

190ff.]

.

In the next section,

I

will look at whether the

convertible premises that fit the definition at 25bl4-19
also fit the definition of 'contingent' in Chapter A13.

I

will present some evidence to show that they are in fact the
same

—

that is, what we find here in A3, 25bl4-19, is a

foreshadowing of the argument in A13 about the failure of

QE-premises to convert. But for Aristotle even when

Q-premises can convert, there is not the same kind of
conversion as in all the other cases. This is the subject of
Section 7.3.

7

.

3

Conversion of O-Premises
The conversion described in Chapter A13 is different

from anything so far encountered in the text. Here is where
the difference between taking 'possible' to be an M or a Q

really matters.
It follows that all premises about being possible
convert with each other. I do not mean that
affirmative premises convert with negatives, but
rather that such as have an affirmative form
convert with respect to their opposite: that is,
'possible to belong’ converts to 'possible not to
belong,' 'possible to belong to every' converts to
'possible to belong to no' (or 'not to every’),
and it is possible to belong to some converts to
'it is possible not to belong to some,'
( 32a31-35
'

)

Ross calls this 'complementary conversion'
p.

298].

[Ross,

1957,

It automatically falls out of the definition of

contingency. We might think of complementary conversion as
160

conversion only homonymously

since it differs from all

,

other conversions by leaving the order of the terms
unchanged. A formal representation of complementary

conversion will help make this clear. Consider
it is contingent that A belongs to every B.

to

'

a

QA-premise

This converts

it is contingent that A belongs to no B.'

(CC-A)

Vx (Bx-»QAx)

A Ql-premise

=

Vx (Bx-»Q~Ax)

.

some B is contingently

A'

converts to 'some B

is contingently not A':

(CC-I)

=

lx(Bx&QAx)

=

Hx(Bx&Q~Ax)

.

Robin Smith sums up the goings on here nicely: "we may add
or remove 'not' within the scope of 'possible' with

preservation of equivalence" [Smith, 1989,
course. Smith means

possible'

p.

125]. Of

in the sense of 'contingent.'

And Aristotle's own comments make clear that it is only

contingent premises that convert in this way:
For since what is possible is not necessary, and
it is possible for what is not necessary not to
belong, it is evident that, if it is possible for
A to belong to B, then it is also possible for it
not to belong, and, if it is possible for it to
belong to every one, then it is also possible for
it not to belong to every one, (32a36-40).

One of the most interesting features of complementary

conversions is that for Aristotle both the original

propositions and the propositions that result from the
161

)

)

CC conversions are affirmative in form, and not
privative,

32bl-2

So,

.

according to Aristotle, each of the following is

an affirmative statement:
Vx Bx->QAx
Vx Bx->Q~Ax
(
(

3x

(

lx

(

Bx&QAx
Bx&Q~Ax

Earlier in that part of Chapter A3 that is clearly about
contingency, Aristotle makes the same point:

being possible [contingent] to belong to none or
not to some' has an affirmative form. For 'is
possible' is arranged similarly to 'is,' and 'is'
always and in all ways makes what it is added to
in predication an affirmation, (25b20-23).
This suggests that Aristotle doesn't think there is any

difference in truth value between Vx( Bx->QAx) and Vx(Bx->Q~Ax)
when A and B are the same in each. From this it seems that

a

difference in truth value comes about only through changing
the subject term.
In order to see how complementary conversions work in

the actual syllogisms,

it is

necessary first to discuss

another matter that arises in the problematic syllogistic --

ampliated contingent premises.

7

.

4

Ampliation
An ampliated contingent premise is just a regular

Q-premise whose subject term is qualified by a (de re)
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.

.

modal. Consider an example:

every B is contingently A.

1

The

regular unampliated reading is Vx (Bx-*QAx) or its equivalent,
Vx(Bx->Q~Ax)

.

In both of these the only term that is modally

qualified is the predicate term. The ampliated reading puts
a

separate modal on the subject term as well. As for

instance, Vx(MBx^QAx) and V x (MBx^Q~Ax)
of

.

These are examples

ampliation to the possible.' We might also 'ampliate to

the contingent’

and give Vx (QBx-*QAx) and Vx (QBx->Q~Ax)

.

Why do we need ampliation at all? Paul Thom
explains succintly:
We need a separate class of ampliated contingencyforms because A13, 32b23-32 notes a syntactic
ambiguity in the expression 'kath' hou to B, to
endechesthai
it appears from that text that
contingency-propositions may be either ampliated
or unampliated. 2 [Thom, 1996, p. 9]
'

.

Aristotle is less succint:
the expression ' it is possible for this to
belong to that’ may be understood in two ways: it
may mean either 'to that to which this belongs’ or
'to that to which it is possible for this to
belong.’ For 'of what B is true, it is possible
that A’ signifies one or the other of the
following: 'of what B is said’ or 'of what it is
possible for B to be said’. But 'it is possible
that A <is said> of what B is’ is no different
from 'it is possible for A to belong to every B.’
Therefore, it is evident that 'it is possible for
A to belong to every B’ might have two meanings,
32b25-32
Now,

(

)

Thom investigates both ampliation to the possible and
to the contingent, but his own account ultimately requires
only ampliation to the possible [Thom, 1996, p. 212ff
2

]
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)

)

Clearly, one meaning involves ampliation. The other
meaning

does not.
xhe

li

aditional view is that ampliation is needed to

validate a^x QQQ syllogisms. A look at the logic makes clear
why it's needed. Consider Barbara QQQ without

ampliated premises:
Vx Bx-»QAx
Vx Cx^QBx
Vx Cx-»QAx
(
(

(

That's not valid. It doesn't follow that everything that's

contingently B is actually

B.

For example, a horse may be a

contingently moving thing because it might move (or not
move), but it doesn't follow from this that the horse is

actually moving. The point is that since something can be

contingently B without being actually

B,

transitivity fails,

and the Barbara above comes out invalid. Ampliating the

premises avoids this problem. Here is Barbara QQQ with
premises ampliated to the contingent:
Vx ( QBx->QAx
Vx ( QCx->QBx
Vx ( QCx-QAx

That's valid, trivially. Ampliating to the possible works
for Barbara QQQ too:
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)

.

Vx ( MBx->QAx
Vx(MCx->QBx)
Vx MCx^QAx )
(

It works here because QBx-»MBx.

Nowhere in his discussion of ampliation does Aristotle
tell us which kind of ampliation he has in mind. He merely

notices that possible premises may be understood as

ampliated or not. He only stipulates that there is

ampliation and leaves it at that. We get no detailed
explanation. In the notes to his translation, Smith looks
for some explanation of this 'rather surprising' new twist:

One consideration may be the need to have a single
middle term in a deduction. If we regard 'it is
possible that A to B as attributing the predicate
'possibly A' to B, and likewise 'it is possible
that B to C as attributing the predicate
'possibly B to C, then these two premises appear
to contain four terms: 'possibly A,' 'B,'
'possibly B,
and 'C.' On the interpretation which
Aristotle advocates, there are only three terms,
and
but they are 'possibly A,’ 'possibly B,
'possibly C.' [Smith, 1989, p. 128]
1

1

1

’

’

This explanation is still ambiguous. Smith seems to mean
that the ampliation is always to the contingent. His point

about the number of terms doesn't hold otherwise, since if
the ampliation is to the possible (M), then Barbara QQQ will

still have four terms:
I

'MB,'

'QB,'

'MC,'

and 'QA.'

think Smith is probably right, but there is more we

might add, given some of the evidence from Chapters
I

5

and

6.

argued there that a good way of explaining the pure

apodeictic Barbara

—

Barbara LLL
165

—

takes the terms to be,

in effect,

'necessarily A,' 'necessarily

necessarily

If that is right,

C.

B,

'

and

then it makes sense to

suppose that when Aristotle came to discuss pure contingent

QQQ syllogisms he adopted the same pattern. Alternatively,
the fact that he seems to adopt such a pattern suggests that
the account of the LLL

1

s

in Chapter

6

might be the

right one.

There's another explanation, too. It might be that

ampliation is just a cover for what is otherwise

a

glitch in

the logic. We might think this because in most of the

problematic syllogistic Aristotle seems to get on well with
just the simple, unampliated Q-premises. There is not any

mention of ampliation in the discussion of complementary
conversions. Later, in Chapter

8,

it emerges that ampliation

isn't obviously a feature in any of Aristotle's Q+Q, Q+X, or

Q+L counter-examples. So, perhaps, Aristotle introduces the

notion of ampliation and, hence, the two meanings of 'some B
is possibly A,

'

simply in order to account for a feature in

the logic that Aristotle noticed but cannot otherwise

explain. This feature would seem to be just that unampliated

QQQ syllogisms are not valid. The various Barbaras above

make clear that this feature of the logic comes about as a
result of a de re reading of the contingency operators. It's

hard to see how ampliation is in any way relevant to

dicto reading.
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a de

)

But look again at Barbara QQQ without
ampliation:
Vx Bx->QAx
Vx(Cx^QBx)
(

Vx(Cx-*QAx)

.

That's invalid as it stands, but it would be valid
if even

only the first premise were ampliated. Look at

a

valid

instance of Barbara QQQ taken this way:
All contingently moving things are contingently white
All animals are contingently moving things
All animals are contingently white.

The ampliated premise raises a question about meaning. The

remarks at 32b25-32 indicate that for Aristotle the

ampliated and unampliated senses of 'all
A'

do not mean the same thing.

B are

contingently

'All moving things are

contingently white' would seem to be about all actually
moving things. The first premise in the syllogism above,
'all contingently moving things are contingently white,'
a

is

much weaker statement since it is about all the things

that are actually moving (if there are any) and all the

things that could be moving (but maybe aren't). While that

might seem like a good way of accounting for the ampliated
premise, it isn't clearly in accord with some of Aristotle's

other notions about logic and predication. In various other
logical works, Aristotle makes clear that he does not want
to ever admit accidents of accidents;

certainly there are no

syllogisms from premises that predicate accidents of
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accidents. The structure of the ampliated premise
above

involves predicating an accident of another accident
and,
so,

violates the 'no accidents of accidents' principle.

There is a tension between what ampliation requires
and what
Ai.j_oi.otle

explicitly rules out. Perhaps the way to try to

understand an ampliated premise such as 'all contingently
moving things are contingently white’ is as saying that

everything that
horse, etc.)

s a

is also

contingent mover (e.g.

contingently white.

I

,

every man, every
return to this

matter briefly in Section 7.6 of this chapter and again in
greater detail in Chapter

8.

All of the QQQ syllogisms in the first figure require

ampliation. Aristotle doesn't say so explicitly. And he

doesn't tell us how much ampliation he envisages. So,

I

will

use as little ampliation as the logic will allow. The first

firgure QQQ syllogisms are listed in Table 11.
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Table 11

QQQ Syllogisms in the First Figure (A14)

Barbara (32b38-33al)
Vx QBx-*QAx
Vx ( Cx->QBx
Vx ( Cx^QAx

( 33a5-12
Vx QBx->QAx
Vx Cx->Q~Bx
Vx ( Cx->QAx

(

(

(

Celarent (33al-5)
Vx ( QBx->Q~ Ax

(

33al2-17

Vx ( Cx-»Q~Ax

Vx QBx->Q~ Ax
Vx Cx->Q~Bx
Vx Cx^QAx

Darii (33a23-25)
Vx(QBx^QAx)
3x Cx&QBx
3x( Cx&QAx)

33a27-34
Vx QBx->QAx
3x Cx&Q~Bx
3x Cx&QAx

)

(

Vx(Cx^QBx)

)

(
(

(

(

(

(

(

Ferio (33a25-27)
Vx ( QBx-»Q ~ Ax )
Hx ( Cx&QBx
3x ( Cx&Q~Ax

The syllogisms in the left-hand column are all of a
kind. Their validity depends on simple transitivity. The

syllogisms in the right-hand column all depend on the fact
that for Aristotle what is contingently

contingently

not-4>.

<p

is also

As Aristotle explains the syllogism at

33a5-12, what is needed is conversion 'in accordance with

possibility.

1

So the proofs for each of the right-hand

syllogisms require CC-conversions

.

To show how complementary

conversion works here, consider a proof of the syllogism at
33a5-12
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

)

)

Vx QBx-»QAx
Vx Cx->Q~Bx
Vx Cx->QBx
Vx ( Cx->QAx

Given
Given
Complementary Conv
Barbara (3) (1)

(

(
(

.

(

2

The syllogism at 33al2-17 requires complementary conversion
of each of its premises:

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Vx QBx->Q~Ax
Vx ( Cx->Q~Bx
Vx ( QBx-»QAx
Vx ( Cx->QBx
Vx Cx->QAx

Given
Given
Complementary Conv.
Complementary Conv.
Barbara (4), (3)

(

(

(1)
(2)

The syllogism at 33a27-34 requires only complemetary

conversion of the minor premise. 3x(Cx&Q~Bx) converts to
^x

(

CxScQBx

) ,

and the syllogism becomes Darii QQQ,

listed in

the left-hand column of Table 11.

Ampliation doesn't cause any problems in the second
figure because there aren't any valid second figure QQQ

syllogisms. Aristotle rejects all Q+Q premise combinations
in Chapter A17. All but one of these depend on

E-conversions, and according to Aristotle there is no
QE- conversion

.

In Section 7.6,

I'll look closely at his

explanation of this.
There are valid QQQ syllogisms in the third figure.

Aristotle discusses these syllogisms in Chapter A20.
them in Table 12. Again,

I

I

list

try to use the minimum amount of

ampliation. As Table 12 shows, the valid QQQ syllogisms in
the third figure need not have ampliated premises, but they
all must have ampliated conclusions.
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Table 12

QQQ Syllogisms in the Third Figure (A20)

Darapti (39al4-19)

(

Vx ( Cx-»QAx

39a26-28

Vx Cx->Q~ Ax
Vx Cx-»Q~Bx
lx QBx&QAx
(

Vx(Cx^QBx)
x QBx&QAx

)

(

(

(

Fe lap ton (39al9-23)
Vx Cx->Q~Ax
Vx Cx&QBx

39a38-b2
Vx Cx->Q~ Ax
lx Cx&Q~Bx
(

(

(

(

!x

(

(

QBx&Q~Ax

lx QBx&QAx
(

Datisi

(

39a31-35

(

Vx ( Cx->QAx
lx ( Cx&QBx
lx (QBx&QAx)

39a38-b2

lx Cx&Q~ Ax
Vx Cx->Q~Bx
lx QBx&QAx
(
(

(

Disamis (39a35-36)
lx Cx&QAx
Vx Cx-»QBx
lx QBx&QAx
(

(
(

Ferison (39a36-38)
Vx ( Cx-»Q~Ax
Hx Cx&QBx
(

lx ( QBx&Q~Ax
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)

xhe syllogisms in the left-hand column do
not require any

complementary conversions. Aristotle certainly is
aware of
consider

,

for instance, his account of the

conversions needed for the first syllogism in Table
12,
Darapti 39al4-19. Aristotle makes no mention of

complementary conversion there; instead, he says:
Then,

since the affirmative premise converts in
and it is possible for B to belong to every
C, it would be also be possible for C to belong to
some B, (A20, 39al5-17).
A valid de re reading of this would seem to be

(

QA

’

)

Vx(Cx-^QBx)

-4

3x ( QBx&Cx )

.

The particular conversion would then be

(

QI

'

)

3x Cx&QBx )
(

-*

3x QBx&Cx
(

)

.

And in fact (QA') and (QI') are all that is needed to get
the left-hand syllogisms right. So, here in the third figure
it seems that Aristotle is using QA- and Ql-conversions

,

but

they aren't anything surprising -- they are simple

substitution instances of ordinary assertoric A- and
I-conversion, with a modal term QB for
(QI') are trivially valid.

B.

And so (QA') and

The proof for Darapti (39al4-19)

would seem to be as follows:

172

))) )))

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

)

Vx Cx-»QAx
Vx Cx-»QBx
3x ( QBx&Cx

.

Given
Given
QA'-conv (2)
Transitivity (3)

(
(

lx ( QBx&QAx

The proof of the Disamis at 39a35-36 involves an
interesting

new twist. It appears that ampliated premises must

also convert:

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

3x ( Cx&QAx
Vx ( Cx->QBx
lx QAx&Cx

Given
Given
QI -conv
1
Transitivity (3), (2)
Ampliated QI -conv (4)
'

(

(

QAx&QBx
x QBx&QAx

lx

(

'

(

Ampliated QI -conversion, just as unampliated
'

QI -conversion,
'

and LI- and Mi-conversion,

is a substitution

instance of ordinary assertoric I-conversion with modal
terms for non-modal terms. So it's valid and unproblematic.
The situation is the same for ampliated QA -conversion
'

The syllogisms on the right-hand side of Table 12 all

involve complementary conversions. To explain the syllogism
at 39a26-28, Aristotle notes that if 'is possible to belong'
is substituted for 'is possible not to belong,’

then the

syllogism becomes the first figure. This is just

complementary conversion. The proof of the syllogism at
39a26-28 would seem to be as follows:

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Vx ( Cx-»Q~ Ax
Vx Cx-»Q~Bx
Vx Cx-»QAx
Vx(Cx-»QBx)

Given
Given
Complementary Conv. (1)
Complementary Conv. (2)
QA'-Conv. (4)
Transitivity (5), (3)

)

(
(

lx

(

QBx&Cx

3x QBx&QAx
(

173

)) ))
)

)

The last two syllogisms in Table 12 will be proven

similarly. Aristotle tells us that there will not be a

deduction through the actual premises taken in the
syllogisms at 39a38-b2. But when they are converted
[clearly, he means by complemetary conversion] then there

will be a deduction, 39b2. So the proofs would seem to be:

7

.

5

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Vx(Cx->Q~Ax)
3x Cx&Q~Bx
Vx ( Cx-*QAx
3x Cx&QBx
3x QBx&Cx

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

3x Cx&Q~ Ax
Vx Cx-»Q~Bx
3x ( Cx&QAx
Vx(Cx-»QBx
3x QAx&Cx
3x(QAx&QBx)
3x QBx&QAx

Given
Given
Complementary Conv. (1)
Complementary Conv. (2)
QI -conv 4
Transitivity (5), (3)

(

(

1

(

(

3x(QBx&QAx

Given
Given
Complementary Conv. (1)
Complementary Conv. (2)
QI -conv 3
Transitivity (5), (4)
Ampliated Ql'-conv (6)

(
(

)

)

)

'

(

(

(

)

Trouble with Q+X Syllogisms
First figure Q+X syllogisms divide into three sorts.

Aristotle deals with them all in Chapter A15. He begins his
discussion with some careful distinctions:
If one of the premises is taken as belonging and
the other as possible, then, when the premise in
relation to the major extreme [the BA-premise]
signifies being possible, all the deductions will
be both complete and of being possible according
to the stated determination, (33a25-28).

So Barbara QXQ, Celarent QXQ, Darii QXQ, and Ferio QXQ are

valid. But these are not particularly interesting, since
174

they are all trivially valid (and don't require
any

ampliation). Matters get more interesting when
the minor

premise is the Q-premise. This is the second sort
of
Q+X syllogism.
However, when the premise in relation to the minor
extreme [the CB-premise] is possible, then not
only are the deductions all incomplete, but also
the privative deductions are not of what is
possible according to the determination, but
rather of what belongs of necessity to none, or
not to every, we also say it is possible for it to
belong to none or not to every, (33b28-33).
3

The specific syllogisms this passage describes are listed in

Table 13. Even though these are in the first figure, they
are all incomplete. As Aristotle explains: "it will also be

clear that they are incomplete, since the proof is not from
the premises taken,

'

(34a3-4). What makes the incomplete

first figure syllogisms especially interesting is the fact
that in modern logic each is invalid. Aristotle, however,

counts them all as valid. His method of 'establishing' their

validity -- he calls his method 'proof through
impossibility' -- is itself dubious.

I

will try to explain

what seems to be going on here. It isn't clear from the text

whether Aristotle thinks of the propositions here as

possible (M) or contingent

(Q)

propositions.

I

have set out

Tredennick explains that 'this is a mistake on
Aristotle's part; the qualification applies equally well to
the affirmative syllogisms' [Tredennick, 1983, p. 266]. This
point is generally accepted.
3
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the syllogisms in Table 13 using M instead of
Q where

possibly'

in the sense of

'

not-necessarily-not

1

seems appropriate.

Table 13
Proof Through Impossibility in the First Figure (A15)

Barbara (34a34-b2)
Vx Bx->Ax
Vx Cx->MBx
Vx ( Cx->MAx

35a3-ll
Vx Bx->Ax
Vx Cx->Q~Bx
Vx Cx->MAx

Celarent (34bl9-35a2)
Vx Bx-»~Ax
Vx ( Cx->MBx
Vx ( Cx->M~Ax

35all-20
Vx Bx->~Ax
Vx(Cx->Q~Bx)
Vx ( Cx-»MAx

Darii (35a35-40)
Vx Bx-^Ax
3x Cx&MBx
3x Cx&MAx
(

Vx Bx-»Ax

(

^x ( Cx&Q~Bx

(

3x Cx&MAx

(

(

(

(

(

(

(

(

(

)

(

35b5-8
(

(

Ferio (35a35-40)
Vx ( Bx->~Ax
3x( Cx&MBx)
3x Cx&M~ Ax

(

35b5-8

Vx(Bx->~Ax
3x Cx&Q~Bx
3x Cx&MAx
(

(

(

Aristotle explains that when the premises are like
these, the fact that there will be deductions must be proved

through an impossibility, 34a2-3. Aristotle's method raises
several questions. It will help to look at how he tries to

prove Barbara, since many of the problems encountered in
that proof arise with each of the others also. The proof

begins with what appear to be Q-premises:
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Barbara (34a34-b2)
^

(

Bx->Ax )

(2)

7x(Cx->QBx)

(3)

Vx(Cx-»QAx)

let A belong to every B
and let it be possible for B to
belong to every C
then it is necessary for it to be
possible for A to belong to every C

Aristotle seems to have in mind a r eductio proof, since
his
next move is to assume that the conclusion is not
possible.

Later, he tells us repeatedly that any deduction through
an

impossibility is about what is 'not of what is possible

according to our determination [i.e., contingent], but
rather of what belongs to none of necessity,' 34b27-32.

[See

also 34b33-35al; 37al5-29.] So the reductio assumption is,
for Aristotle, about what is possible (M) and not about what
is contingent (Q).

But there is still an ambiguity in this

next step. Aristotle wants to assume that (3) is impossible.
He says only

let it not be possible.

That might mean

'

either that we should assume 3x(Cx&~MAx) or that we should
assume the stronger Vx Cx->~MAx
(

expect to find in

a r eductio,

)

.

The first is what we'd

but Aristotle, rather

surprisingly, opts for the stronger formula at 34a38.
[Compare 34b22-24, 34b28-31.]

(4)

Vx ( Cx->~MAx

(5)

Vx(Cx->Bx)

)

let it not be possible for A to
belong to every C
and put B as belonging to every C

This last requires some explanation. Aristotle says about

premise (5) that it "is false
impossible,'

(

pseudos

)

although not

(34a37). Tredennick [1983, p. 270] takes
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5

)

pseudos' here to mean 'not implied by
the original
premises.' From (4) and (5) Aristotle appears
to conclude
/x

"

(

Bx-»

MAx

then it will not be possible for A
to belong to every B

)

Now, we come to the heart of the problem with

Aristotle's proof. There are two points
here.

In the first place,

even valid assertor ical ly

(

.

4

)

(

) (

6

I

want to focus on

isn't valid.

It isn't

Aristotle doesn't explain how he

gets (6) from (4) and (5); he only stipulates that it
follows:

'Therefore,

if it is not possible for A to belong

to every C and B belongs to every C, then it will not be

possible for A to belong to every B (for a deduction comes
about through the third figure),'

(34a38-40). This is

offered as an example which bears out the principle that
from false but not impossible premises, what results through

those premises will also be false but not impossible,
34a25-27. But Aristotle's application of the principle, in
the proof of the Barbara at 34a34-b2,

The second point

I

want to focus on has to do with what

Aristotle wants the reductio to show.
(1)

is true.

is flawed.

(6)

cannot be true if

Aristotle appears to want to make the

incompatibility of (6) and

(1)

the basis of his reductio.

Having reached (6) by an already dubious method, he
then remarks:
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)

But it was assumed that it is possible for
A
belong to every B. Therefore, it is necessaryto
for
1
to be possible for A to belong to every
C (for
when something false but not impossible was
supposed, the result is impossible),
34a40-34b2
4

«_

(

Aristotle seems to assume that the incompat ibi lty
of

(6)

and

illustrates the falsity of (4), and so establishes the

(1)

original conclusion (3).
There are a lot of problems to disentangle here. Smith
and Ross focus much of their commentary on the fact that

Aristotle is here using 'possibly' in the sense of

necessarily-not
questions.

I

.
’

'

not-

The meaning here does raise plenty of

want to address a different worry about

Aristotle's method that

I

think holds regardless of which

sense of 'possibly' Aristotle uses here. My worry is this.

Aristotle seems really to be dressing-up a very simple
matter. If he has (1) and (2), and assumes (5), then simply

from (1) and (5) by Barbara XXX he gets

(

7

Vx ( Cx->Ax

)

)

.

And since (7) is stronger even than the conclusion Aristotle

wants to prove,

(3)

Vx(Cx->MAx),

(stronger according to the

T-principle) then clearly (3) follows as well. Clearly, too,
(7)

Vx(Cx-»Ax) and (3) Vx(Cx->MAx) both contradict the

In fact, the assumption was not that it is possible
for A to belong to every B, but that A does belong to
4

every

B.
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original reductio assumption,
a

(4)

Vx ( Cx->~MAx

)

.

But there is

very serious problem with all this. The conclusion

Aristotle is after doesn't follow from the original
premises. Aristotle even acknowledges this fact; recall
34a3-4

:

the proof is not from the premises taken.

If the proof depends on having (1) and
(2),

and

assuming (5), then the proof is really that Barbara XXM is
valid. Nothing in this shows that Barbara XQM or Barbara XMM
is valid.

In fact,

they aren't. It seems that what we really

find here is a complicated excuse for putting an M-qualifier
on the predicate term of an assertoric proposition. So long
as the predicate term is an accident,

real problem.

that doesn't present a

(I'll discuss why in Chapter 8.) But if

inserting an M-operator on an accidental term is all that's
needed, then we could just as well get a conclusion without

syllogizing. There may be more to say about the method of

proof 'through impossibility,' but if

I

have represented

Aristotle fairly, then he has goofed. The proofs for each of
Celarent, Darii, and Ferio in Table 13 involve

similar problems.
There is a third sort of syllogism dealt with in

Chapter A15. These involve complementary conversion together

with proof through impossibility. The syllogisms that

Aristotle 'proves' this way are listed in the right-hand
column of Table 13. In each, the Q-premises are first

converted according to complementary conversion. Then
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’

Aristotle appears to shift from Q-premises to M-premises,
and the proofs through impossibilty purportedly validate
his
claims. Aristotle does note that when the premises are taken
as he initially sets them out, nothing necessary will

result.

'For a necessity in no way comes about from the

actual premises taken, but when the possible premise is

accordingly converted there will be a deduction,
(

7

35al4-15

.

6

)

.

[See also 35a3-8;

35b7-9.]

The Failure of OE-Conversion
In Chapter A17, Aristotle sets out to prove that

possible E-premises do not convert in the same way as their

assertoric counterparts:
First, then, it must be proved that a privative
premise of possibility does not convert: that is,
if it is possible for A to belong to no B, it is
not also necessary for it to be possible for B to
belong to no A, (36b35-37).

Aristotle offers a detailed proof to show why this should
be.

In this section

I

will briefly discuss his argument in

order to look at how the failure of this kind of

E-conversion affects Aristotle's count of valid syllogisms.
In Section 7.2 of this chapter

I

tried to see if there

is enough evidence in Chapter A3 to tell clearly whether

Aristotle is discussing possibility
or both.

(M)

or contingency (Q),

It seems to me that most of the evidence there

indicates that in A3 it's mainly M’s. The question of M's or
181

.

Q's comes up again now in Chapter A17. Smith
and Tredennick
aim for neutral translations of endechomenon
Ross, Brogan,
and Kosman think Aristotle's argument in A17
is about

contingency. They are clearly right, as Aristotle's
proof
shows.

I

will explain.

(1)Aristotle's

argument is elegant. He shows that we

don t have
'

Vx Bx-»Q~ Ax
(

-4

)

Vx Ax-»Q~Bx
(

)

by showing what would happen if the conversion were allowed.

Given (1):

Then,

since affirmations in being possible

convert with their denials,

'

by complementary conversion, we

would also have
(2)
(

2

)

Vx Bx-»QAx
(

Vx Ax->QBx

-»

)

(

'But this is incorrect:

)

.

for if it is possible for this to

belong
to every that, it is not necessary for it to be
(3)
possible for that to belong to every this,'
is not allowed.

presumably,

(

2

)

(37a2-3). So,

Aristotle doesn't explain further, but,

is not allowed for contingency because it

isn't even allowed for assertorics. In other words,

(3)

is

is,

an

not allowed:

Vx(Bx^Ax)

->

Vx ( Ax-»Bx

)

.

Aristotle's A-premises only convert in part -- that

A-premise always converts to an I-premise, never to another
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A premise.

If this is how Aristotle is reasoning
here,

then

it seems he will only allow modal
conversions that follow

the formal pattern established by the
assertoric

conversions. Since (3) is rejected for assertorics,

(2)

is

rejected for Q. Since (1) is equivalent to
(2) by

complementary conversion,

(1) must also be rejected.

So,

the

fact that complementary conversion turns a QE-premise
into a

QA-premise is what ultimately rules out the QE-conversions
The consequences for the syllogisms is easy to see. All
but one of the syllogisms in the second figure depend on

E-conversion.

(

Baroco is proven differently.) So all but one

of the QQQ syllogisms in the second figure depend on

QE-conversion

.

Since there is no QE-conversion, Aristotle

counts as invalid all of the second figure QQQ syllogisms
that need conversion. Also invalid are all the Q+X and Q+L

second figure syllogisms that require QE-conversion.
There is, however, a problem that arises for the

interpretations

I

suggest for Aristotle's modal

propositions. The problem comes out of the passage at
37a4-9. Aristotle continues the discussion about why

QE-premises don't convert. At 37a6, Aristotle begins again,
making the same point about why

(1)

is wrong,

but this time

he adds terms in place of A and B. The terms are 'white'
A,

'man'

for

for B:

Assume
<any> man,'

'

it is possible for white not to belong to every

(37a6).
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Vx(Man x

(4)

But,

-»

Q~ White x)

TRUE

according to Aristotle, it is not true to say that 'it

is possible for man not to belong to anything

white,

'

(

(5)

37a7

)

Vx (White x

->

Q~ Man x)

The proof goes like this:

FALSE

'For man of necessity does not

belong to many white things ,'( 37a8

)

—

that is, some white

things are necessary-non-men. This makes (6) true:
(6)

3x White x & L~ Man x)

TRUE

(

'And the necessity was not possible,'

=

(7)
(8)

(37a9).

3x( White x & ~Q Man x)
~Vx( White x -» Q Man x)

If we were to assume that

TRUE
TRUE

is true,

(5)

then by complementary

conversion we would also get (9).
Vx( White x

(9)

->

Q Man x)

(8)

and (9) are contradictories. So (9) must be false. Since

(9)

means the same as (5),

(5)

must also be false. So the

original conversion from (4) to (5) is rejected. So,

QE-conversion again is shown to fail.
Here's a problem. On the interpretation

Chapters

5

and

6,

I

develop in

'some white is necessarily a man’

analyzed as 3x(White x

St

L

Man x)
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.

I

isn't

relied on AristOi_le

s

,

comments in An. Post. A22

,

in order to restrict subject

terms of L-propositions always to substance
terms. This
makes any L-proposit ion an instance of genuine
predication.
Here, in Chapter A17, Aristotle is pretty
clearly analyzing

man of necessity does not belong to many white
things' as
x White x & L
Man x), with the accident 'white'
(

as the

logical subject. From what

I

have said, it would seem that

the analysis ought to be 3x(Man x & L~ White x
), but that is

not the analysis Aristotle appears to give here.

Aristotle has very strong reasons for rejecting
QE-conversion. QE-conversion would make (2) Vx(Bx^QAx)
lx(Ax->QBx) valid,

that he doesn

t

->

and Aristotle is explicit about the fact

want that

.

He seems not to want

(

2

)

because

the assertoric version of (2) is invalid. Aristotle gives

another reason for rejecting QE-conversion. If one term is
an accident and the other is a substance, then Aristotle

won't want the Q-operator to shift from the accident to the
substance. That seems to be at the heart of his explanation
at 37a4-9.

That still doesn't explain why he might want to

analyze 'man of necessity does not belong to many white
things' as 3x(White x & L~ Man x), since that seems to go

against much of what he seems to hold elsewhere about

apodeictic propositions.
Maybe we can explain the analysis like this: Aristotle

clearly says the proposition 'man of necessity does not

belong to many white things' is 'of necessity (ex anankes
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1

)

but what he is talking about in this
passage is really
contingency. So, perhaps, what he has in
mind here is not an

apodeictic proposition at all. Aristotle
does allow
accidents as subjects of Q-propositions

.

It might even be

that the subjects of ampliated Q-propositions must
be

accidents, since they are always in the scope of a

Q.

So,

when Aristotle says 'man of necessity does not belong
to

many white things' perhaps what he has in mind is that
there
are many white things (e.g., horses, swans, pieces of chalk,
etc.) that fail to be contingently non-men (because they are

necessarily-non-men)

.

That would make proposition (5) true,

but would disallow it as a genuine apodeictic proposition.

When Aristotle disallows interpreting 'some white is

necessary man' as 3x(White x &

L

a

Man x), he is talking about

the form of a premise in the syllogistic. It would be absurd
to suppose that Aristotle would deny that in Nature there

are things that are white but of necessity are not men. Of

these things, it would be true that they are white things
that are not contingent men.
That is,

(8)

3x(White x & ~Q Men x). And since Aristotle

does allow Q-propositions with accidents as subjects, this

gives a statement about contingency that he does allow.
All this is a bit tenuous, since there is no direct

textual justification for it. But this way of taking

186

Aristotle isn't obviously at odds with
the text either. The
best I can do now is suggest this as
one way of describing
how Aristotle might be reasoning. In
Chapter 8, I pursue in
more detail some of the issues raised here.
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CHAPTER

8

PROBLEMATIC TERMS

8

•

1

Some

P ossible

Restrictions on Terms

±he results from the last two chapters
suggest that it
is

plausible to suppose that terms in Aristotle's
modal

syllogistic fall into two sorts: the substance terms
and the
a«~«„ident terms.

premises,

I

In accounting for Aristotle's apodeictic

suggested that the valid apodeictic syllogisms

are simply the valid assertoric syllogisms in which
certain
a.

estr ict ions are placed on terms. In particular, restricting

terms to substances seems to answer the traditional problems

about the apodeictic syllogistic and gets the all the right

apodeictic syllogisms valid and none of the wrong ones.

I

want to consider, now, whether in the problematic premises

imposing any restrictions on terms will help make sense of
the results Aristotle claims for this part of

the syllogistic.

Since terms in apodeictic premises appear to all be

substance terms, it would seem that terms in problematic

premises might all be accidents. Certainly, terms in

ampliated problematic premises would seem to fit that
restriction. Some examples might be
(A)

All Q-moving things are Q-white
All Q-moving things are Q-not white

(B)

All Q-brown things are Q-white
All Q-brown things are Q-not white

.

There are two ways we might take these to be true. Consider
(A).

every

'All Q-moving things are Q-white' might be true because
i_hiny

that is a contingent mover (e.g., every man or

horse or whatever) is also contingently white. The (B)

propositions might be true because anything that is

contingently brown, might fail to be brown, and so might be
white instead. But, by reading (A) and (B) this way, we're
not taking

moving' and

brown'

to be the logical subjects

of the predications. We are taking (A) and (B) as though the

real logical subjects are things like men or horses,

i.e.,

substances. Suppose, on the other hand, that 'moving' and
'brown'

really are the logical subjects of the (A) and

(B)

propositions. This would require that there be such things
as accidents of accidents. There is good reason to think

that this can't be right. Aristotle explicitly rules out

accidents of accidents in An. Post., A22, and in Metaphysics
T,

1007blf f

Aristotle doesn't give any examples of explicitly
ampliated premises with terms in place of predicate
variables. And, as noted earlier, in Chapter

7,

ampliation

doesn't sit well with some of Aristotle's other remarks
about predication and syllogisms. In general, his discussion
of ampliation is too sketchy to tell exactly what the right

analysis is. Nowhere does Aristotle tell whether he thinks
of ampliated premises as premises relating two

accidental terms.
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There is, however, plenty of evidence that
shows it
won't always do to restrict premises
about possibility

to

premises about accidents. In the first place,
problematic
premises sometimes involve substantial subjects,
as for

instance,

'all men are possibly white’ or, equivalently,

Aristotle,

'all men are possibly not white.’ Aristotle

for

offers these as true problematic premises at A17,
37a4-9.
Since these premises about possibility do involve
oubs cant i a 1 terms, premises about possibility cannot be

restricted generally to premises that relate two
accident terms.
If a general restriction to accidental terms is too

strong, perhaps a modified restriction will work. One

possibility is that in the problematic premises any term in
the scope of a Q-operator must be an accident. Then, since
an ampliated premise involves two Q-operators, both terms in
an ampliated premise must be accidents. This would allow
'all contingently moving things are contingently (not)

white.

’

It would also allow the unampliated premise 'all men

are contingently (not) white.’ But, the restriction would

disallow 'all contingent horses are contingently white’ as
Vx(Q Horses x

->

Q White x), because 'horse'

is a substance

term and inappropriately qualified by a modal

Q.

That much,

at least, makes good sense.

Even if terms in the scope of a Q or Q-not are

restricted to accidents, it doesn't follow that any
190

:

.

substitution of terms yields a true Q-proposition
Consider

C

)

All chalk is Q-musical
All chalk is Q-not-musical

(C)

Here,

(

it would seem that both (C) propositions are false,

since being musical (though it's an accidental property of

some substances) isn't an accidental property of chalk. So,
it isn't an accident of all substances. We might expect,

however, that Aristotle would say 'all chalk is not possibly
musical’

in the not-L-not sense of possibly.

But then that's

not a Q-prpposition; it's really an LE-proposition

.

And that

isn't evidence against taking terms in the scope of a Q or

Q-not to be always restricted to accidents.

There is, however, a problem with even this
restriction. In Section 7.6,

I

suggested that Aristotle

wants to analyze 'man of necessity does not belong to many
white things' as a premise about possibility equivalent in

meaning to 'some white things are not contingent men’:
3x{White x & ~Q Men x)

.

If that’s right,

then sometimes a

substance term such as 'man' does fall within the scope of a
Q-operator. This would make even the modified

restriction wrong.
So,

is the problematic syllogistic,

perhaps, fully

general with respect to our choice of terms? As we've seen
in Chapter 6,

Aristotle's assertoric syllogistic appears to
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be fully general.

If the problematic is too,

then anytime we

have a valid assertoric syllogistic form, we would then

expect to also have a corresponding valid problematic
°y 1 1 y i s t i
v-',

xorm. But it is clear that this is not right for

Aristotle. It would make all of the second-figure QQQ

syllogisms valid, and Aristotle explicitly rejects them in

Chapter A17. From this it would seem that Aristotle does
somehow restrict terms in his problematic premises. In order
to see what sort of restrictions might be at work,
look, next,

I

want to

at the evidence Aristotle's QQQ counter-examples

provide. These counter-examples make clear which kinds of

premises about possibility Aristotle counts as true, and

which he counts as false.

8

.

2

Counter-Examples Involving Contingency
In Chapter A14, Aristotle discusses those cases in the

first figure in which a syllogism follows from two premises

about possibility. He also describes in the same chapter
four premise-combinations that do not yield any syllogism.
In this section

I

want to look at his comments about these:

If the premise in relation to the major extreme is
taken as particular and the premise in relation to

the minor as universal, then whether both are put
as affirmatives, or both as privatives, or they
are not put as the same in form, or both as
indeterminates or particulars, there will not be a
deduction in any way, (33a34-38).
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:

Aristotle's method of determining invalidity here is
very
similar to the method used for the assertoric
invalids.
Again his idea is to show that 'there will not be a

deduction
a

x

by setting out terms that give true premises, but

a 1 s e conclusion.

Matters are just more complicated by the

addition of modals and by excessive brevity. What Aristotle
seems to be saying in this passage, at 33a34-38, is that for

each of the following premise-combinations, there is no

conclusion
possible-I
possible-0
possible-I
possible-0

+
+
+

+

possible-A,
possible-E,
possible-E,
possible-A.

Aristotle is only considering premises in the first figure,
here, so the pattern in each case will be

BA
CB
CA

where the term on the left is the subject term. In the

assertoric syllogistic an I+A premise pair gives an
I-conclusion relating subject C to a predicate
the modal qualifiers, a possible-I

premise-combination will be:
Some B are possibly A
All C are possibly B
Some C are possibly A
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+

possible-A

A.

So,

adding

xhau this is invalid will be evident from terms,
33b4.

Aristotle explains that we can choose sets of terms in
such
a way that
it is not possible for the first term to belong
to any of the last,' (33b5)
'

and
(i-

So,

—

1

)

it is also necessary that the first necessarily
belongs to all of the last,' (33b6).

when Aristotle gives terms, he gives two different sets
one set to satisfy each condition (i) and (ii).

Terms in common for all cases, for belonging of
necessity, are animal, white, man; for not being
possible, animal white, coat. 33b7-8.

The first set of terms gives:

Some white is possibly an animal
All men are possibly white
Some men are possibly animals
The second set of terms gives:

Some white is possibly an animal
All coats are possibly white
Some coats are possibly animals
In the first case,

the purported conclusion is 'some men are

possibly animals.’ But for Aristotle, that is a false
statement. It is rejected because of (ii) above --

it is

necessary that the first term [animal] belongs to all of the
last [man].'

In other words,

all men are necessarily

animals. A conclusion about possibility might seem alright
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’

if we think of

)

possibly as not-necessarily-not

,

but

Aristotle makes it clear that this is not the way
he's using
possibly here. He reminds us of the new definition:

'what is

necessary was not possible,

’

33bl6. So because the terms

admit a conclusion about necessity, Aristotle rejects a

conclusion about possibility. This means that if 'all C are

necessarily

A’

is true,

then 'some C is possibly

A'

must

be false.

The terms for the second case also give a false

conclusion:

some coats are possibly animals.' This

conclusion is rejected because of condition (i) -- 'it is
not possible for the first term [animal] to belong to any of
the last [coat].' No coat is possibly an animal. This is,

plainly, an LE-proposition

.

So,

here,

it seems that

Aristotle rejects a conclusion about possibility -- 'some C
is possibly A'

necessar i ly-not

-- because it is true that 'all C are
A.

Later in Chapter A17, Aristotle sums up his strategy
for falsifying a premise about possibility:
It is clear, then, that as the opposite of what is
possible or not possible in the way in which we
originally determined it, one must not only take
'of necessity belongs to some but also 'of
necessity does not belong to some.’
(A17, 37a28-30
1

So,

to falsify a Q-conclusion Aristotle gives terms for

belonging of necessity and terms for not possibly belonging
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:

(ie,

for necessarily not belonging). That's the
point of the

passage above at 37a28-30. And this explains why

invalidating a syllogistic form involving contingency

generally requires two sets of terms.

1

Since any proposition about possibility (any

Q-proposition) can be denied in either of two ways,
Aj.

io Lutle generally shows that there will not be a

Q-conclusion by giving a set of terms to deny each of the
two ways. Consider a QI -proposition

:

'some C are

contingently A.' This entails both 'some
some C are M-not-A.

'

So,

C are M-A'

and

in order to falsify a

Ql-proposition, Aristotle gives one set of terms to show
that a conclusion cannot be M-not; these are the terms for

belonging of necessity. He gives another set of terms to
show that a conclusion cannot be about what is M; these are
the terms for 'not being possible.'

2

To show that a Q-conclusion doesn't logically follow

from true premises, all Aristotle really needs to do, given

*In Chapters A17 and A19, Aristotle sometimes offers
only one set of terms. I'll look at these cases later in
this section.

Modern logic helps to represent Aristotle's modal
equivalences
2

Q
E

M & M~

E
e
e

~L~ & ~ L
~(L~ v L)
~(~M v L)

def Q
def M
DeMorgans
LM Interchange
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his definition of Q,

is show that when we put the terms in

the appropriate relations, what results in each
case is

really an apodeictic proposition. That is, we get either
an

affirmative or a privative L-proposition
for L-propositions in Chapters

5

and

6,

.

Given the results

we would expect to

find that Aristotle's counter-examples for Q-syllogisms

involve term-triples giving genuine L-conclusions -- that
is,

L-conclusions in which the subject is

a

substance term

and the modal L-operator is on the predicate term. In fact,
that is what we find in all three figures, with a only a few

obvious exceptions. I'll discuss the exceptions later in
this section. Table 14 lists all of Aristotle's term-triples
for the invalid problematic syllogisms. In Table 14
P'

I

use

instead of 'M' or 'Q.' This is because in his

discussions of the invalid problematics Aristotle sometimes
equivocates between the different meanings of 'possibly.'
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,

,

>
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Table 14
Terms in the Problematic Syllogistic
belonging
of necessity

not possibly

belonging

Invalid Q+Q Premise Combinations
A14

33a34-bl7
37a32-bl0
37bl0- 16

<animal, white, man>

II A17

III A20

3 9b 2 -

<animal, man, white>

I

:

:

:

Invalid
I

:

34bl 1-18

A15

Premise Combinations

35bl4-22

<animal, moving, man>
<moving, science, man>^
<white, animal, snow>
<white, animal, snow>
<animal, white, man>

<man, moving, horse>
<raven, reasoning, man>
<white, animal, pitch>
<white, animal, pitch>
<animal, white, coat>

37b35-38

<health, animal, man>

chealth, horse, man>

<animal, man, white>
(same as 3 9b 2 - 6 ?

<horse, man white>

34b33-35a2
35a20-24
3

II:A18

P-t-X

<animal, white, coat>
<white, man, horse>
<white, man, horse>
chorse, man, white>

5b8 - 1

III A21 40al-3
:

)

Invalid
I

:

A16

36a27-31
36b3-7
3

6b 7- 1

36bll-12
36bl2-18
38a26-b4
38bl3-23
38b27-29
38b35-37

II A19
:

III A22 40a35-38
:

P+L

Premise Combinations

<white animal
<animal white
<animal white
<animal white,
<animal white
emotion, animal

,

snow>
man>
raven>
swan>
man>
awake

<white, animal, pitch>
eanimal, white, coat>
eanimal, white, pitch>
eanimal, white, snow>
< animal white inanimate
<white, man, swan>
<white, swan, man>
(same terms)
(same terms)
,

,

<sleep sleeping horse ,man> <sleep waking horse, man>
,

,

Aristotle is unhappy with these terms and notes that
they 'should be better chosen,' (35al-2).
T
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In Table 14,

I

use Roman numerals to indicate whether

the terms should be taken in the order of the first, second,
or third figure. A14, A15, etc., refer to chapters of the

Prior Analytics

.

There are several points worth noticing in Table 14.
Some of them are incidental. For instance, in A17, Aristotle

only offers one set of terms to illustrate the invalidity of
some of the second-figure QQQ syllogisms. The single sets of

terms aren't an oversight. In fact, even the single counter-

examples are unnecessary since Aristotle has already

established that there are no valid QQQ syllogisms in the
second figure at all. The proof of this through terms just

repeats the same point.
In A19,

again, we sometimes find only single sets of

terms instead of the usual paired sets. In A19, 38bl3-23,
for instance, Aristotle considers syllogisms involving an

LA-premise and a QA-premise. He appears to take it to be

a

fundamental principle of logic that from any two affirmative

premises only an affirmative conclusion can possibly follow:
However, if the premises are put as positive,
there will not be a deduction. For it is evident
that there will not be one of not belonging or of
not belonging of necessity, because a privative
premise has not been taken, either as expressing
belonging or as expressing belonging of necessity.
But neither will there be a deduction of being
possible not to belong, (38bl3-18).
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Aristotle gives terms to illustrate that point.
His terms
are Wni

i_e,

swan,

and man,

from which we get the

following premises:
All swans are L-white
All men are Q-white.
But,

from these we will get neither 'all men are possibily

not swans’ nor 'some men are possibly not swans,’ because,
simply, all men are necessarily not swans. That fact is

enough to rule out both

a QE-

and a QO-conclusion

.

But

Aristotle doesn't give terms to show that an affirmative
conclusion doesn't follow. All he says is 'Nor, indeed, will
there be a deduction of the opposite affirmations, since B
has been shown as of necessity not belonging to C,

(38b20-21). This appears to mean that neither an assertoric

affirmative, an apodeictic affirmative, nor

a

problematic

affirmative follows from the premises taken. Aristotle's
general practice in cases like this is to set out a second
set of terms to establish this.

Some of the evidence presented in Table 14 is not so

easy to explain.

I

want to look now at some of the more

serious troubles about the terms Aristotle offers for the

problematic invalids.
All but three of the purported conclusions from Table
14 are

genuine apodeictic propositions. This isn't difficult

to see when we decode Aristotle's term-tr iples
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In Table 14,

list the terms in the order <A,B,C>. The
patterns for each
of the three figures is as follows:
I

I

11

BA
CB
CA

III
CA
CB
BA

BA
CA
CB

where the term on the left gives the subject, and the
term
on the right gives the predicate. So in the first figure,

any purported conclusion will relate a C subject and an A

predicate. Where C is 'snow' and A is 'white,'

purported conclusion will not be

a

3

the

genuine apodeictic

proposition. But, as noted in Chapter

6,

Aristotle routinely

treats this as a premise about necessity. The case is

similar when C is 'pitch' and A is 'white': just as it's
true for Aristotle that all swans are necessarily white, it
is true that all pitch is necessarily not white.

In the second figure,

always have

a C

the purported conclusion will

subject and a B predicate. All but one of

the term-triples in the second figure give genuine

apodeictic CB-propositions
interesting, and
In A19,

I

.

The lone exception is very

want to look at it closely.

38a38-b3, Aristotle investigates the results of

combining a QE-premise and an LA-premise in the second
figure. He tells us that in such a case there will not be a

deduction, and he offers the term-triple <motion, animal,

3

A15

,

35a20-24

;

35b8-14; and A16, 36a27-31.
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awake> to show that the purported conclusion cannot
be about
not belonging. That is, a proposition about belonging
comes

about from the terms:

Moreover, it is also possible for B to belong to C
when these things are supposed. For nothing
prevents C being under {hupo) B, it being possible
[Q] for A to belong to every B, and A belonging of
necessity to C, as for instance if C is awake, B
is animal, and A stands for motion: for motion
belongs of necessity to what is awake, it is
possible [Q] that it belongs to every animal, and
everything awake is an animal. It is evident,
then, that neither is there a deduction of not
belonging, given that when the terms are like this
it is necessary for B to belong to C, (38a38-b3).
The statement

'

it is possible that motion belongs to every

animal' appears in surface form, at least, to be an

affirmative Q-premise. But earlier in 38al3-17, when he sets
out the general method of Chapter A19, Aristotle makes clear

that he's concerned in this chapter with premise-

combinations involving a privative and an affirmative. A19
is about the second figure,

and all syllogisms in the second

figure have at least one privative premise. But in the

passage quoted above, it looks as though Aristotle uses two

affirmative premises. There is, however, a sense in which
'it is possible that motion belongs to every animal' might

be considered a privative. Since it is a Q-premise, it is

equivalent to

'

it is possible that motion does not belong to

every animal.' Putting it formally,
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Vx (Animal x
Vx (Animal x

-»

->

Q-Moves x)
Q-not Moves x).

Ordinarily, Aristotle calls both of these affirmatives,
but
here in A19 he appears to think of
\/x(Animal x

->

Q-not Moves x)

as a privative Q-premise. This would make the syllogism
in question:

Vx (Animal x

->

Q-not Moves x)

Vx( Awake x -» T, -Moves v)
Vx (Awake x a Animal x)

And this seems to fit Aristotle's discussion well.

Aristotle sums up this passage saying 'It is evident,
then,

that neither is there a deduction of not belonging,

given that when the terms are like this it is necessary for
B to belong to C,

'

(38b2-3).

It isn't clear whether the

necessity here is de dicto or de re. if it is de dicto

,

then

this remark seems simply to describe the necessity of the

conclusion given true premises in a valid form. That's

nothing troublesome or surprising. If the necessity here is
de re, then it seems that Aristotle is taking the conclusion
to be an L-proposition

:

Vx(Awa/ce x

-*

L -Animal

x).

Clearly,

this isn't a genuine apodeictic proposition. Neither,

however, is the premise Vx(Awake x

-»

L-Moves x), and the

modality of this premise will be a problem no matter what we
say about the conclusion.
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This passage in A19 presents what

I

think is the single

biggest counter-example against the interpretation
for apodeictic propositions.

say about it.

I

suggest

It’s difficult to know what to

It is worth noting,

however, that no other

passage presents quite the difficulties this does.

Mocters are only slightly more straightforward in the
t_h i

j_

j_

igur e counter-examples.

In the third figure,

the

Pu^pO^tsd conclusions will always relate a B subject and an
A predicate.

In Chapter A22, Aristotle is again full of

surprises. He gives two sets of very unusual terms:
<sleep, sleeping horse, man>
<sleep, waking horse, man>

These are entirely unprecedented. Nowhere else in the

syllogistic does Aristotle ever use complex terms.
Let's look closely at how he wants to use these terms
in A22,

40a33-38. He begins by taking the minor premise to

be affirmative and necessary. When the minor extreme is like

this,

and the major is privative and contingent

4
,

then there

will not be a deduction in the third figure. Look at what we
get putting in the first set of terms:

"This involves taking a premise of the form Vx(Cx->Q~Ax)
to be, in some sense, privative. Again, this goes against
Aristotle's earlier stipulation that propositions of the
form Vx(Cx->Q~Ax) are affirmatives and so equivalent to
Vx(Cx-»QAx). The sense of the present passage requires that
there be privative Q-propositions The reason here is the
same as in 38a38-b3.
.
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nxx men are contingently (not) sleeping
All men are necessarily not sleeping-horses
sleeping-horses are necessarily asleep

The second set of terms gives:
All men are contingently (not) sleeping
All men are necessarily not waking-horses
All waking- horses are necessarily not sleeping
I

give the purported conclusions as L-propositions because
says from these premises, the conclusion 'may both

belong necessarily to all and also be possible to belong to
none,

(40a35-37). Robin Smith offers a different reading:

he suggests it might be a good idea to take the necessity

here to be the kind of necessity that relates syllogistic

premises to conclusions [Smith, 1989,

p.

139]. This is a de

dicto necessity. But the fact that Aristotle says the

conclusion may both belong necessarily and also be possible
to belong to none

,

suggests that, whatever he has in mind

here, de dicto isn't really what he means.

'Belonging

necssarily and being possible to belong to none' is the
standard de re formula Aristotle uses to illustrate the
falsity of Q-propositions

More troubling than the actual terms Aristotle gives in
A22 is the fact that he appears to give them in order to

invalidate a third-figure QE

+

LA premise-combination. Since

he counts the third-figure Felapton QXQ as valid in A21,

39bl7-22,

it seems that he should really count the QE
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+

LA

)

)

)

)

combination in A22 as valid also, though the conclusion
ion
should then be a QO-proposition

To see this, compare the

.

logical structure of the rejected A22-syl logism
with
Fe lap ton QXQ:

Fe lap ton QXQ
Vx(Cx-»Q~Ax
Vx Cx->Bx

A22 QE + LA
Vx Cx->Q~ Ax
Vx Cx->LBx
Vx Bx->Q~ Ax
invalid)
:

(

(

Bx&Q~Ax
valid)

-lx
(

(

)

(

*

(

(

Since the CB-premise converts from a universal to a

particular, one would expect that the conclusion in each of
the above cases would be a particular-proposition. Aristotle

doesn't explain why he wants

a

universal conclusion in A22.

Perhaps a good way to answer the problems here is just
to say that when Aristotle sets out terms for the Q+L

invalids, he is particularly sloppy. So perhaps the troubles

we find in Chapters A19 and A22 are really just the result
of simple carelessness. That may not be a very satisfying

answer, but it does seem that this last section of the

syllogistic involving Q+L premise-combinations is by far the
least polished part of the syllogistic. When we set aside
the handful of problems here, what remains of the

problematic syllogistic is largely coherent and sits well
with the results of the apodeictic syllogistic. In the next
section,

I

will show why.
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Interpreting O-Propositions

3

I

want to return for the moment to the counter-example

from the first set of terms in A14, 33a34-bl7.
This is the
first entry in Table 14 -- <animal, white, man>
Aristotle
.

<~lcaj.

ly offers this as an invalid, instance of

Some B are possibly A
All C are possibly B
Some C are possibly A.

Any invalid instance shows that the syllogistic form is
really invalid. That means that Aristotle takes the premises
as true, but the conclusion as false. The terms he offers

make the premises

some white is possibly an animal' and

'all men are possibly white.’ This last seems

straightforward. In modal LPC it goes to
1x{Men x

->

Q -White x)

.

And the term under the Q is the

accidental term. But what is the right modal LPC analysis of
'some white is possibly an animal

1

?

Suppose that the right analysis is

3x(White x & Q~Animal x)
to what Aristotle says,

.

If this were right,

then contrary

the syllogism would really be valid.

Further, we would then need to know what counts for

Aristotle as a contingent animal. Since anything that is
is,

by definition, both

M<j)

and

Qc{>

anything that is a

contingent animal is both possibly an animal and possibly
not an animal. And that seems not to make good sense. To see
why,

consider the following Q-propositions
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.

(E)

Some white things are Q-animals
Some white things are Q-not animals

These two propositions are, for Aristotle,
equivalent in
meaning. But what do they really mean? There
are two ways we
might try to explain.
In the first place, we might recall the
L-not Principle

from Section 6.7. The L-not Principle allows that
for any

subotance

$,

L(}>

is

equivalent to

L.

~

So anything that's

not-necessar i ly an animal is necessari ly-not an animal. This
worked on the assumption that for any substance
is just the same as to be

As,

L4>.

cj>,

to be

(j)

for instance, to be an

animal is to be necessarily an animal, or essentially an
animal. On the other hand, consider something that is not an
animal. Then it is not a necessary animal. By the L-not

Principle, it is also necessari ly-not an animal. So it is

not-possibly an animal. This would seem to hold no matter
what our sense of possibility. Looking back to (E) now, if
some white things are animals, then they are necessarily
animals, and so they cannot be contingently animals. If the

white things are not animals, then they are not-possibly
animals, and so, this way too, they cannot be

contingently animals.
Aristotle does talk in the Physics and later in

Metaphysics

G

about 'potentiality.'

describes why a seed is not
is.

a

In Metaphysics 07,

he

potential man but an embryo

If Aristotle means that an embryo is not a man,
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but is a

’

.

possible man, then some of what I’ve said
here might be
wrong. Anything that is a potential man
is certainly
a

potential animal. But it is not clear whether
the

potentialities dealt with in the Physics and in
the
Metaphysics are in any way included in the Prior
Analytics
follow Paul Thom in assuming that they aren’t
included; if
they are included, then much of what I have been
arguing
I

will need to be revised.
L«=(_

o

return to the question about how to understand

the propositions in (E). There is a second way we might
try
1

them.

In earlier chapters

I

have often made a

distinction between logical structure and surface structure.
I

rciied on that distinction in order to get clear about

which term really functions as the subject of a proposition.
Given the results in Chapter

we might expect that if the

6,

propositions in (E) are true for Aristotle, then he is
taking the logical subject in each case to be 'animal.
So suppose that lx{White x & Q-Animal x) is not the

right analysis of

some white is possibly an animal.’

Aristotle clearly offers this as a true proposition. But
perhaps the underlying logical structure of the proposition

disallows 3x(White x

&

Q-Animal x) for the same sort of

reason that 'some white is a necessary man’ cannot be

analyzed as 3x(White x

Si

L -Man

x).

Perhaps, in the case of

affirmative premises about possibility, such as 'some white
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possibly an animal,’ a substance term cannot
come under
the scope of a Q.
is

This might appear to be ad hoc

,

since in Section 7.6,

I

suggested that 'some white things are contingently
not men'
is analysed as 3x{White x & Q-not Men x). And
that does put
a

substance term under a

Q.

But the apparent difficulty here

can, perhaps, be explained away.
It would seem that

(1)

some white thing is Q-man'
as 3x( White x & Q-Man x)

isn't allowed because there is nothing in Aristotle's

metaphysics that's a Q-man since 'man' is a substance and
anything that's a substance is what it is essentially. On
the other hand,

(2)

'some white is not-Q man'
as 3x( White x & ~Q Man x)

is allowed,

for reasons given in Section 7.6.

Why might

(2)

be alright but not (1)? The answer would

seem to depend on the fact that (2) is privative and so

doesn't violate any of Aristotle's metaphysical doctrines.
There are things in Nature that are not-contingently men -e.g., horses and pieces of chalk. But there are not things
in Nature that a re contingent men.

(Of course,

I

am still

assuming here that there is no place in Aristotle's logic
for Aristotelian potentialities.) So (1) is not allowed.
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If we take

some white is Q-animal

is really 3x(Animal x

Q White x ),

St

'

as true because it

then we still have true

premises and a false conclusion. From true premises
Some white is Q animal
All men are Q white

(3)
(4)

3x{Animal x & Q White x)
Vx (Men x
Q White x
)

no Q-conclusion about men and animals follows. It is false

that

some men are Q animals' because it is true that all

men a^e necessarily animals. So only when we analyze

white is Q animal' as 3x(Animal x

St

some

Q White x) does

Aristotle's counter-example work. Taking the premise to be
3x(White x

St

Q-Animal x

)

makes it false, and so cannot be

the basis of a proof of invalidity, since that depends on

having all true premises. So only when we analyze 'some

white is Q animal' as 3x {Animal x & Q White x) does

Aristotle's counter-example work.
What all of this suggests is that Aristotle's ideas
about problematic predication, like apodeictic predication,
are not merely linked to his metaphysical notions, they are
in fact dependent on them.

3x(White x

St

This is what makes

Q-Animal x) an inappropriate analysis of 'some

white is contingently an animal.’ For Aristotle there are no

contingent animals, and so 3x(White x

St

Q Animal x)

is

false. Since he takes it as true that 'some white is

contingently an animal,

'

3x (Animal x

St

Q White x) must be

the right analysis. And, in fact, the problematic syllogism
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na^e been considering provides independent
evidence that
this is so.
x
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CHAPTER

9

IS THERE A MODAL SYLLOGISTIC?

Is there a modal syllogistic? This might
seem an odd

question, since, of course, in one sense obviously
there is.
uut there is an important sense in which maybe
there isn't.
In this last chapter,

I

will explain what

The results from Chapters

subotan^e

i_erm,

such as

xiiLersubstitu table

.

man,

substance term, then

So,

and

then

6
(}>

show that if $ is a
and L

cj>

are

Being a man and being essentially a man

are the same thing. Chapters
a

'

5

mean.

I

~<p

5

and

and

6

also show that if

cj?

is

are intersubstitutable

L~4>

anything that is not a man is by necessity not

a man;

its essence excludes being a man. A plant or a horse is a

good example of such a thing. Because all substance terms

satisfy the L-Not Principle (Section 6.7), anything is
if and only if it is also

~L<}>.

So the necessary-non-men are

precisely the not-necessarily-men
emerges in Chapters

5

and

6

.

is that

premises are instances of what

L~<j>

I

Another point that

Aristotle's apodeictic

have called genuine

predication. That is, true apodeictic premises predicate

a

substance term of another substance term.
Not every term is a substance term; some terms are

accidentals. Examples of Aristotle's accidental terms are
'white,'

'moving,' and 'musical.' These accidental terms do

not take subject position in L-propositions

under an

L

.

They do occur

or an L~ in predicate position. When they do, an

affirmative proposition is always false and a
negative

proposition is always true.

1

No substance is essentially

moving or essentially musical. Also, no substance
is

essentially not-moving or not-musical. Accidental
properties
are properties that might hold of thing but, equally
well,

might not -- as, for example, a man might be musical or

might not be. We can represent Aristotle’s reasoning this
way:

for any accidental term

$ also

might be

<j>,

any substance that might be

Since moving and not-moving are only

~cj>.

accidental properties of a substance, it is clear that
accidental terms can fall within the scope of a modal

Q.

It

is important to note that in one of his metalogical proofs,

Aristotle does put

a

substance term under the scope of a

Q;

see Section 7.6. But, perhaps more importantly, none of

Aristotle's examples of syllogisms or counter-examples put
substance terms under Q's. In the syllogisms and counterexamples, only accidental terms are under Q's.
All of the distinctions above fit the way Aristotle

uses terms in his own examples of modal propositions. These

distinctions amount,

I

think, to restrictions on terms.

There appear to be no restrictions on terms in the non-modal
or assertoric syllogistic. But the ways in which Aristotle

There are exceptions to this, since, for example,
Aristotle does take it as true that swans are essentially
white. So swans are L-white. But, as I explain in Section
6.6, there is some reason to think this is a glitch since it
doesn't sit well with many of Aristotle's other comments
about whiteness.
J
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restricts terms in his modal propositions makes
all of his
modal premises just special instances of
assertoric
premises. Modal LI-, LA-

,

and LE-conversions turn out to be

just special cases of non-modal I-, A-, and
E-conversion.

The de re analysis set out in Chapters 2-4 makes
this clear.

Were

our modal is a Q or an M, again, conversions follow

the same pattern as the one established by the
assertoric
conversions.'' These Q and M modal versions are just special

instances of the same assertoric patterns, as Chapters
8

7

and

make clear.
The same is true of the modal syllogisms themselves:

Valid modal syllogisms are simply valid syllogisms that
follow the restrictions on terms set out above. The

assertoric syllogistic provides the basic structure. The
assertoric syllogistic is about syllogisms that are formally
valid. But sometimes we want to know if we can get a

conclusion about necessity or possibility from a syllogism.
In the case of necessity, we start with an assertoric

syllogism that is formally valid, and we ask if we can get
an L-conclusion

.

Aristotle seems to be saying that whether

we can will depend on certain features of the premises we
If they meet certain conditions then we can syllogize

take.

to an L-conclusion.

In determining whether there is a

I do not include Complementary Conversions. These are
based on purely modal considerations and not on any pattern
established by the assertorics.
2
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.

syllogism to an L-conclusion, or on the other hand,
to a
Q- conclusion, then we’re entitled to make certain
non-formal
distinctions. These appear to be dictated by the

restrictions above.
Ii

ior Ar is lo xe cnere is just

is assertoric,

syllogistic' and that

then it is perhaps misleading to talk about

Barbara XaX, LaL, XLL, and LLL, since the apoueictic
syllogisms are noL different syllogisms from the assertoric
ones -- the modal ones are special versions of the

assertorics. This way of taking Aristotle makes his modal

syllogistic seem easy and pretty nearly trivial. Aristotle’s
apodeictic logic doesn't add any extra 'logical' rules. The

problematic syllogistic does add one new rule: complementary
conversion. Aside from that, the rules for the modal are
just the rules for the non-moual subject to the appropriate

restrictions on terms. The Kneales, of course, think this
must make it wrong. 3 But Aristotle's concerns in the Prior

Analytics seem to me to have as much to do with metaphysics
and predication as they do about formal logic.

The results in this work show that validity in the
modal syllogistic is always obtained by substitution in the

assertoric syllogistic. One way we might put the point is to
say that the only logic that Aristotle believes in is the

assertoric syllogistic, and that a modal syllogism exists if

3

See Section 5.6 for a discussion of their views about

this
216

and only if the corresponding assertoric syllogism
exists
and certain restrictions on terms apply.
If all this is right,

then why would Aristotle bother

with the modal syllogistic at all?

I

think the answer is

that he has set out to prove just how powerful his

syllogistic is. He does believe that every scientific
argument can be reduced to a syllogism. The modal

syllogistic is, for Aristotle, a step towards proving this.
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